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January 29 2012

Grèce : « j'ai signé le mémorandum du FMI sans le lire »

Les Grecs ont été stupéfaits lundi dernier, lorsque Louka Katseli, précédemment ministre du travail et de la sécurité sociale (2010) et ministre de l'économie, de la compétitivité et de l'armement naval (2009), révéla n'avoir eu que trois heures pour lire le mémorandum du FMI sur la crise de la dette grecque.

Michalis Chrysochoidis, l'actuel ministre du développement, de la compétitivité et de l'armement naval et auparavant titulaire de la protection civile, a admis dans un entretien à une matinale télévisée qu'il avait signé le mémorandum du FMI sans l'avoir lu du...


// citation par oAnth:


« Je veux clarifier et confirmer ma position. Oui, je répète que je n'ai pas lu le mémorandum. Je ne me suis pas occupé ni du texte ni des procédures de “prétendues” négociations. Je l'ai déclaré sans la moindre fierté. Même plus, je ne dis pas cela pour me décharger de mes responsabilités. Au contraire. Je considère cela comme l'une des plus grandes erreurs de la carrière politique ; parce que j'ai mal apprécié ces moments critiques et étais préoccupé par un aspect mineur, ma tâche de ministre, au lieu de l'aspect majeur, ma responsabilité de membre de la direction du pays.

J'ai dit cela pour insister sur la nécessité pour chacun de changer. Nous étions habitués à faire confiance à chaque dirigeant, à chaque premier ministre ; à voter au Parlement et être d'accord au gouvernement. Ces temps appartiennent au passé et ce modèle est obsolète. Ce qu'il faut, c'est du collectif, de la responsabilité et de la contribution personnelles. […] »


Reposted fromsigalonfrance sigalonfrance

September 03 2011

Why Lagarde is right: Bank recapitalisation is the best strategy

Harald Hau, 2 September 2011

The latest proposed solution to the Eurozone crisis is Eurobonds. This column argues that such a move would be politically poisonous and would shift the losses of the continent’s richest to the taxpayer. Instead, Europe’s policymakers should follow the strategy outlined by the new IMF chief Christine Lagarde. She calls for the recapitalisation of banks so that they can absorb the worst of the losses should Eurozone countries default.

Full Article: Why Lagarde is right: Bank recapitalisation is the best strategy



The May 2010 Greek policy was a mistake

It is increasingly clear that avoiding the default of Greece and the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was a big policy mistake (see Wyplosz 2010 and 2011). Some bank economists and bond investors have done their best to manipulate public opinion and, surprisingly, many confused journalists have echoed the narrow self-interest of exposed capital-market investors. But now that the insolvency of larger countries like Spain or even Italy seems possible, the ECB doctrine of "no European sovereign default" becomes simply untenable.
European guarantees for Spanish or Italian public debt are just unacceptable to the French, German, or Dutch taxpayer because of the magnitude of the risk involved.
  • The Finns have already said their farewell to the Greece rescue plan and they cannot be blamed their good common sense.
  • When the full financial burden of EFSF guarantees falls upon the German taxpayer over the next three years, it will become evident that Chancellor Merkel has led her Christian democratic party down a road to political suicide.


Reposted from02myEcon-01 02myEcon-01

July 04 2011



Under what conditions could the IMF promote growth while protecting the people?

Aurélie Trouvé:  Beyond democratization, the IMF must promote an economy governed not by financial interests, but by the goals of sharing wealth and preserving the planet.  In the short term, this means stopping the austerity programs and restructuring public debt, some part of which must be forgiven.  The big lenders must finance this, a plan already propsed by Germany, but under attack from Christiane Lagarde and others. To prevent debt speculation and forestall another crisis, the IMF must disarm financial markets by stringent regulation and the creation of a financial transaction tax heavy enough to generate the hundreds of billions of euros necessary to pursue social and environmental policies.  The Fund must pursue a truly international economic policy by making any country with an unbalanced economy stabilize in coordination with other countries, by monetary controls and active budgetary and wage policies.  Lender countries must not escape these conditions, since their dumping and currency devaluation set up an unfair playing field.  Finally, the IMF could develop a world money to replace the dollar.

Demba Dembélé:
  First of all, the countries of the global South should have a preponderant voice in the decisions of the IMF, to make the Fund serve their own development goals.  For the IMF to promote development, it needs a culture of development.  The current credo is growth at any price, led by exports and open markets: thus the emphasis on the deregulation of commerce, the free movement of capital, the ending of price controls, etc.  In the end, profound change in the IMF can only come at the expense of its autonomy, by placing it under the direction of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.  The choice of a new IMF chief would thus be left to the UN General Secrectary, at the end of a democratic, equitable, and transparent process.

