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January 04 2015

Rumford-Soup for Humanities wrote the following post:

Ulrich Beck dies aged 70
A very sad announcement:

The German sociologist Ulrich Beck died January 1 at age 70 of a heart attack.

Süddeutsche Zeitung:

* "Ulrich Beck is tot"

* "Was die Soziologie Ulrich Beck zu verdanken hat" - Armin Nassehi

* "Der Kosmopolit" - Andreas Zielcke

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:

* "Der Freihandsegler der Theorie" - Jürgen Kaube

Die Welt:

* "Der Mann der uns Chaos aushalten lehrte" - Alan Posener

* "Wir alle wurden von Ulrich Beck beeinflusst" - Sigmar Gabriel (SPD)

Der Tagesspiegel:

* "Der demokratische Existentialist" - Peter von Becker

Die Zeit:

* "Er lebte, was er lehrte" - Gunter Hofmann

Der Spiegel:

* "Kollegen erinnern an Ulrich Beck: Er wollte wirken - und das auch politisch" - Richard Sennett, Angela McRobbie, Claus Leggewie, Ronald Hitzler, Cornelia Koppetsch, Saskia Sassen, Paul Gilroy, Sighard Neckel

* "Zum Tode Ulrich Becks: Die Zukunft ist offen" - Romain Leick

#German #deutsch


October 16 2014

September 28 2014

Post-analytic phenomenology vs market serfdom

Paul Crowther interviewed by Richard Marshall.

Paul Crowther bites the hands of both analytic and continental philosophical approaches to aesthetics. Whilst chewing he thinks about how post-modernism is linked to market forces and Supermodernity, about how the civilising is organised round self restraint, about how Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Deleuze have created a distorting orthodoxy, about rejecting analytic philosophical approaches to art, about White Aesthetics, about post-analytic phenomenology, about phenomenological depth, about subject-object reciprocity, about meaning in abstract art, about Kant and german idealism. Take this one neat and then go for a walk…

3:AM: What made you become a philosopher?

Paul Crowther: When I was fifteen and sixteen, I had a strong sense of the 1960’s as a special time that was about to be lost. This brought home the importance of the relation between human experience and the passing of time. I also began to develop an interest in modernist painting (impressionism and the like) and the songs of Bob Dylan – which seemed to be wonderfully defiant as well as beautiful. In fact, I recall reading on the sleeve notes of Dylan’s first album that, at university, he once stayed up all night ploughing through Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, rather than revising for a biology exam. This intrigued me; so in the spring or summer of 1970 I went to a second-hand bookshop at the bottom of Kirkgate in Leeds to see if they had a copy of the Kant book. They didn’t, but I looked up ‘philosophy’ in encyclopedias and the like. I wasn’t confident enough to think of doing it at university, but when I got there, I studied it as a subsidiary subject, and it got me hooked.

I recall walking round some of the mustier shelves of the John Rylands Library at Manchester University, browsing through tomes by McTaggart and Bradley, thinking how wonderful it would be to think thoughts as deep as that. Anyway as I couldn’t switch to philosophy as a single subject at Manchester, I returned to study it in my home city of Leeds.

3:AM: You once indicated that relativism was our age’s ‘special vanity’ and in the hands of Lacan, Derrida and Foucault it has regretfully become a dogma. But you also say that it doesn’t mark a break with modernist foundationalism and results in what you call ‘supermodernity’. This seems to be paradoxical. Can you say how we are to negotiate this apparent contradiction and what is at stake in this issue, in particular in the domain of values?

PC: In Philosophy After Postmodernism and other works, I show how the anti-foundationalist discourse of the poststructuralist tradition is intimately connected with the ideology of market forces. The rhetoric of the transient and relative structures of cognitive perspectives, and the idea of the ‘de-centred’ self are often presented as a basis for ‘oppositional’ thought. They are not. In fact, they are tacit expressions of the constant need for new brands and the need to ensure that the consumer exists as permanently unsettled agency (expressed through such things as shopping and ‘lifestyle choices’). The modern world in the twentieth-century and beyond has developed around consumerism and the technologies associated with it, and this has now been taken to a global level. I see the anti-foundationalism of the poststructuralism and other relativisms as key expressions of the intellectual mind-set of this ‘Supermodernity’.

The challenge to the realm of values presented by Supermodernity is colossal. As embodied beings, we exist in a world – both natural and cultural – that is rich, diverse, complex, and full of different aspects. However, Supermodernity violates this complexity. It is permeated by the cult of management that seeks to promote ‘efficiency’ by reducing everything to models of social interaction and outcomes derived from cybernetics and the advertising industry. What it is to be human, and what it is to change oneself and be encultured in a deep sense is lost. Indeed, the very notion of freedom itself is reduced to consumer choices. Of course, there has always been a difficult relation between money and civilization, but in most eras there was always a strong sense that some things were more important than money-power. Values of a moral and aesthetic nature, and such things as self-development and bettering oneself and one’s community, were acknowledged as things that had to be protected from market forces. This critical distance has been lost. And the intellectual relativisms of Supermodernity are not the slightest help in reconfiguring it, because they are complicit in the new market serfdom.

3:AM: You argue for civilization rather than the end of civilization don’t you? How do you map out your theory of civilization and does it bridge the gap between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy and social theory?

PC: I follow Elias in his theory that the civilizing process is organized around the development of self-restraint. What makes this possible is its emergence from various cognitive capacities, the most central of which are language, empathic identification, aesthetic experience, and imagination in general. These are the foundational to embodied subjectivity. However, this is perhaps better described as ‘refoundational’ because the cognitive capacities just described are exercised differently and have different effects under different historical conditions. By definition we are self-conscious beings but the structure and pattern of self-consciousness changes, and can be developed to higher stages. As well as the need to satisfy physiological needs and procure the means of subsistence and security, humans develop needs related to self-consciousness itself. They need to know who they are as individuals and members of a collective, as well as their relation to the universe as a whole.

Self-consciousness and self-restraint develop around this through various symbolic practices that refine the scope of language and imagination. This refinement also leads to technological development and a greater ability to adapt the world to human needs. It allows also for increasing complexity in modes of social organization and religious ritual. The civilizing process just is the generation of these changes. It is self-consciousness regarded from the viewpoint of its diachronic development.

This theory is based on the view that there are necessary structures in human experience which can be shown through systematic structures of discursive argument. In this respect, I relate closely to the tradition of Analytic philosophy. Unfortunately, Analytic philosophy – with the exception of figures such as Charles Taylor, who, like myself, cross its boundaries – has little or no sense of the constitutive role of historical understanding in all aspects of cognition. The Continental tradition, in contrast, (as I noted earlier) has emphasized the perspectivalist basis of knowledge and the de-centred self, an approach that emphasizes transient relationality and change. They take this too far, but their approach at least points towards the historical dimension in cognition. My theory goes further. By arguing that the civilizing process refines functional constants in experience through different historical realizations of them, I am, in effect, integrating the Analytic approach with the Continental emphasis on change and relationality, and , in so doing, offer a normative social theory.

3:AM: Derrida, Foucault and Lacan are important to you aren’t they in that they set the terms of the contemporary landscape whereby art historians and theorists who thought art was a unique form of meaning has been subjected to sustained critique. What is the challenge that these three thinkers raise?

PC: In conjunction, Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Deleuze, and others create the perspectivalist/de-centred emphasis that I’ve already described. As I’ve also said, this has some importance in drawing attention to the more transient dimensions of cognition. However, I now think that in the context of studying the arts, this has had a very distorting effect. These relativist approaches underline heterogeneities, aporias, rhizomatics, divergences, dis-affinities, and anything else that can make art and its history seem unstable – nothing more than a network of ‘discursive practices’ driven by power relations. However, this approach is no longer a challenge, it has become something of an orthodoxy.

