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September 11 2012

Du bon usage de la fin du monde / Patrick Viveret 2012

Crise économique, crise financière, crise politique…. Mais où est l’homme dans tout cela ?

Pour le philosophe Patrick Viveret, la période trouble dans laquelle nous vivons doit servir de levier à une nouvelle conception de l’humanité. Un grand entretien de Laurence Difélix de la radio suisse romande

// écoutez en plus (~60 min): http://jlmi.eklablog.com/du-bon-usage-de-la-fin-du-monde-patrick-viveret-2012-a49944962



Reposted from02myhumsci-01 02myhumsci-01

The Missing Links | 3ammagazine - 2012-09-08

How to say nothing. * A performance of 4’33″ by the BBC Symphony Orchestra. * More tributes to John Cage. * Charles Ball R.I.P. * Great piece by Brian Dillon on John Stezaker. * The Biographical Dictionary of Literary Failure. * Nicholas Rombes on his Blue Velvet Project. * Tom McCarthy interviewed on France Culture. * Male anxiety and the female reader. * Scott Esposito responds to Lars Iyer‘s death-of-the-novel anti-manifesto. * “Writing isn’t a career choice in this visual age. We’re a dying breed.” Lee Rourke. * On an early interview with Malcolm McLaren, 1975 [see picture of Jordan above]. * Joe Stevens‘s photography (including an iconic shot of McLaren). * Jon Savage on Dennis Browne‘s 1978 fanzine, Dat Sun. * Bret Easton Ellis dismisses David Foster Wallace as “a fraud”. * “David [Foster Wallace] was special & the purity of his commitment to his readers & his interest in their well-being was seductive.” D.T. Max interviewed. More here. * Gabriel Josipovici on why Kafka isn’t understood. * The King’s Road music and fashion trail. * The speech Obama won’t give by Steve Almond. * How artists fell in love with chess. * Chris Killen‘s spanking new website. * Matthew Newton on the end of the suburban dream. * Jean Cocteau reads six poems (via UbuWeb). * Why Faulkner, Fitzgerald & other literary luminaries hated Hollywood. * Aleksandar Hemon on the Wachowskis. * “Spaces for contemplation & deliberation have been greatly reduced. Most people don’t spend two or three hours thinking or reading. Books seem to be artefacts from a slower time.” Junot Díaz. * The enduring saga of The Smiths. * Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s passion for looking, not thinking. * Adam Kotsko deconstructs the theories of popular philosopher Slavoj Žižek. * Internet connectivity error, Johannes Lichtman on Joshua Cohen’s Four New Messages. * Marcel Aymé, where have you been all my life? * See something say something, Ben Graves on Alfredo Jaar, bin lids & Mo Tucker. * Jarvis Cocker narrates a documentary on Ziggy Stardust. * Simon Reynolds on Roxy Music‘s debut. * Who was Humbert Humbert? * The New York Dolls in Paris, 1973. * Jayne Joso interviewed. * Midnight tourism with Badaude. * How Google & Apple’s digital mapping is mapping us. * Photoblending the 1906 San Francisco earthquake with today. * “I’m not interested in clubbing together behind some flag of the avant-garde.” Zadie Smith. * And Zadie Smith on the Subaltern podcast. * Geoff Dyer explores representations of reality through the lens of Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness.

Reposted from02myhumsci-01 02myhumsci-01

Redéfinir l’individu à la lumière de sa trajectoire et de ses rencontres

Appel à contributions - Comment articuler les approches et les méthodes pour dépasser un point de vue déterminé et réducteur, ou un point de vue excluant les trajectoires de vie singulières ? Entre historicité, déterminisme et hasard, les sciences humaines et sociales, la biologie ou la philosophie développent des méthodes, des approches et des modes d’explicitation qui amènent à sortir de l'opposition binaire entre déterminisme et hasard. Il s’agit ainsi de sortir d’une tendance forte à figer les individus en des substances anhistoriques et autonomes, de même que d’interroger une conception trop forte du déterminisme, qui reviendrait à en faire la prédétermination de tout ce qui est encore à venir.

 

 

// lisez en plus: http://calenda.revues.org/nouvelle24888.html



September 09 2012

Debt Cancellation in Mesopotamia and Egypt from 3000 to 1000 BC

We must pierce the smoke-screen of creditors and re-establish the historical truth. Repeated and generalised debt cancellation has occurred throughout history.