Pedro Paez:
Every action of the IMF, especially in the third world, has been an obstacle to development.  Latin America has had a number of bad experiences.  Adjustment and austerity policies generated a chronic fiscal crisis.  Other options are possible, linked to the formation of a sovereign credit system and the reinforcement of the national currency.  Here in Latin America, we have developed a new architecture for finance and development: the Bank of the South [Banco del Sur], based not only on key currencies, but on local resources and national (and soon, regional) currencies.  The architecture of this new bank is the SUCRE: Unitary System of Regional Compensation, a common currency operating outside of the neoliberal restrictions of the euro as a savings mechanism for international monies.  The Sucre, a kind of mutual credit card among national banks, simplifies exchanges and avoids the use of the dollar. In this way, we no longer have to play with interest rates, and each country has greater space to manage exchange, finance, and commercial policies. Keeping the interest rate low will reduce debt servicing charges for families, businesses, and the State, thus liberating resources for investment in the common welfare. Moreover, those resources will be protected from the attacks of speculators and the fragilities of the international market, so we can use them for jobs and development programs.

Should we get rid of the IMF?


Pedro Paez: The question isn’t whether we should rid ourselves of the IMF, but how we can create a new financial architecture, an international lender of last resort with special drawing rights, based on a governance structure engaged in cooperative regional development.  To do this, we might look to the example of the Bank of the South.  This type of monetary and financial organization offers the possibility of recycling local and regional resources for other kinds of development and opens new technical options on the financial and macroeconomic levels, options capable of changing our relation to the IMF.  This could entirely modify the IMF’s repressive mechanisms, like the austerity plans you see in Ireland and Greece.

Should We Get Rid of the International Monetary Fund? | - PA - 2011-07-01

July 03 2011

June 12 2011

Play fullscreen
Should Greece repudiate its debt?
Language GR - Subtitles EN

youtube permalink
yt-account: kryfos0kosmo

11/06/2011 By George Irvin

With thout delving here into the intricacies of recent exchanges between the ECB and the German goverment, let me recommend the following (1 hour) video film to readers. Inter alia, it cites several precedents for debt repudiation. I think most will agree it raises some very relevant questions.

May 16 2011


[Brad DeLong: No, the IMF Does Not Need Another European Head...] ?

written by oAnth as a commentary to entry-permalink at

The kind of rough language, which is in use here by Brad DeLong, reflects to a high extend a certain financial imperial attitude that points IMHO in 2 directions:

a) the Americans and UK are quite sure, that Mme Lagarde won't make it, because of her more or less open critics she uttered last year in case of the German debts politics concerning Southern Europe and Merkel Germany's  low income policy,

b) Lagarde would be the third French IMF-chief the last 20 years  (after Michel Camdessus 1987-2000 & Strauss-Kahn, from 2007 on). A quite cheap argument but certainly in some other European states' interest, foremost unfortunately in Merkel's and Cameron's.

A political open confrontation between Germany and French could be the result of a by the US provoced opposition to Lagarde's candidature; unnecessary to explain who would be the 3rd winning part as consequence of such a constellation.

Brad DeLong's reaction on Münchau shows a typical reductionist standpoint à la US foreign and financial policy, which is internationally one of the major reasons for local disintegration, balkanisation and hereby sparked tensions.
A short view back might help, what must be considered in the political situation of Europe today.

Since the Greek financial breakdown Europe's politics are completely disintegrated due to Frau Merkel's political mono German orientated economic diplomacy. The multiplicity of interests inside the European Union has been abandoned by Germany's financial and social agenda - what means, that the economic strongest part of Europe decided to follow a national authoritarian guide line, which accelerates the already ongoing rejection against the European Union inside and outside the member states and triggers more and more open resistance against the by the IMF and Germany as economic remedy claimed financial and social hardships.

As a consequence of Merkel's authoritarian IMF policy outlines it takes not too many subsidiary conclusions to understand, why Europe has used so weak measures against the new Hungarian constitution. In fact, it seams much more, that there is a silent laissez-faire agreement with the legal changings enforced by Viktor Orbán.

Arguments inside and outside of Germany which are pointing in the same direction are endless and, I must admit, for Europe's sake, frightening. Merkel's political ruthless opportunism has proven since the beginning of the Greek crisis more than once its disastrous effects.

Btw, I don't ask necessarily for Mme Lagarde as a successor for Strauss-Kahn - nevertheless, she is praised as one of the most capable - but I am asking from the American side for a much more subtle insight in European politics as it is shown here by one of the most renowned US-American economist. This saying I don't want to play down Münchau's rather undiplomatic shooting forward.

At the address of Brad DeLong: to propose Larry Summers as chief of the IMF follows quite frankly spoken directly an already much too wellknown and hardly to forget neoliberal policy with all its consequences we see us in today - it would be worth a new chapter in Naomi Klein's analysis of the Shock Doctrine. A brief brainstorming on the 2nd Clinton term should be rather helpful, likewise in this regard is also to consider a look to the readers' comments in Brad DeLong's blog.

oAnth - Muc - 2011-05-16-19

written as a commentary to permalink at
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