The real challenge consists in resisting the imperial scope of the orthodoxy. There is one vital issue, in particular. On the basis of the orthodoxy, art and the aesthetic are regarded as no more than historically specific expressions of dominant power relations. But this raises a question, namely what is it about certain varieties of representation that allow them to be invested with such cultural kudos? You can map out all the different uses to which representations are put, historically, and the different ideological attitudes that inform them, but why does making pictures, writing stories and poems, and making music lend themselves to such uses, in so many different times and places? My point is that these activities have an intrinsic fascination, they have the power to make the world of ideas exist sensuously at the level of the real. Over and above how images are used, it is what is done through creating them that is to say, their aesthetic significance, that is compelling.

3:AM: You worry however that the approach [ of the poststructuralists] is too reductionist don’t you, and avoids detailed descriptions of aesthetic and phenomenal structures. Despite this, you seem very interested in Heidegger’s approaches to art so why do you think you’re describing a post-analytic turn rather than developing a line of research of the continental camp?

PC: This relates to the previous question. There is a tradition in Continental thinking that retains a proper regard for the artistic/aesthetic dimension of art – its sensuous presentation of ideas. It comprises thinkers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Dufrenne, Gadamer, Deleuze, and even Lacan (though this aspect of his thought is rarely discussed). However, all these thinkers approach art very strongly from the viewpoint of their own philosophies. This presents a very one-sided approach that does no justice to the importance of what is involved in the making of art. Artists change how the world appears and to recognize this transformation you not only have to look at the work in relation to how it represents things, you also have to understand the individual way it achieves this. Such understanding centres on how the artist uses the medium of which he or she is a practitioner, and this, in turn, entails knowledge of the comparative history of the medium.

The point is that, in aesthetics, attention has to be shifted from the conditions of spectatorship to those of how art is created. This does not mean fantasizing about what the artist’s intentions were, but in looking or reading the work itself in relation to what it represents and how it represents it. This requires detailed discussion of particular artworks, and relating them to those transformative powers that produce effects distinctive to the individual media. These effects often have far-reaching ontological/aesthetic significance that is elided by more global terms such as Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s notions of ‘Truth’ or Merleau-Ponty’s ‘visible/invisible’ pairing, or Deleuze’s notion of the ‘Figure’.

In order to bring out this ontological/aesthetic significance, the Continental approaches have to be conceptually unpacked, clarified, and extended by reference to historical and conceptual factors bound up with the relevant media. This latter feature takes us far beyond what the Continental tradition itself has attempted (with the problematic exception of Deleuze), and marks my major problem with it. True, the relativist approaches draw attention to the way things change , but in the context of the arts, we need to combine phenomenological attention to the works, with a proper critical analysis of the traditions of making within a medium. This why I advocate a post-analytic phenomenology rather than just working in the Continental tradition. The ontology of artistic media requires close analysis rather than immersion in an atmosphere of jargon and/or ill-defined terms. It’s true that Adorno’s paratactical method – where artworks are approached from different cognitive directions in order not to do violence to the their sensuous particularity – offers many insights about the relation between artistic meaning and society. However, even he scarcely touches the question of what is special and distinctive about the individual art media.

3:AM: The analytic tradition is not much good either for aesthetics is it? Do you see Richard Wollheim as part of this tradition? What’s so wrong that we need to take a post-analytic turn?

PC: In terms of clarifying the centrality of art and the aesthetic, the Analytic tradition is now more or less useless. It has recently tried to re-brand itself as ‘Anglo-American’ but is better described as White Aesthetics. Instead of regarding the Duchampian tradition of ready-mades as secondary and parasitic upon traditions of sensuously embodied art-making – as (in other words) something whose artistic status has to be justified, Analytic philosophers have now made this tradition, dogmatically, into the very focus of artistic meaning. In this way, over thirty thousand years of artistic practices in different parts of the world and different historical periods, are made subservient to the marginal idiosyncracies of a white Euromerican avant-garde elite. I regard this as a tacit form of racism.

The narrowness of White Aesthetics is shown by the fact that it appears to be of no significance to anyone except its own practitioners. Contemporary art and criticism, and historical studies rarely make reference to it. White Aesthetics is very interested in the semantic and syntactic structures of art media, but not in what makes art matter to those involved in its creation or appreciation. Insofar as it does wrestle with these issues, it tends to do so through the clumsy notions of ‘expressive qualities’ or the artist’s intentions. However, these are not concepts that solve problems but ones that have to be explained in more fundamental terms. OK, art is expressive, and artists have intentions, but these are only significant if we can link them to how the artist transforms the medium so as to achieve distinct communicative effects.

Wollheim offered some brilliant phenomenological analyses of the arts, notably painting, but, as well as tying himself mainly to the spectatorial viewpoint, he also falls back on the weak mainstays of ‘expressive qualities’ and the ‘artists intentions’ – terms that have no explanatory value. (I justify this claim in detail in my book on Phenomenologies of Art and Vision… .)

As far as I can see, the only way to overcome White Aesthetics is by clarifying the cognitive uniqueness of the individual arts, and the complex varieties of aesthetic experience. The post-analytic phenomenology described earlier has great promise in this respect.

3:AM: So how does your approach of ‘post-analytic phenomenology’ attempt to overcome the shortcomings of the Analytic and Continental traditions?

PC: I’ve already explained this in relation to my work in aesthetics, so I’ll now explain it in more general philosophical terms.

Analytic philosophy tends to resolve phenomena into formal component features (such as, for example, the self’s persistence through time, and occupancy of the same body) and then takes such analyses to be sufficient for understanding the unity of the phenomenon in question. However, there is a prior unity based on the correlation of embodied subject and object of experience that tends to be elided by Analytic approaches.

Continental philosophers, notably Merleau-Ponty have been aware of this, but unfortunately have imagined that one can express the unity in question by making philosophical language become more poetic and ambiguous. The assumption is that, by doing this, we touch some kind of primordial mutual inherence of subject and world, that precedes the subject-object relation. I think this is a mistake. In fact, much ‘Continental’ philosophy after Merleau-Ponty strikes me as little more than bad poetry dressed up as philosophy.

To transcend the limitations of Analytic philosophy and the Continental tradition I have tried to develop a post-analytic phenomenology that looks to Merleau-Ponty, but which goes far beyond him by restoring the primacy of the subject-object relation in knowledge of objects and the self. By emphasizing that knowledge of an objective world, and the unity of self-consciousness are correlated – the one cannot be known without knowledge of the other – I am emphasizing a relation that is epistemologically fundamental but which has a different meaning and structure according to different historical circumstances.

I have actually formalized the notion of post-analytic phenomenology in some recent papers on the concept of imagination. It strikes me that if we are to get a proper phenomenological orientation we must be clear about which aspects of the object we are most interested in. This is especially the case with imagination, which is a term used in many different ways. I propose accordingly, that phenomenological inquiry starts with an analytic reduction. This is directed by two questions.

First, given a specific linguistic term (referring to a phenomenon, concept, relation, or whatever) do any of our uses of that term identify features that are logically distinctive to it, and, second, do other features seem to constellate around these distinctive features , even if only indirectly, or associationally?

If we can answer both questions affirmatively, then, we have identified what I call the nodal core of meaning for the term. By looking at how the term is used its ‘essence’ can be identified at the level of public discourse, rather than that of introspection. In the case of imagination, the idea of mental imagery with a quasi-sensory character provides this nodal core.

This allows us to proceed to a second level of investigation – namely, phenomenological description of the nodal core features as experienced. Such investigation focusses on how things are present to perception or before the mind. In the case of imagination, this involves attending to such things as the schematic and unstable character of the image, and the way, qua subject to the will, it exemplifies the personal style of the one who is imagining.