 

 

// read more: http://www.globalresearch.ca/debt-cancellation-in-mesopotamia-and-egypt-from-3000-to-1000-bc/



September 06 2012

The Missing Links | 3ammagazine 2012-09-02

Christopher Hitchens is a hard act to follow. * Slavoj Žižek on the politics of Batman. * Žižek in conversation with Jonathan Derbyshire. * Full Stop continue their ‘Thinking the Present’ series with an interview with Albert Toscano. * Judith Butler responds to the Jerusalem Post‘s claims of anti-semitism. * What Pussy Riot taught the world. * Hanging out vs. being hanged, HTMLGIANT interview Jarett Kobek. * Niven Govinden interviewed. * You could spend your whole life making films & not invent a character as complex or endearing as Werner Herzog. * From Beatrix Potter to Sebald, Patrick Keiller chooses 10 books whose images are intrinsic to the work. * The accidental history of the @ symbol. * Steven Pinker explains the neuroscience of swearing. * Some 3 million books & countless artifacts were destroyed when Sarajevo’s National Library was burned to the ground 20 years ago. It was a clear attack on the cultural identity of a people. * How time is measured by memory. * Sven Birkerts‘ essay on Sebald’s Vertigo. * Teju Cole on Rubens as a compendium. * And Teju Cole in A Room for London. * Harry Mathews on finding Marie Chaix. * A critic’s manifesto. * 10 things Martin Amis loves to hate. * Against acknowledgments (& Helen DeWitt‘s defence). * This Space on the new Paul Auster. * George Saunders interviewed. * On promiscuous reading. * “The reader is taking these splotches of ink & making them real…a good reader is an artist.” Ron Rash. * The melancholy worlds of Béla Tarr. * Brian Dillon on Barthes (via @TheWhiteReview). * “I seek out subjects that plug into my own weaknesses & my own past.” John Jeremiah Sullivan.

Reposted from02myhumsci-01 02myhumsci-01

Judith Butler | differentia.wordpress ( & yt-playlist - Arte docu) 2012-09-03

“Der Mythos von der conditio humana stützt sich auf eine sehr alte Mystifikation, die seit jeher darin besteht, auf den Grund der Geschichte die Natur zu setzen.” Roland Barthes: Die große Familie der Menschen. In, ders.: Mythen des Alltags. Frankfurt/Main 1964, S. 17

Das Aktivierungspotenzial transzendentaltheoretischer Vorbehalte gegen eine soziale Wirklichkeit, die von einer faustischen Gelehrsamkeit als noch immer aufklärungsbedürfitg in Sachen Menschenrecht qualifiziert wird, dürfte auch in Zukunft nicht so schnell erschöpft sein.
Die Menge der Zumutungen und Kränkungen, die das Subjekt einerseits zu fürchten hat, und das Ausmaß an säkularen Utopien, auf die es andererseits hoffen kann, haben im Laufe der Entwicklung der modernen Gesellschaft Strukturen geschaffen, die sowohl diese Ängste als auch entsprechende Hoffnungen in einen stabilen Kokon eingewebt haben, welcher sicherstellt, dass beides für den Fortgang eines sozialen Differenzierungsprozesses unverzichtbar bleibt. Diese Ängste und Hoffnungen können nicht ersetzt werden, weil jede soziale Wirklichkeit immer angewiesen bleibt auf lebende, auf Lust und Schmerz empfindende Menschenkörper (was auch für Cyborgs gelten wird).
Das liefert Rechtfertigungsgründe für einen philosophischen Materialismus, welcher aber seine Erklärungsfähigkeit verliert, sobald Rechtfertigungstheorien, zu denen auch die von Judith Butler gehört, sich auf Differenz festlegen. Denn ein Recht auf Differenz ist soviel wie die Einsicht in eine Pflicht zu sterben. In dieser Hinsicht gibt es nichts mehr zu rechtfertigen.
So wenig Sterblichkeit eine sozial durchgesetzte Pflicht ist, so wenig ist Differenz ein sozial festgelegtes Recht. Wird aber dennoch ein Kampfgeschrei darüber angestimmt, so darf man sich fragen, was das eigentlich noch soll.

Das spricht nicht dafür, dass eine Lösung für die conditio humana eine reale Chance hätte, sondern nur, dass diese Unverzichbarkeit die Chance liefert, den transzendentalphilosophischen Wunsch- und Alpträumen mit Indifferenz zu begegnen. Da die Natur sich nicht um mich kümmert, was sollte mich da die Natur kümmern? Nicht nur eine Frage für ökologisch bewusste Konsumenten …

Reposted from02myhumsci-01 02myhumsci-01

The great divergence | understandingsociety.blogspot 2012-09-01

It has been ten years since Ken Pomeranz published The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy., a book that forced some real rethinking about the economic history in Europe and China. Along with Bin Wong in China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience, he called for a deep questioning of many of the basic premises of much twentieth century economic history, which was premised on the backwardness and stagnation of China and the dynamism of Western Europe. Industrial revolution and sustained economic growth were unique products of the west, and China was incapable of these transformations at the beginning of the modern epoch -- 1600, let us say.

So the central problematic for "European exceptionalism" was to identify some set of features of western society lacking in China that could account for takeoff. Was it merchant culture? Perhaps Newtonian science? Was it European family and reproductive behavior? Or perhaps it was some feature of Christianity?

Pomeranz doesn't like these theories. More basically, he doesn't accept the premise of European economic superiority in 1600, whether in institutions or ideology. He considers agriculture first and holds that Chinese agriculture was as productive in terms of land and labor as English farming; it was not undergoing involution through population increase; and it supported a rural standard of living that was competitive with that of Europe and England, his primary focus.

Pomeranz doesn't doubt that there were sharp differences in European and Chinese economic development in the 18th century. This is the "great divergence" to which he refers. But he doubts that there are grand socio-cultural explanations for this fact; instead he focuses on contingent conjunctival circumstances that gave England a lead that it maintained for 200 years. These include the fortuitous location of coal in Britain, the fact of New World wealth, and the returns if slave labor in North America. None of these is a deep systemic factor but rather a lucky break for Britain.

Bin Wong adds a different theme to the debate. He recognizes that Europe and China possessed complex political-economic systems that were different from each other. And he agrees that these systems had consequences for development. But he agrees with Pomeranz that neither system is inherently superior. And he calls for an economic history that pays attention to the differences as well as similarities. Each process of development can be illuminated by comparison to the other.

So where is the debate today? This was the focus of a productive conference at Tsinghua University in Beijing last week. Some of the primary contributors to economic history participated, including Robert Allen, Bozhong Li, and James Lee. It isn't possible to summarize the papers, but several themes emerged. The most basic is the need to bring substantially more factual detail to the debate. What we need at this point isn't more theorizing about large causes; it is more fine grained factual discovery across both Europe and China.

Three areas in particular have gotten much more factual in the debate in ten years. the first is agricultural productivity. Historians like Robert Allen and Bozhong Li have substantially sharpened our knowledge of the farm economies of England and China.

Second is the question of the historical standard of living in various places. Essentially this depends on price data, wage data, and a system for comparing consumption across countries. Here too there has been a great refinement of our knowledge. Robert Allen has contributed much of this.

Third is population behavior. The Malthusian theory of the difference between China and Europe is a stumbling block, and of course this theory was created in a fact-free universe. Now comparative historical demography has advanced a long way thanks to researchers like James Lee. The Eurasian Population and Family History Project has now refuted the Malthusian view.

A key idea in the Pomeranz debate is Philip Huang's idea the Chinese agriculture was "involutionary". The work provided by Bozhong Li demonstrates that this theory is simply incorrect when applied to the lower Yangzi River delta. Moreover, China's development after 1970 makes the theory implausible in any case. As Li pointed out at the conference, "It is inconceivable China's modern development could have occurred in the conditions of involution described in the debate." China was clearly not caught in an inescapable involutionary trap.

So there is work to be done still on the origins of the great transformation. And it is valuable for this work to take place with a global and comparative perspective. But most valuable will be detailed factual research that adds significantly to what we know about the past.




Reposted from02myhumsci-01 02myhumsci-01

Henry, Marxist political economy | driftwork.tumblr

…. There are thus two readings of political economy. The first integrates it with the general movement of the sciences towards scienticity and towards the exclusive reign of objectivity through increased idealisation and mathematization. The critique of political economy is the critique of everything that would retain within itself some relations to human beings, life, and individuals. It is a critique of everything that is irreducible  to the objective, to objective forms, to scientific concepts like productive forces,  relations of production etc, etc. This is a reading of traditional Marxism with its scientific and positivistic aim that culminates in structuralism.  The second the critique of political economy in the (other) Marxist sense, is no longer a naive adherence to scientific construction; instead it is really its deconstruction. It sees the whole economy as a simple value for life, as Ersatz, because each economic entity only has meaning in reference to life, and more essentially; because it proceeds from life at each instance….