Phenomenological description of the nodal core identifies those features that clarify the term’s broader conceptual relations and cognitive significance. The investigation of these constitutes a tertiary level of analysis. This is especially important for the concept of imagination, as the features identified through its phenomenological description are what allow it to play a necessary role in our correlated knowledge of objects and self-consciousness. It has a cognitive fundamentality – as Kant recognized – but it takes a post-analytic phenomenology with the threefold methodological structure just described, to set out the complete grounds of this fundamentality.

One other outcome of the tertiary stage of analyzing imagination is an explanation of the origins of pictorial art. With more work, indeed, it might be able to identify further links between imagination and the origins of literature, dance, and music.

The post-analytic phenomenology that I have been describing here overcomes the limitations of Analytic philosophy and the Continental tradition, by combining what is best in them through an integrated method of inquiry. Obviously, I hope to take this much further.

Interestingly, a couple of former students of mine have just finished writing a book concerning the relation between my aesthetics and Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. This is some justification for this, and, admittedly, I have made some use of Cassirer in the past. However, the transcendental arguments for the correlated unity of subject and object of experience that I provide, and the extended theory of imagination, are not found in Cassirer. (He falls back on the unwarranted authority of Kant to provide these things.) It should be emphasized, also, that the threefold method of post-analytic phenomenology that I advocate does not – as far as I know – have a counterpart in Cassirer’s thought. Cassirer and I are both committed to aesthetic cognitivism, but my general philosophical position goes beyond his.

3:AM: You use the term ‘phenomenological depth’ which you take from your reading of Merleau-Ponty , Hegel and a tincture of Kant. So what does this depth amount to?

PC: It consists of all the factors that are involved in the reciprocal correlation of subject and object of experience. These include those features of the immediate perceptual field – details, textures, relations, and the like, which are present but not noticed explicitly. (The object of present awareness emerges from this network of phenomena and relations.)

Also included is the role of imagination which – at will – allows us to project how the world not immediately present to perception might appear, and by implication, what it would be like for us to occupy different perceptual positions from the one we presently occupy, and which allows us to form playful associational chains of such imagery.

The other major feature of phenomenological depth is those switches of cognitive emphasis where we can sometimes think of our sensuous animal being and, at other times, consider ourselves primarily as rational beings. Related to this is our sense of being a part of nature and tied to physical limits, yet at the same time being able to create artifacts that can have effects far from the location we presently occupy, and which can survive long after we are dead. The most fundamental aspect of all this is our capacity to form a sense of who and what we are, and our place in relation to the universe. We are finite, but more than just finite.

All these aspects of phenomenological depth can be described explicitly through philosophical explanation, But since the artwork is a sensuous or imaginatively-intended individual, it shows phenomenological depth rather than states it. In a Cezanne still-life – of apples, say, the picture creates an appearance of these fruits that deviates from how they would appear in real life. They look more palpable because of the way they are painted, yet, at the same time, have an intenseness of being that almost transcends corporeality. Viewing the work in such terms requires that we attend to how compositionally, and texturally, Cezanne has rendered them. This means that – without being explicitly aware that we are so doing – we attend to both the way the perceived group of apples emerges from a ‘flesh’ of details, and the way it seems to be pregnant with other potential viewpoints that might be taken upon it. At the same time, however, we also know that it is an image of apples which discloses how Cezanne has understood the concept of ‘apple’ in particular sensuous terms. More than this, Cezanne’s treatment of this subject dramatically emphasizes the quiddity of the fruit. It has come to be and will pass away, but whilst here, it is fecund – not just biologically, but perceptually, and spiritually.

The above analysis resolves the picture into different aesthetic aspects. But the point is, that in the picture itself, they are present simultaneously and inseparably as a part of a whole that encompasses creator, image, subject-matter, and spectator. We intuit this complex whole on its own terms – as a phenomenon which is full of meaning that cannot be paraphrased except in terms that loose the fullness of its immediate unity. This is why aesthetic meaning – with all its phenomenological depth, is shown rather than said.

3:AM: That our perceptions and cognition has a pre-reflective character is really important to your theory isn’t it and has special relevance to the visual arts. Can you say something about this, perhaps illustrating it in terms of your discussion of a sculpture’s phenomenological depth and its relation to transcendence?

PC: Suppose you look at Michelangelo’s Bruges Madonna, or Boccioni’s Unique Forms of Continuity in Space. You might say you see a beautiful, tender image of mother and child, or a curiously angular representation of a striding figure. However, these works speak to more intuitive pre-reflective levels of experience as well. This can involve fundamental levels of experience. For example, if something exists it must occupy space, or be the effect of something that does. Space-occupancy is basic and fundamental to us that, of course, we scarcely ever take notice of it. Now the fact that sculpture is three-dimensional means that it acts on our sense of space. The sculpture makes space transcend its usual inexplicit existence to become manifest, though not yet the kind of thing that we can put firmly into words. We are interested in how the sculpture occupies space – its way of defining shape or shapes through strong physical embodiment. There is a beauty of space giving birth to things, or things taking on form (in terms of both the sculpture itself, and that which it represents) – an emergence that is all the more powerful since we know that it has been created by a fellow human being. When a work is free-standing, this effect is all the more pronounced.

Of course, architecture will give you similar effects, but there is one factor which makes sculpture unique. It creates depth by the semantic and physical articulation of a three-dimensional medium. Meaning arises from the emergence of spatial form rather than the enclosure of space. Painting does this in virtual terms, but in sculpture, the virtual aspect has real spatial physicality as well, through being three-dimensional. In fact, there is a supreme transcendence involved in this. We know that qua finite physical beings we emerge from inert matter, and pass back into it. In sculpture, brute matter is overcome. That which appears most indifferent to, and other-than organic life, is, as it were with spirit. Life transcends the inanimate in sensuous-symbolic terms.

The point is – again – that what I am describing in an analytic way is experienced intuitively in the sculptural work as a whole of aesthetic meaning. It engages us pre-reflectively, but in such a way as to make us want to reflect on it.

3:AM: So is it your view that the visual arts are best understood as making basic features of experiential subject and object reciprocity exist in a heightened and enduring form? And does this set constraints on what an artist can create?

PC: The characters of visual media engage with different aspects of subject-object reciprocity. There’s one especially important aspect of this that I’m currently exploring in relation to pictorial art. I call it ‘presentness’. All our perceptual activity fixes on moments of recognition or sequences of momentary perceptions in how we attend to things. Pictorial art intervenes on the transience of these features. If a work is representational, it links the viewer and the scene viewed in a present whose immobility and self-containedness exceed the limits of ordinary perception. A contrast is useful here. Photographs snatch a moment of time, by, as it were, snatching it out of a flow of visual events. But the painter represents by accumulating the visual elements to compose the image. He or she represents a single moment that – like the moments of human experience as such, are internally complex . In life we never completely possess our passing moments – they pass in the very act of trying to fix them in place. But pictorial art does fix them in place, symbolically. It offers a kind of eternalization of the represented present. This has the profoundest aesthetic and psychological ramifications. In presentness, the artist makes a moment of visual appearance available as a permanent possibility of experience.

Of course, not all visual art is pictorial. I ‘ve done a large amount of work on meaning in abstract art. Abstract works disclose features that are usually unnoticed in direct perception, or take unusual angles on it, or posit alternative modes of perceptual reality. Conceptualism also has its own special features, but here there is a significant constraint. We can invoke it through a question. Is there something about the conceptual ‘object’ that the artist creates or assembles that demands that it be directly perceived, or is it something which can be comprehended sufficiently by mere description? If it’s the latter there is no reason to regard it as art. Some conceptual works are like this, of course, and are better regarded as adjuncts to theory than as works of art. Other conceptual idioms, however, are hugely rewarding in what they offer to direct perception – such as, for example, Duchamp’s entwined exhibits at the First Papers of Surrealism exhibition in 1942. White Aesthetics, of course, tends not to ask this test question. On its terms, if the artist says its art, then that’s what it is.

3:AM: You’re clear that Heidegger, Adorno and Merleau-Ponty are important but that their strategies of elliptical address – adapting description to the irreducible concreteness of an art object – fails to bring descriptive clarity to their analysis. However, despite the shortcomings, Heidegger’s ‘Art And Space’ and ‘The Origin of a Work of Art’ are important for you aren’t they?

PC: Yes, as I pointed out earlier, they all have important insights but are somewhat one-sided in the way they frame general problems in aesthetics from their particular philosophical positions. Elliptical strategies bring their own internal problematics in accordance with the particular philosophical method involved

3:AM: Could your theory and approach link with German Idealism and Schelling just as well as the phenomenological-existentialist tradition you identify?

PC: Yes, almost certainly. I think that my stuff has affinities with Hegel more than Schelling, but to tell you the truth, I suspect that this is because I know Hegel’s work a lot better than Schelling’s. Probably the deepest debt of all that I owe is to Kant’s theory of cognition – especially the Transcendental Deduction, and to his terribly neglected theory of art.

3:AM: Do you see yourself as providing a comprehensive aesthetic theory?

PC: As comprehensive as can be. Obviously, I’ve paid special attention to the philosophy of the visual arts – with five published monographs and many papers. However, there are also three books on more general aesthetics, and two works where I develop Kant’s aesthetics into something of more general significance.

3:AM: And finally, are there five books other than your own which would help us go further into your philosophical world?

Hegel – Lectures on Aesthetics
Cassirer – An Essay on Man
Merleau-Ponty – The Primacy of Perception (the book of that title, not just the essay)
Adorno – Aesthetic Theory
Bradley – Appearance and Reality

Richard Marshall is still biding his time.

Buy the book here to keep him biding!