Michel Henry - Barbarism. (from the section the ideologies of barbarism)

Henry goes onto say that Marxism is infected with the “defective principles of the Galilean project” (with, that is, science and scientism) where  reality and truth are not found in life but beyond it in another world…. Even though he has already stated that the “second” the critique of political economy does not adhere to this barbaric transcendental project, still Henry wants to say that because history exists there are individuals is not the same as to say because there are living individuals  there is a history…

But of course he is wrong they are equivalent and can and must be understood as the same.

link

Reposted from02myhumsci-01 02myhumsci-01
Entretien avec Jocelyn Benoist (1) : Autour des Eléments de philosophie réaliste - actu philosophia

"Né en 1968, professeur à l’Université Paris I, membre de l’Institut Universitaire de France, directeur des Archives Husserl de Paris, Jocelyn Benoist est l’auteur de douze ouvrages, l’éditeur scientifique de quatorze autres ouvrages, et l’auteur de cent quatre vingt articles à ce jour. Il a longtemps œuvré à l’interface de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique, de la philosophie du langage et de la philosophie de l’esprit, et s’est en particulier imposé comme un des principaux spécialistes de la philosophie autrichienne et des origines de la phénoménologie."

// continuez à lire: http://www.actu-philosophia.com/spip.php?article399



Reposted from02myhumsci-01 02myhumsci-01

August 28 2012

Grand Old Marxists

Timothy Snyder

Friedrich Hayek, Paul Ryan, Ayn Rand

A specter is haunting the Republican National Convention—the specter of ideology. The novelist Ayn Rand (1905–1982) and the economist Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992) are the house deities of many American libertarians, much of the Tea Party, and Paul Ryan in particular. The two thinkers were quite different, subject to much misunderstanding, and, in Hayek’s case, more often cited than read. Yet, in popularized form, their arguments together provide the intellectual touchstone for Ryan and many others on the right wing of the Republican Party, people whose enthusiasm Mitt Romney needs.

The irony of today is that these two thinkers, in their struggle against the Marxist left of the mid-twentieth century, relied on some of the same underlying assumptions as Marxism itself: that politics is a matter of one simple truth, that the state will eventually cease to matter, and that a vanguard of intellectuals is needed to bring about a utopia that can be known in advance. The paradoxical result is a Republican Party ticket that embraces outdated ideology, taking some of the worst from the twentieth century and presenting it as a plan for the twenty-first.

Romney’s choice of an ideologist as his running mate made a kind of sense. Romney the financier made hundreds of millions of dollars in an apparent single-minded pursuit of returns on investment; but as a politician he has been less noted for deep principles then for expediently changing his positions. Romney’s biography was in need of a plot and his worldview was in need of a moral. Insofar as he is a man of principle, the principle seems to be is that rich people should not pay taxes. His fidelity to this principle is beyond reproach, which raises certain moral questions. Paying taxes, after all, is one of our very few civic obligations. By refusing to release his tax returns, Romney is likely trying to keep embarrassing tax dodges out of public view; he is certainly communicating to like-minded wealthy people that he shares their commitment to doing nothing that could possibly help the United States government. The rationale that Ryan’s ideology provides for this unpatriotic behavior is that taxing rich people hinders the market. Rather than engaging in activist politics, such as bailing out General Motors or public schools, our primary responsibility as American citizens is to give way to the magic of the marketplace, and applaud any associated injustices as necessary and therefore good.

This is where Ryan comes in. Romney provides the practice, Ryan the theory. Romney has lots of money, but has never managed to present the storyline of his career as a moral triumph. Ryan, with his credibility as an ideas politician, seems to solve that problem. In the right-wing anarchism that arises from the marriage of Rand and Hayek, Romney’s wealth is proof that all is well for the rest of us, since the laws of economics are such that the unhindered capitalism represented by chop-shops such as Bain must in the end be good for everyone.

The problem with this sort of economic determinism is that it is Marxism in reverse, with the problems of the original kind. Planning by finance capitalists replaces planning by the party elite. Marx’s old dream, the “withering away” of the state, is the centerpiece of the Ryan budget: cut taxes on the rich, claim that cutting government functions and the closing of unspecified loopholes will balance budgets, and thereby make the state shrink. Just like the Marxists of another era, the Republican ticket substitutes mythical thinking about the economy for loyalty to the nation.