Reposted from02myhumsci-01 02myhumsci-01

La sacralisation à l’œuvre dans l’expérience littéraireUniversité de Lorraine, Centre Écritures (EA 3943)UFR Arts, Lettres, Langues (site Metz)5-6 juin 2015Ce colloque s’inscrit dans un programme de recherche interdisciplinaire consacré à l’articulation entre littérature, processus mémoriels et sacralisation. Il fera suite, notamment, à un colloque intitulé «Littérature et sacré: la tradition en question» (UL-Metz, novembre 2014) qui portera sur les modalités de construction d’une tradition littéraire du sacré, à savoir sur la possibilité ou l’impossibilité de sa transmission.Penser le rapport qu’entretient la littérature avec la sacralité ouvre au moins sur trois problématiques, certes enchevêtrées dans les pratiques mais qu’on peut distinguer d’un point de vue analytique:1) une problématique institutionnelle . Celle-ci examine comment sont mis en place des dispositifs d’élection et de construction d’ espaces striés , au sens deleuzien du terme, dont le caractère sacré est garanti aussi bien par des institutions, des lois et des discours savants (dogmes endogènes et exogènes) que par une doxa qui fonctionne sur le mode de l’évidence ordinaire et de la révélation;2) une problématique cultuelle . Elle décrit les rituels, publics et privés, qui encadrent l’approche et le contact avec le sacré que constitue l’ absolu littéraire ( cf. Ph.Lacoue-Labarthe, J.-L.Nancy, L’Absolu littéraire: théorie de la littérature du romantisme allemand . Seuil, 1978; G.Steiner, Passions impunies , «Envoi: Le lecteur peu commun», Folio essais, 2001); elle analyse par ailleurs les rôles des prêtres et des médiateurs qui garantissent le respect de ces rituels et leur diffusion-infusion;3) une problématique empirique («C’est cela l’empirisme, syntaxes et expérimentation, syntaxique et pragmatique, affaire de vitesse» G. Deleuze, Dialogues , Champs essais, 1996, p.73), préoccupée de décrire en quoi et comment la réception que fait un sujet lecteur –toujours membre d’une «communauté interprétative»– d’un texte littéraire a à voir avec des processus de sacralisation. En effet, l’espace littéraire (M. Blanchot) peut être conçu comme une hétérotopie (M. Foucault) où s’agencent des dispositifs de sacralisation et de profanation; ceux-ci expérimentent nos «modes d’identification» (P.Descola) les plus archaïques (totémisme, animisme, analogisme…), ceux dont dépendent les liens ( religio ) que nous entretenons avec les autres, avec la société prise dans son ensemble.C’est ce troisième axe que nous voudrions privilégier dans ce colloque. Il s’agira, en effet, de déterminer dans quelle mesure l’expérience littéraire, comme exercice spirituel de piété subjective , tant en production qu’en réception, relève du sacré , celui-ci étant conçu, entre autres, comme un apprentissage de soi et un souci de soi ( cf . M.Foucault). Après le règne du «démon de la théorie» (A. Compagnon) dans les études littéraires, il nous semble opportun de nous interroger sur le rôle que joue la littérature dans nos procès de subjectivation, grâce à une (dé)sacralisation qui nous interdit d’être un «histrion des identifications» ou un «froid docteur des distances» (G.Deleuze, op. cit. , p.67-68) et nous permet d’ agencer , c'est-à-dire «être au milieu, sur la ligne de rencontre d’un monde intérieur et d’un monde extérieur» ( ibid. , p.66).Ainsi, cette seconde rencontre cherche à penser la sacralité comme modèle d’action ou force performative de la pensée. Notre perspective naît d’un constat: la précipitation propre aux temps modernes défie toute prévisibilité, esquive le passé, bouleverse l'avenir. La modernité vénère moins, en effet, le sens du passé vécu et l’expérience des générations antérieures qu’elle ne célèbre l’affirmation du temps utile, une interprétation de la temporalité qui privilégie la progression par le changement et la nouveauté coupés du passé. Le sens de l’h/Histoire ayant perdu son fil (J.Rancière), il paraît opportun, en restreignant notre champ d’investigation à un corpus emprunté à la littérature contemporaine (XIXe et XXe siècles) francophone ou de langue étrangère, de nous interroger à propos de cette sacralisation du littéraire opérée par le sujet lecteur. En quoi cette sacralisation ressemble-t-elle et diffère-t-elle de sa consœur religieuse? Quels sont les gestes qui la constituent? D’où émane l’impression de sacralité inhérente aux expériences esthétiques, à la lecture littéraire, en l’occurrence? Nos modes de consommation postmodernes –où l’immersion dans un fonctionnement machinique l’emporte sur la recherche herméneutique, représentative ou expressive– ne mettent-ils pas à mal cette émergence du sacré? Inversement, la prise en compte d’une dimension sacrée qui serait immanente à toute expérience esthétique n’offre-t-elle pas une occasion de résister aux entreprises de forclusion de toute transcendance et de désacralisation , dont les symptômes se font ressentir douloureusement dans nos sociétés?Il s’avère qu’aborder la sacralité, en relation avec le bouleversement de l’expérience du temps inhérente à la modernité et les fractures de notre univers postmoderne, suppose la relecture de la sacralité du littéraire à travers un prisme interdisciplinaire. En effet, l’articulation entre sacralité et rythme temporel dans l’expérience littéraire oriente l’examen du rôle du sacré non seulement comme usage toujours distancié et vénéré de l’objet à examiner, mais également comme expérience auratique pouvant mener vers une certaine forme de résistance ou de contre-conduite. Se jouent, ici, dès lors, l’existence et le rôle d’une négativité qui, bridée vers le temps révolu, ou vers «l'unique apparition d’un lointain, quelle que soit sa proximité» (W.Benjamin), freine la précipitation du temps, anachronise l’Histoire, en déroulant une temporalité dédaléenne où le lien entre le nouveau et l’ancien (la mémoire) advient, survient, revient sans cesse.Pour questionner cette problématique de la revenance (sacrée?) du lointain, ou, du moins, la mettre en perspective, on pourra solliciter des auteurs comme J.Derrida et sa notion de spectre , G.Didi-Huberman et son idée de survivance , J.Lacan et sa conception du deuil comme trou matisme, J.Allouch et sa lecture de l’ au-delà psychique de l’objet perdu, J.-F.Hamel et le fantasme de la tradition retrouvée, J.-C.Bailly et son idée de l’ ombre de Dieu. Pour renouveler l’approche de l’expérience (sacrée?) du littéraire, on pourra faire appel aux travaux de certains anthropologues comme A.Gell et P.Descola; de sociologues comme E.Morin; de philosophescomme G.Agamben, A.Badiou, J.Rancière.Les grands axes retenus pour le colloque sont donc les suivants :a) La littérature comme force spirituelle ou d’initiationb) La revenance comme expérience du sacréc) La sacralité comme force subjective à l’œuvre dans l’expérience littéraireLes chercheurs, enseignants, doctorants intéressés sont invités à envoyer avant le 15 décembre 2014 , leur proposition de communication qui comprendra:- un titre- un court résumé d’environ 200 mots (hors bibliographie) précisant l' axe du colloque dans lequel l’intervention s’inscrit- quatre mots-clés- une bio-bibliographie personnelle de 50-100 motsaux adresses suivantes:Raymond MICHEL raymond.michel14@gmail.comMarta Inés WALDEGARAY marta.waldegaray@univ-lorraine.frComité d’organisation: Raymond MICHEL , Marta I. WALDEGARAYComité scientifique: Raymond MICHEL, Myriam WATTHEE-DELMOTTE, Laurent HUSSON, Jean-Michel WITTMANN, Marta I. WALDEGARAYDurée de la communication : 25 minutes suivies de 10 minutes d'échange.Nombre maximal de signes par article: 35 000 (espaces compris).Langue de travail et de publication : français.
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Appel à communications pour un atelier du congrès 2015 deL’Association des Professeur.e.s de Français des Universités et Collèges Canadiens (Université d’Ottawa, du samedi 30 mai au vendredi 5 juin) sur:L’âme sous l’Ancien RégimeSi l’Ancien Régime est connu comme l’époque du triomphe de la Raison – raison d’État, vraisemblance littéraire, et efflorescence des Lumières en philosophie – ce n’en est pas moins une période où fleurissent les interrogations sur la nature de l’âme. Les auteurs de l’École française de spiritualité, tels que Pierre de Bérulle ou Jean-Jacques Olier, cherchent une âme anéantie et soumise à Dieu, tandis que dans le domaine des sciences René Descartes transforme l’âme en laboratoire en disséquant le fonctionnement des passions qui l’animent. Pierre Corneille et Jean Racine mettent en scène des âmes qui se sacrifient à leur devoir ou qui se déchirent sous le poids d’un amour impossible tout en se cachant derrière les exigences de la bienséance. Au siècle suivant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau essaie de «rendre [s]on âme transparente aux yeux du lecteur», mais s’attarde sur des histoires qui dissimulent autant qu’elles révèlent. L’âme sous l’Ancien Régime hante la rigueur, l’éclat, et l’exploration scientifique qui marquent le règne des rois Bourbon.Cet atelier se propose donc de tirer l’âme des ombres des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles pour examiner sa vie littéraire, religieuse et historique. Comment rendre compte du rôle de l’âme sous l’Ancien Régime? Quelle est son importance symbolique, mystique, politique, philosophique et idéologique dans les écrits de l’époque moderne?Selon le contexte, plusieurs pistes de réflexion pourront être envisagées, par exemple:L’âme théâtrale (l’âme en scène et/ou la théâtralité de l’âme)L’âme noble (honnêteté, gloire, devoir)L’âme nue (mysticisme, anéantissement, spiritualité)L’âme scientifique (objet et mécanisme de réflexion philosophique)L’âme narrative (mémoires, confessions, correspondance)Nous invitons les propositions d’environ 300 mots. Veuillez envoyer vos propositions, ainsi qu’une brève notice biographique, à avant le 15 décembre 2014 .Responsable:Joy Palacios – joy_palacios@sfu.caSimon Fraser University, Département de françaisDate limite pour l’envoie des propositions: le 15 décembre 2014
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«Le préjugé hiéroglyphiste» dans la pensée occidentalede la Renaissance à la Grande Guerre25, 26 et 27 juin 2015Université de Strasbourg (SEARCH, EA 2325)Dans Le débat sur les écritures et l'hiéroglyphe aux 17 e et 18 e siècles (1965), Madeleine David s’attache à mettre en évidence les conceptions du signe qui ont freiné le déchiffrement des hiéroglyphes. Parmi ces obstacles figure le «préjugé hiéroglyphiste», qu’elle définit comme « l'exaltation de la figure hiéroglyphique en tant que symbole pur». Dans cette perspective, les hiéroglyphes rendent visible une réalité cachée, mais ne constituent pas une écriture et n’ont pas vocation à assurer la communication entre les hommes. Deux ans plus tard, dans De la grammatologie , Derrida adopte l’expression dans sa critique d’une tradition métaphysique pour laquelle la vérité s’origine dans le Logos.L'Égypte et sa symbolique ont profondément marqué la pensée de la Renaissance. La parution en 1505 des Hieroglyphica , attribués à Horapollon, déclenche une fascination pour le code crypté des hiéroglyphes dans lesquels on croit déceler le réceptacle des mystères divins et une source de la Prisca Theologia . En 1556, l'imprimeur bâlois Michael Isengrin fait paraître les Hieroglyphica de Pierio Valeriano, immense ouvrage de codification des images qui cherche à traquer les sources du christianisme dans les hiéroglyphes et la symbolique gréco-latine païenne. On sait que nombre d'auteurs puisèrent à ce trésor, tel Ben Jonson qui l'utilisa pour la composition de ses Masques. La peinture fut également sujette à cet engouement pour l'Égypte et ses hiéroglyphes, comme en témoigne la parution en 1593 de l' Iconologia de Cesare Ripa, dont les sources principales sont le compendium de Valeriano et l' Emblematum Liber d'Alciat. Les nombreuses rééditions et traductions de l’ Iconologia aux dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles attestent le succès de ce texte qui devint un manuel de référence dont l'impact sur l'art occidental fut considérable. Tous ces ouvrages dessinent les contours de ce que Jean Raymond de Petity nomme, au dix-huitième siècle, une «Hiérographie» ( Le Manuel des artistes et des amateurs , Paris, 1770), expression d'une conception du monde encore fortement ancrée dans la théorie des analogies.L’imaginaire du hiéroglyphe perdure après le déchiffrement de l'écriture égyptienne par Champollion en 1822. Il fleurit dans un dix-neuvième siècle qui voit la résurgence d’une vision mystique du monde. Les Romantiques des deux côtés de l’Atlantique sont profondément influencés par la tradition néoplatonicienne et en particulier par Swedenborg, auteur du célèbre C lavis Hieroglyphica arcanorum naturalium et spiritualitium per viam Repraesentationum et Correspondentiarum (1741). Dans Nature (1836), ouvrage considéré comme la bible du Transcendantalisme, Ralph Waldo Emerson déclare que le monde est emblématique, faisant ainsi écho aux propos de Francis Quarles dans ses Emblemes (1635): «What are the Heavens, the Earth, nay every Creature, but hierogliphicks and emblemes of [God’s] Glory.» En France, Baudelaire, qui contribue à restaurer l’ancien univers analogique, affirme que «tout est hiéroglyphe» dans son étude sur Victor Hugo. Le discours des Symbolistes accorde une très grande place à la métaphore du «livre du monde», dont le poète doit déchiffrer les hiéroglyphes. Cependant, à mesure que change la conception du symbole, le rapport à la transcendance n’est plus admis comme une évidence. Ainsi, dans «Le démon de l’analogie» (1874) notamment, Mallarmé semble faire vaciller l’univers des similitudes, lui qui affirme aussi dans «l’Azur» (1864) que «le ciel est mort».Le déchiffrement des hiéroglyphes a cependant des conséquences visibles sur l’utilisation de la métaphore. Certains détectives de fiction excellent à déchiffrer des indices qui sont parfois comparés à des hiéroglyphes. Dans «The Adventure of the Dancing Men» (1903), Sherlock Holmes parvient à trouver le code qui donne sens aux mystérieux dessins soumis à son attention. De son côté, Freud reprend la métaphore du hiéroglyphe pour décrire les arcanes du rêve. Dans sa perspective, le hiéroglyphe n’est plus un symbole toujours ouvert, mais le signifiant d’un signifié récupérable par l’interprétation.Les communications pourront aborder le hiéroglyphe au sens propre, sa métaphore ou sa symbolique dans la pensée et l’art en Occident de la Renaissance à la Première Guerre mondiale. L'objectif du colloque est d'explorer l'évolution de la figure du hiéroglyphe sur près de quatre siècles, en mettant au jour des invariants, des inflexions, voire des ruptures dans les traitements qu'elle a subis. On explorera à cet effet les textes théoriques qui placent le hiéroglyphe au cœur de l'épistémè des périodes concernées, les discours théologiques et philosophiques qui légitiment le hiéroglyphe comme langue adamique, les diverses formes d'expressions artistiques qui recourent à la figuration hiéroglyphique en tant que symbole, ou encore les écrits qui s'approprient le hiéroglyphe en tant que modèle herméneutique. Modalités de soumissionLes propositions de communication en français ou en anglais (environ 500 mots) devront être adressées pour le 20 décembre 2014 à: Jean-Jacques Chardin ( ), Sophie Mantrant ( ) et Rémi Vuillemin ( publication (en anglais) est prévue après relecture des contributions par le comité scientifique du colloque.