The attempt to add intellectual ballast to Romney’s career pulls the ticket downward into the slog of twentieth-century ideology. Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, which in its better passages is a paean to modesty in economics, is read by leading Republicans as the formula that intervention in the free market must lead to totalitarianism. This is a nice confident story, with a more than superficial resemblance to the nice confident Marxist story that a free market without intervention would bring revolution. Like Marxism, the Hayekian ideology is a theory of everything, which has an answer for everything. Like Marxism, it allows politicians who accept the theory to predict the future, using their purported total knowledge to create and to justify suffering among those who do not hold power. Ayn Rand is appealing in a more private way because she celebrates unbridled anarchic capitalism: it magnifies inequality and brings pleasure to the wealthy, who deserve it for being so wonderful, and pain to the masses, who deserve it for being so stupid. Hayek thought that we should hesitate to intervene in the market because certainty about economic matters was impossible; Rand thought that the law of the jungle was itself a rather good (and sexy) thing.

Though he now prefers discussing Hayek, Ryan seems to have been more deeply affected by Rand, whom he credits for inspiring his political career. It is likely the combination of the two—the theory of everything and the glorification of inequality—that gives him his cheery, and eerie, confidence. Hayek and Rand are comfortable intellectual company not because they explain reality, but because, like all effective ideologists, they remove the need for any actual contact with it. They were reacting to real historical experience, Hayek with National Socialism and Rand with Soviet communism. But precisely because they were reacting, they flew to extreme interpretations. Just as untethered capitalism did not bring proletarian utopia, as the Marxists thought, intervention and redistribution did not bring totalitarianism, as anti-Marxists such as Hayek claimed.

Hayek’s native Austria was vulnerable to radicalism from the right in the 1930s precisely because it followed the very policies that he recommended. It was one of the least interventionist states in Europe, which left its population hugely vulnerable to the Great Depression—and to Hitler. Austria became a prosperous democracy after World War II because its governments ignored Hayek’s advice and created a welfare state. As Americans at the time understood, making provisions for citizens in need was an effective way to defend democracy from the extreme right and left.

Rich Republicans such as Romney are of course a small minority of the party. Not much of the Republican electorate has any economic interest in voting for a ticket whose platform is to show that government does not work. As Ryan understands, they must be instructed that their troubles are not simply a pointless contrast to the gilded pleasures of the man at the top of the Republican ticket, but rather part of the same story, a historical drama in which good will triumph and evil will be vanquished. Hayek provides the rules of the game: anything the government does to interfere in the economy will just make matters worse; therefore the market, left to its own devices, must give us the best of all possible worlds. Rand supplies the discrete but titillating elitism: this distribution of pleasure and pain is good in and of itself, because (and this will not be said aloud) people like Romney are bright and people who will vote for him are not. Rand understood that her ideology can only work as sadomasochism. In her novels, the suffering of ordinary Americans (“parasites,” as they are called in Atlas Shrugged) provides the counterpoint to the extraordinary pleasures of the heroic captains of industry (which she describes in weird sexual terms). A bridge between the pain of the people and the pleasure of the elite which mollifies the former and empowers the latter is the achievement of an effective ideology.

In the Romney/Ryan presidential campaign, Americans who are vulnerable and isolated are told that they are independent and strong, so that they will vote for policies that will leave them more vulnerable and more isolated. Ryan is a good enough communicator and a smart enough man to make reverse Marxism work as a stump speech or a television interview. But as national policy it would be self-destructive tragedy. The self-destructive part is that no nation can long survive that places stories about historical necessity above the palpable needs of its citizens. The tragic part is that the argument against ideology has already been won. The defenses of freedom against Marxism, above all the defense of the individual against those who claim to enact the future, also apply to the reverse Marxism of the Republican ticket.

The great political thinkers of the twentieth century have discredited ideological systems that claim perfect knowledge of what is to come and present politicians as scientists of the future (remember, Ryan’s budget plan tells us what will happen in 2083). The way to national prosperity in the twenty-first century is surely to think non-ideologically, to recognize that politics is a choice among constraints and goods rather than a story about a single good that would triumph if only evil people would allow it to function without constraints. The market works very well for some things, the government is desperately needed for others, and stories that dismiss either one are nothing more than ideology.

Reposted fromsigaloninspired sigaloninspired

August 24 2012

02mydafsoup-01

The Human Use of Human Beings by Norbert Wiener (1st ed.1950, 2nd ed. 1954) [books.google]

via

----------------------------

// oAnth

cf. WP (EN) - The Human Use of Human Beings is a book by Norbert Wiener. It was first published in 1950 and revised in 1954.

Wiener was the founding thinker of cybernetics theory and an influential advocate of automation. Human Use argues for the benefits of automation to society. It analyzes the meaning of productive communication and discusses ways for humans and machines to cooperate, with the potential to amplify human power and release people from the repetitive drudgery of manual labor, in favor of more creative pursuits in knowledge work and the arts. He explores how such changes might harm society through dehumanization or subordination of our species, and offers suggestions on how to avoid such risks.

[...]



July 29 2012

02mydafsoup-01

Reading Kant in Teheran - Kant lesen in Teheran | in EN as pdf online available - in DE: Süddeutsche Zeitung, p 11, 2012-07-18


oAnth 2012-07-29 -  An English pdf-version is available at http://www.zora.uzh.ch/35935/

----------------------------------------

  
oAnth 2012-07-18 - For those of you who prefer to read it in German -
Roman Seidel: Kant lesen in Teheran, SZ Feuilleton, p 11,  2012-07-18  ( printed edition, not yet online )

July 27 2012

02mydafsoup-01

[...]

Sport erzählt uns auch etwas über die Machtbalance innerhalb der vorindustriellen Gesellschaften, wo sich die sozialen Eliten nicht nur in Republiken wie der Schweiz, den Generalstaaten oder in Venedig, sondern sogar in Erbmonarchien wie Frankreich, der Toskana oder den deutschen Fürstenstaaten verpflichtet fühlten, populäre Sportarten zu sponsern und zu besuchen und – solange sie fit genug waren – aktiv mitzumachen.

„Running for election“ – wie heutige Politiker – war für die Fürsten nicht das Problem, aber sie mussten auch in Alteuropa um die Zustimmung ihrer Untertanen kämpfen. Ein von der Bevölkerung nicht anerkannter Herrscher galt gemäß der frühneuzeitlichen Politiktheorie als Tyrann. Herrschaft beruhte auf gegenseitigem Respekt. Besonders ungeschickten Potentaten nützte aber auch die Unterstützung des Sports nichts. König Karl I. von England etwa verlor wegen seiner Unfähigkeit in der Finanz- und Religionspolitik buchstäblich seinen Kopf. Jakob I. von England hatte dagegen mit der Verteidigung des Sports gegen religiöse Angriffe in seinem „Book of Sports“ große Zustimmung gewonnen.

Bereits der Schriftsteller Juvenal hat festgestellt, dass die Bevölkerung des Römischen Reiches durch „Brot und Zirkusspiele“ abgelenkt und dabei politisch entmündigt würde. Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Sport und Macht hat Soziologen auch in den letzten Jahrzehnten stark beschäftigt. Gelehrte im Umfeld der Frankfurter Schule – und insbesondere Theodor W. Adorno – bezogen eine Extremposition mit der Ansicht, dass Sport nur ein raffiniertes Mittel zur Unterdrückung sei. Dieses in der Bitternis des Exils formulierte Urteil bezog sich aber nicht allein auf den Sport im Nationalsozialismus, sondern gleichermaßen auf den Sport als Teil der amerikanischen Kulturindustrie.[17] Ein Echo dieses Standpunkts findet sich bei dem französischen Kulturtheoretiker Michel Foucault, der Sport als Bestandteil einer gewaltigen staatlichen Disziplinierungsmaschinerie sieht, die seit Beginn der Neuzeit versuchte, die Körper der Menschen zu dressieren.[18]

Wesentlich differenzierter ist die Sicht des Italieners Antonio Gramsci, der zwar wie Adorno die faschistischen Massenchoreographien vor Augen hatte, aber doch dem Sport ein emanzipatorisches Potential zuerkannte. Einerseits sahen er und seine Nachfolger den Sport als Bestandteil einer kulturellen Hegemonie der bürgerlichen, kapitalistischen Klasse, die das Volk mit „Zirkusspielen“ zumal in ­einer Periode zunehmender Freizeit ablenkt und besonders die immer unruhige männliche Jugend in das System einbindet, andererseits setzte Sport als Quelle der Freude potentiell auch positive Energien frei.[19]