**«The Hieroglyphist prejudice» in Western thought from the Renaissance to the Great WarUniversity of StrasbourgJune 25-26-27 2015 (SEARCH, EA 2325)In her book entitled Le débat sur les écritures et l'hiéroglyphe aux 17 e et 18 e siècles (1965), Madeleine David argues that specific conceptions of the linguistic sign have impeded the development of a method to decipher hieroglyphs. One of these conceptions is the “hieroglyphic prejudice” which she defines as “the exaltation of the hieroglyphic figure as a pure symbol.” The prejudice is a postulate that hieroglyphs reveal a truth that is concealed, but they are neither a writing system nor a means of communication between human beings. Two years later, in Of Grammatology , Derrida used the same phrase as David, in his criticism of a metaphysical tradition for which truth originates in the Logos .Egypt and Egyptian symbolism have left a deep imprint on Renaissance thought. The printing of Hieroglyphica (1505, attributed to Horapollo), triggered a fascination for the cryptic code of hieroglyphs, which was seen as a key to the revelation of divine mysteries and a source of Prisca Theologia . In 1556, the Basel printer Michael Isengrin issued Piero Valeriano’s Hieroglyphica , an impressive attempt at codifying and tracing images and the sources of Christianity in hieroglyphs, as well as in Greek and Latin symbols. Numerous authors—such as Ben Jonson for his Masques—drew upon this rich treasure trove. Egypt and hieroglyphs were also to inspire painters, as shown by the publication of Cesare Ripa’s Iconologia (1593), whose sources are Valeriano’s work and Alciato’s Emblematum Liber . The sheer number of editions and translations of Ripa’s Iconologia in the 17 th and 18 th centuries testifies to the impact of the work on Western art. Taken together, these texts constitute what Jean Raymond de Petity called a “hierographia” in the 18 th century ( Le Manuel des artistes et des amateurs , Paris, 1770), the expression of a Weltanschauung that was still deeply rooted in the theory of correspondences.Hieroglyphics retained a powerful hold on the Western imagination even after Champollion deciphered the Rosetta Stone in 1822. The metaphor was given a new lease of life with the resurfacing of a mystical world view in the 19 th century. On both sides of the Atlantic, the Romantics were influenced by the neoplatonic tradition, and more particularly by Swedenborg and his famous C lavis Hieroglyphica arcanorum naturalium et spiritualitium per viam Repraesentationum et Correspondentiarum (1741). In Nature (1836), a work that was considered the bible of Transcendentalism, Ralph Waldo Emerson declared that the world was emblematic, echoing Francis Quarles’s words in Emblemes (1635): «What are the Heavens, the Earth, nay every Creature, but hierogliphicks and emblemes of [God’s] Glory.» In France, Baudelaire, who took part in reviving the old analogical world view, stated that “everything [was] hieroglyphic” in his study of Victor Hugo. The Symbolists repeatedly used the metaphor of the “book of the world,” the hieroglyphs of which are to be deciphered by the poet. However, as conceptions of the symbol changed, the transcendent nature of the hieroglyph was not seen as obvious anymore. In “Le démon de l’analogie” (1874) for instance, Mallarmé questions the world of resemblances, affirming in “L’Azur” (1864) that “the sky is dead.”The deciphering of hieroglyphs was not without impact on their metaphorical status. Champollion-like fictional detectives show great skill in reading clues that are sometimes likened to hieroglyphics. For example, in «The Adventure of the Dancing Men» (1903) Sherlock Holmes manages to uncover the code that lends meaning to the mysterious drawings. At the same period, Freud is using the metaphor of the hieroglyph to describe the mysteries of dreams. In his perspective, the latter sees the hieroglyph is not an open symbol, but rather the signifier of a signified that can be recovered through interpretation.We invite papers on the hieroglyph itself, but also on its use as metaphor or symbol in Western thought and art from the Renaissance to World War I. The aim of the conference is to explore the evolution of hieroglyphical thinking over four centuries, bringing out the continuities, variations or ruptures in the conception, use, and presentation of the “sacred engravings.” We will welcome investigations of theoretical texts that lay particular emphasis on the hieroglyph, making it central to the epistemes of the periods under consideration, theological and philosophical discourses that legitimize the hieroglyph as the Adamic language, artistic forms of expression that use the hieroglyph as a symbol, or the narratives and discourses that use the hieroglyph as a hermeneutic model.Papers will be reviewed after the conference by a publication committee and the accepted papers will be published in print and/or online.Please send abstracts of approximately 500 words by December 20th , 2014 to Jean-Jacques Chardin ( ), Sophie Mantrant ( ) and Rémi Vuillemin ( )
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Facetia , motto , Geschwenck … le développement de la facétie en France ne peut être envisagé sans ces parents européens dont souvent elle s’inspire, et au contact desquels elle se cherche, s’élabore. Parmi les pratiques de traduction et d’adaptation qui assurent ces échanges à la Renaissance, la traduction du mot d’esprit est un observatoire privilégié pour le développement et la codification du genre en Europe. Traduire le bon mot d’un texte latin, italien ou allemand, ce défi bien connu des traducteurs et des traductologues, confronte le conteur de la Renaissance à l’inadéquation irréductible de deux langues, parfois de deux cultures, et le conduit à proposer les solutions les plus diverses: trouvaille linguistique, mot à mot, mais aussi, en vertu du statut particulier de la translation à la Renaissance, réécriture radicale ou omission concertée. Dans leur diversité et leur inventivité, les solutions de traduction élaborées offrent alors une réflexion implicite sur les codes de la facétie, tout en révélant les fondements culturels des formes littéraires du rire.À l’articulation de la traductologie et de l’histoire littéraire, le colloque international qui se déroulera à Clermont-Ferrand du 9 au 11 octobre 2014, dans le cadre du programme FACEF (MSH Clermont-Ferrand) et de l’Atelier XVI e siècle de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, se propose d’envisager la littérature facétieuse à l’aune de ses enjeux linguistiques et culturels. Il s’agira de croiser les regards du traducteur, du traductologue et de l’historien de la littérature pour confronter les problèmes linguistiques posés par la traduction du comique verbal aux solutions spécifiques apportées par les recueils facétieux, et d’en dégager les implications poétiques, génériques et culturelles au sens large.ProgrammeJeudi 9 octobre20149h00 Ouverture du colloque(Mireille Huchon, Dominique Bertrand)9h15 Présentation générale (Nora Viet)9h30 Tom Conley(Harvard University) , conférence inaugurale : «Traduire: mot d’esprit»10h30 PauseSession 1 . Le mot d’esprit dans la traduction humaniste10h45 Bérangère Basset (Université Toulouse Le Mirail): «Érasme, passeur de bons mots? »11h15 Paola Cifarelli et Piero Andrea Martina (Università degli Studi di Torino) :«Pratiques de transmission du rire chez Guillaume Tardif: le cas des Dits des Sages Hommes »11h45 Marie-Claire Thomine (Université Paris-Sorbonne):«Du latin à l’italien, du latin au français: quelques appropriations facétieuses chez Guichardin et Du Fail»12h15 DiscussionSession 2. Le bon mot aux frontières de l’EuropeLes pérégrinations de Pogge14h00 Étienne Wolff (Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense) :«La traduction des mots d’esprit dans les Facéties du Pogge et les Colloques d’Érasme»14h30 Stefano Pittaluga (Università di Genova) :«I primi volgarizzamenti italiani delle Facezie di Poggio Bracciolini»15h00 Discussion et pauseJoke books européens 15h30 Louise Amazan (Université Paris-Sorbonne) : «D’une frontière l’autre: place, traduction et interprétation des mots d’esprits dans les Comptes du monde Adventureux d’A.D.S.D. (Paris, Groulleau, 1555)»16h00 Sebastian Coxon (University College London) :«Rire et traduire dans la réception européenne de l’ Ulenspiegel »16h30 Discussion et pause17h00 Table ronde : le défi de traduireVendredi 10 octobre2014Session 3. Mobilité et malléabilité du mot d’espritSur les routes du livre9h15 Jelle Koopmans (Universiteit van Amsterdam):«Bons mots et mauvaises plaisanteries en Europe»9h45 Anne Réach-Ngô (Université de Haute Alsace , Mulhouse) :«Comment l’esprit vient au mot. Le Trésor des récréations (1600), un manuel facétieux?»10h15 Discussion et pause Aux frontières de la facétie : le mot d’esprit dans la satire11h00 Bernd Renner (City University of New York) :«“Plus me arrestant aux sentences que aux dicts”: les Nefs des fols comme première satire universelle»11h30 Dominique Bertrand (Université Blaise Pascal , Clermont-Ferrand) :«“Sous le signe du facessieux”: la première adaptation française de l’ Encomium Moriae d’Érasme»12h DiscussionSession 4. La traduction, ouvroir de littérature facétieuseFacéties verbales et inventions romanesques14h30 Mireille Huchon (Université Paris-Sorbonne) : «“Ô belle mentule, voire diz je, memoire”, les colliguances de Rabelais»15h00 Elsa Kammerer (Université Charles de Gaulles-Lille) :«Traduire ou filer le mot d’esprit? la traduction allemande des jeux de mots de Rabelais par Johann Fischart (1575-1590)»15h30 Yen-Maï Tran-Gervat (Université Sorbonne Nouvelle-Paris 3) : «Les facéties de Sancho: la transposition de quelques bons mots dans la première traduction française de Don Quichotte (C.Oudin, 1614; F. de Rosset, 1618)»16h Discussion et pauseLe mot d’esprit en scène16h30 Claire Lesage (Université Rennes 2) :«Le mot d’esprit dans I Suppositi (1509) de l’Arioste et dans sa traduction française»17h00 Rolf Lohse (Universität Bonn) : «Le mot d'esprit sur les scènes italiennes et françaises»17h30 DiscussionSamedi 11 octobre2014Session 5. Traduire le mot d’esprit, inventer le bien direSous le signe du Courtisan09h15 Florence Bistagne (Université d’Avignon) :«Castiglione traducteur dans le Libro del Cortegiano »09h45 Serge Stolf (Université Stendhal , Grenoble) :«Le traducteur traduit»10h15 Karine Abiven (Université Paris-Sorbonne) : «“Le bon mot accompagné de narration”: l’héritage de la Renaissance italienne dans le discours sur la civilité en français»10h45 Pause et discussionLe mot d’esprit, pierre de touche du style11h15 Jean Balsamo (Université de Reims) : «Montaigne traducteur et la pratique du ‘bon mot’»11h45 Dominique Brancher (Universität Basel) :«La Dendrologie de James Howell (1641, 1648). Les défis de l’éloquence végétale»12h15 Discussions et conclusions du colloqueL’organisation de ce colloque s’inscrit conjointement dans le projet FACEF de la MSH de Clermont-Ferrand (dir. D. Bertrand) et dans le cadre de l’Atelier XVI e siècle de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne (dir. M. Huchon). Il bénéficie du soutien du Labex COMOD (Constitution de la Modernité) de l’Université de Lyon, du CERHAC (Centre d’études sur les Réformes, l’Humanisme et l’Âge Classique) de l’Université Blaise Pascal, ainsi que de l’équipe STIH (Sens Texte Informatique Histoire), de l’École doctorale “Concepts et Langages” et du Conseil Scientifique de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne.Comité scientifique : Dominique Bertrand (Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand), Florence Bistagne (Université d’Avignon, IUF), Mireille Huchon (Université Paris-Sorbonne, IUF), Jelle Koopmans (Université d’Amsterdam), Marie-Claire Thomine (Université Paris-Sorbonne), Nora Viet (Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand).
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September 27 2014