Ohne Bezug auf Gramsci verfolgte Pierre Bourdieu, der sich als einer von wenigen Klassikern der Soziologie früh zu Fragen des Sports geäußert hat, einen ähnlichen Pfad, indem er die Klassenbedingtheit der Sportarten untersucht.[20] Seinem Befund nach haben Angehörige der Arbeiterklasse eine höhere Wertschätzung für physische Stärke und ein stark gegenwartsorientiertes Interesse an Kampfsportarten wie Ringen, Boxen, Karate, Gewichtheben oder Bodybuilding, an Mannschaftssportarten mit hohem Körpereinsatz wie Fußball, Rugby oder American Football und an Wettkämpfen, die mit Gefahr und ganzem Körpereinsatz verbunden sind wie Autorennen oder Geräteturnen. Dagegen sähen die Angehörigen der mittleren und höheren Klassen Sport eher zukunftsorientiert im Zusammenhang mit Gesundheit und Sozialprestige. Dies betreffe fitnessorientierte Aktivitäten wie Jogging, Walking etc. sowie Sportarten mit Naturbezug (Klettern, Kajakfahren, Skilanglauf), Mannschaftsspiele mit wenig Körperkontakt (Volleyball, Cricket) oder prestigeträchtige Sportarten wie Golf, Segeln, Polo oder die Jagd, die mit den entsprechenden Clubs und Accessoires zur Akkumulation von symbolischem Kapital dienten.

Die Wahl der Sportart hängt nach Bourdieu also nicht nur von materiellen Voraussetzungen ab, sondern auch von der Mentalität der unterschiedlichen Gesellschaftsklassen in Bezug auf Praktiken des Körpers. Der klassenspezifische Habitus trage entscheidend zur Erhaltung der herrschenden Machtverhältnisse bei, die quasi in die Körper eingeschrieben seien.

[...]


Olympia 2012: Die sportifizierte Gesellschaft | Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 2012-07-27
02mydafsoup-01
[...]


[A]uch in der dortigen Pflichtveranstaltung über 'Die Natur des Rechts' interessiert sich der anscheinend sehr charismatische Professor nicht im Mindesten für die Vermittlung von Wissen. Er besteht vielmehr darauf, dass ein Recht, das seinen Namen, nämlich den 'des Rechten', verdient, ohne eine politische Philosophie undenkbar ist, dass diese aber zugleich für alle politikpraktischen Blaupausen unzuständig ist. Deshalb legt er seinen Studenten in einem langwierigen Prozess gemeinschaftlichen Selbstdenkens eigentlich nur die Frage vor, mit der die griechischen Philosophie gern begann: 'Was eigentlich ist (das Recht)?'

Schon dass er dabei von der Alltagsanschauung ausgeht, zugleich aber nichts lieber zerpflückt als das alltägliche Gerede, erweist Voegelin als den bisher wohl letzten Vollplatoniker von Rang. Er argumentiert denn auch, dass sich die Geltung des Rechts nie vom Rechtssetzungsprozess ableiten lasse, sondern immer auf eine wahre, in der Empirie verborgene Ordnung verweise. Darin könnte man zunächst ein simples Naturrechtsmodell erkennen, und in der Tat polemisiert Voegelin gegen den Positivismus seines eigenen Doktorvaters Hans Kelsen. Interessanterweise aber formt er zugleich Platons Argumentation, dass die staatliche Ordnung der Natur des Menschen entsprechen solle, zu einem regelrechten Partizipationsmodell um. Indem nämlich in der Demokratie jeder einzelne Bürger den Staat repräsentiere, reiche der Horizont der Gesellschaft immer weiter als die jeweilige Machtkonstellation. Solch stark soziologische Akzent war seinerzeit nicht nur völlig ungewöhnlich, sondern scheint teilweise die Überlegungen von Jürgen Habermas zum Verhältnis von Recht und Öffentlichkeit vorwegzunehmen.

[...]


Die wahre Ordnung - sueddeutsche.de 2012-07-25 | Rezension zu

- Eric Voegelin (1901-85) : Die Natur des Rechts. Aus dem Englischen, mit Anmerkungen und einem Nachwort versehen von Thomas Nawrath. Matthes & Seitz, Berlin 2012. 219 Seiten
Die wahre Ordnung - sueddeutsche.de 2012-07-25 | Rezension zu Eric Voegelin: Die Natur des Rechts. 

July 18 2012

02mydafsoup-01

Reading Kant in Teheran - Kant lesen in Teheran | Recommendation - in EN as pdf online available - in DE: Süddeutsche Zeitung, p 11, 2012-07-18


oAnth 2012-07-29 -  An English pdf-version is available at http://www.zora.uzh.ch/35935/

----------------------------------------

  
oAnth 2012-07-18 - For those of you who prefer to read it in German -
Roman Seidel: Kant lesen in Teheran, SZ Feuilleton, p 11,  2012-07-18  ( printed edition, not yet online )
Reposted byiranelectioniranelection02mydafsoup-01

July 16 2012

02mydafsoup-01

[...]

Stevan Harnad, professor of electronics and computer science at Southampton University, said the government was facing an expensive bill in supporting gold open access over the green open access model.

He said UK universities and research funders had been leading the world in the movement towards "green" open access that requires researchers to self-archive their journal articles on the web, and make them free for all.

"The Finch committee's recommendations look superficially as if they are supporting open access, but in reality they are strongly biased in favour of the interests of the publishing industry over the interests of UK research," he said.

"Instead of recommending that the UK build on its historic lead in providing cost-free green open access, the committee has recommended spending a great deal of extra money — scarce research money — to pay publishers for "gold open access publishing. If the Finch committee recommendations are heeded, as David Willetts now proposes, the UK will lose both its global lead in open access and a great deal of public money — and worldwide open access will be set back at least a decade," he said.

Free access to British scientific research within two years | Science | The Guardian 2012-07-15
Reposted bypaket paket

July 03 2012

02mydafsoup-01
Coverbild wohlstand ohne wachstum?

Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ 27-28/2012)

Wohlstand ohne Wachstum?

Vor 40 Jahren veröffentlichte der Club of Rome den Bericht "Grenzen des Wachstums". Der Befund war alarmierend: Die herrschenden Produktions- und Lebensweisen industrialisier­ter Gesellschaften seien langfristig nicht tragbar. Auch in Deutschland gibt es eine intensive Debatte über die ökologischen Konsequenzen unseres Wirtschafts- und Wohlstandsmodells.

Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ 27-28/2012) - DL als Pdf u. EPUB

June 28 2012

02mydafsoup-01

[...]

So then imagine Alan Turingstein, mathematics genius, computer pioneer, and Nazi code expert. After the war, he messes around in the German electronics industry in some inconclusive way, and then he commits suicide in some obscure morals scandal. What would we think of Alan Turingstein today, on his centenary? I doubt we’d be celebrating him, and secretly telling ourselves that we’re just like him.

On the contrary, we’d consider him a sinister figure, somebody to be whispered about. He’d be a spooky, creepy villain, a weird eccentric with ragged fingernails and pants held up with twine. He would show up in World War II historical novels as a scary fringe character. As for the famous Turingstein Test, which I’m about to discuss at length, we wouldn’t see that as a fun metaphysical thought experiment. Those interesting ideas would also bear the taint of Nazi culture, and we’d probably consider the Turing Test some kind of torture chamber for intelligent machines.

Now, Turing had the good luck not to be born German, but he also had the bad luck of being a consistently eccentric, shadowy, obscure, cooped-up and closeted guy. Furthermore, I believe our world has many such people right now — few so brilliant as him, but many as isolated as him. Rather than apologizing to Alan Turing after his death, I’d be happier if we had some working way to reach out to other Alan Turings, ways to find people like him and to convince them to put down the poisoned apple and find good, sensible reasons to cheer the hell up and enjoy life.

We have no way to know which Alan Turings among us will leave a grand legacy like his: technological advance, the Allied victory and the persistence so far of liberty, racial tolerance and democratic capitalism. We do have plenty of geeks who are just as obsessive and hung-up on weird hacks as he was. While we’re somewhat more inclined to valorize them, I don’t think we meet their needs very well.

We’re okay with certain people who “think different” to the extent of buying Apple iPads. We’re rather hostile toward people who “think so very differently” that their work will make no sense for thirty years — if ever. We’ll test them, and see if we can find some way to get them to generate wealth for us, but we’re not considerate of them as unusual, troubled entities wandering sideways through a world they never made.

So, let me talk a little bit about Turing’s famous test for intelligence, the “imitation game.” Everybody thinks they know what that is: it’s a man talking to a computer, and the computer is trying to convince him that he’s not a machine, he’s a man. If he talks like a man and knows what a man knows, if he presents as a man, then we don’t have to get into the dark metaphysical issues of what’s going on in his black-box heart and spirit; the machine keeps up the façade, so therefore he’s one of us, he’s perfectly fine. That’s the Turing Test as it’s commonly described.

However, that’s by no means what Turing actually says in his original paper on the subject. The real Turing imitation game is not about that process at all. It’s about an entirely different process of gender politics and transvestism. It’s about a machine imitating a woman.

In the original Turing imitation game, you’ve got three entities: a judge, a woman, and a machine pretending to be a woman. Alan Turing says he can’t answer the question “can machines think” because he doesn’t want to waste time with the popular definitions of “machinery” and “thinking.” He wants a simpler, more rigorous test that’s more objective and reliable. So what he actually comes up with is a test for a machine with a woman’s sensibility.

[...]

Turing Centenary Speech | www.wired.com via radar.oreilly.com 2012-06-27
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