Seventeenth-Century Theories of Consciousness

[Revised entry by Larry M. Jorgensen on September 27, 2014. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html] In the seventeenth century, "consciousness" began to take on a uniquely modern sense. This transition was sparked by new theories of mind and ideas, and it connected with other important issues of debate during the seventeenth century, including debates...

Utilitarianism, Act and Rule

Act and Rule Utilitarianism  Utilitarianism is one of the best known and most influential moral theories. Like other forms of consequentialism, its core idea is that whether actions are morally right or wrong depends on their effects. More specifically, the only effects of actions that are relevant are the good and bad results that they […]


[Revised entry by Marga Reimer and Eliot Michaelson on September 26, 2014. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html] Reference is a relation that obtains between certain sorts of representational tokens (e.g., names, mental states, pictures) and objects. For instance, when I assert that "George W. Bush is a Republican," I use...

Kant, Immanuel: Overview

Immanuel Kant: An Overview Towards the end of his most influential work, Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), Kant argues that all philosophy ultimately aims at answering these three questions: “What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?” The book appeared at the beginning of the most productive period of his career, […]

Meaning of Life, The: Early Continental and Analytic Perspectives

The Meaning of Life: Early Continental and Analytic Perspectives The question of the meaning of life is one that interests philosophers and non-philosophers alike. The question itself is notoriously ambiguous and possibly vague. In asking about the meaning of life, one may be asking about the essence of life, about life’s purpose, about whether and […]

September 26 2014

September 22 2014

Copenhaver: articles

Brian P. Copenhaver:  
Research & Publications: Articles Completed

[quote]      Jewish Theologies of Space (4.69 MB)
              Scholastic Philosophy & Magic (4.9 MB)
             Astrology & Magic (5.63 MB)
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J. Jurt, Sprache, Literatur und nationale Identität. Die Debatten über das Universelle und das Partikuläre in Frankreich und Deutschland

Référence bibliographique : Joseph Jurt, Sprache, Literatur und nationale Identität. Die Debatten über das Universelle und das Partikuläre in Frankreich und Deutschland , De Gruyter Moton (Berlin/Boston), collection "mimesis, 58", 2014. EAN13 : 9783110340365.Si la 'nation d'Etat' est en principe un projet politique qui repose sur des principes universels, celle-ci a défini en même temps son profil particulier par des critères culturels. On a ainsi attribué, lors du processus de la constitution d'une identité nationale, à la langue et à la littérature une fonction centrale. La portée spécifique de la dimension culturelle par rapport à la dimension politique peut être très bien saisie à travers l'exemple de la France et de l'Allemagne. La France s'est définie très tôt par ses structures politiques. La langue et la littérature sont denvenues ensuite un attribut important de la nation. L'Allemagne a réalisé son unité étatique beaucoup plus tard. A travers la culture et la littérature s'est développée auparavant une pensée nationale pré-étatique. Dans le contexte de la guerre de 1870/71, des intellectuels allemands ont défini la nation par des critères culturels 'objectifs' alors qu'on a défini en France la nation par le principe de l'autodétermination des citoyens. Il serait cependant trop sommaire de partir d'une opposition idéaltypique entre 'nation d'Etat' et 'nation de culture'. A travers une reconstruction se fondant sur l'histoire linguistique, littéraire et politique on tente ici d'élucider ce processus dans toute sa complexité à partir du 16 e siècle jusqu'à nos jours.
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September 21 2014

Mainstreaming popular culture: les dynamiques hégémoniques dans la culture populaire

Mainstreaming popular cultureLes dynamiques hégémoniques dans la culture populaireUniversité Paris 8, jeudi 16 octobre 2014, salle G-2Contact: mainstreamingpc@gmail.comLa culture populaire reste un concept difficile à définir. Si elle a un temps été utilisée péjorativement pour (dis)qualifier la culture «de masse», dépréciée, car «marchande» – et si elle continue parfois d’être utilisée dans ce sens –, elle a progressivement gagné une valeur descriptive sans pour autant être précise. La culture populaire se rapporterait à une dimension concernant «les gens» ou «le peuple» à la fois comme public ou marché mais aussi comme sujet. L’apport de Stuart Hall, dans son travail de «déconstruction du "populaire"» (1981), a été de proposer une troisième définition qui «embrasse, pour une période donnée, les formes et les activités qui ont leurs racines dans les conditions sociales et matérielles des classes particulières, et qui se sont incarnées dans les traditions et les pratiques populaires» (Hall 2008: 123). Avec cette définition, Stuart Hall entendait mettre l’accent sur la «tension continue (de corrélation, d’influence et d’antagonisme) avec la culture dominante» ( Ibid .).La culture populaire rend possible la contestation et la subversion comme elle peut consolider l’hégémonie culturelle lorsqu’elle devient l’instrument cynique des industries culturelles. C’est cette tension que nous souhaitons interroger et qui donne son sens au titre de cette journée d’études. Dans un ouvrage majeur des cultural studies , Dick Hebdige notait que les subcultures sont toujours amenées à décevoir nos attentes puisqu’elles sont constamment menacées d’être récupérées par la culture mainstream . Entendue chez Hebdige comme le processus par lequel l’ordre subverti est restauré, la récupération apprivoise et domestique la subversion en se l’appropriant. Elle est une arme aux mains des industries culturelles, à la fois commerciale et idéologique. Pour autant, la culture populaire n’est jamais récupérée une fois pour toute, elle est un processus jamais fini. À ce titre, elle est à la fois le lieu et l’enjeu d’une lutte pour l’hégémonie. Il s’agira donc d’interroger ensemble les dynamiques hégémoniques et contre-hégémoniques dans la culture populaire (cinéma, musiques populaires, romans, etc.) et les intérêts contradictoires qui s’y jouent, en considérant la culture dans sa matérialité.Organisation: Keivan Djavadzadeh et Pierre RaboudProgramme9h30-10h Introduction à la journée – Keivan Djavadzadeh (Cresppa-LabToP) et Pierre Raboud (IHES)10h-12h Table ronde 1« La subversion est-elle soluble dans la culture de masse ? »Fabio Mascaro Querido (UNICAMP – Brésil, attaché à l’École de Hauts Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)) : Réification et utopie. La dialectique de la culture de masse dans le capitalisme contemporain chez Fredric JamesonMarie Pierre Huillet (Université Toulouse II Le Mirail, Laboratoire: Lerass, UT III; équipe du Grecom) : Masculin, féminin : immanence et transcendance dans le cinéma de Quentin TarantinoAlix Bénistant (Université Paris 8, CEMTI) : « My label isn't Sony, my label is the people ». Processus hégémoniques et contre-hégémoniques dans l’industrie musicale latino-américaine de Miami.Animée par Maxime Cervulle (Université Paris 8, CEMTI)12h Déjeuner13h30-15h30 Table ronde 2« Modes, pratiques et limites des processus de réappropriations populaires »Valérie Rolle (Université de Lausanne, Institut des sciences sociales): Le tatouage dans tous ses éclats : marginal, populaire, mainstream et artistique ?Sébastien François (Lycée français de Vienne) : Des braconniers rançonnés ? Succès de la fanfiction et évolution des tentatives de marchandisation des pratiques de fansNelly Quemener (Université Paris 3, Laboratoire CIM, Équipe MCPN) : Relookez-vous ! Les émissions de relooking , de l’injonction à l’expertise individuelle aux appropriations des publics.Animée par Ulrike Lune Riboni (Université Paris 8, CEMTI)15h30 Pause15h45-17h15 Table ronde 3« Réception et diffusion des cultures populaires »Thomas Pillard (Université Paris 3): Culture patriarcale et cinéphilie féminine. Réceptions genrées du cinéma dans les magazines populaires des années 1950Luc Robène (Université de Bordeaux, LACES) et Solveig Serre (THALIM, CNRS) : L’émergence de la scène punk en France (1976-1978) : entre passion subversive et mainstreamisation médiatiqueAnimée par Ilana Eloit (London School of Economics, Gender Institute)17h15 Conclusion – Laurent Jeanpierre (Université Paris 8, Cresppa-LabToP)Journée d’études co-organisée par le Cresppa-LabToP (Paris 8, France) et l’IHES (UNIL, Suisse)
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Blogspektrogramm 38/2014

Ihr Expertenteam für ausgewogene Sonntagsfreizeitgestaltung verwöhnt Sie heute mit Begriffsreflexionen, Satzzeichen, Internetsprache, Speisekartenlinguistik, Lexikografie, Homophonophobie und großem Rätselspaß:

  • Krise? Krieg? Zur unheilvollen Unschärfe des Begriffs Krise schreibt Matthias Heine in der WELT: „Die Krise ist in der Krise.
  • Anatol war diese Woche mehrfach gefragt: ein Interview im Elektrischen Reporter zum Sprachwandel auf Twitter & Co (ab 8:10) und im RBB-Radio zum Semikolon, wo Anatol seine Einschätzung aus der TAZ im Juni revidiert.
  • Kulinarische Linguistik gefällig? Dan Jurafsky & Co tun uns den Gefallen und entschlüsseln die Linguistik von Speisekarten.
  • Die NZZ berichtet über den Abschluss des lexikografischen Großprojekts des „Historischen Lexikons der Schweiz“ und reflektiert über derartige Projekte im digitalen Zeitalter.
  • In unseren Feeds ging es vor einigen Wochen schon rum: in den USA ist ein Sprachlehrer gefeuert worden, weil sein Chef den Unterschied zwischen homophon und homophob nicht kannte. SLATE kommt dem Chef nun zu Hilfe und erklärt (auch, was homophonophobia ist).
  • Rätselspaß: ALL THINGS LINGUISTIC greift eine (schon recht alte) Idee des linguistischen Satiremagazins Speculative Grammarian auf: LingDoku, Sudoku für Linguist/innen.
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Re: Periodisations, borders

Parts of Brian Garcia's review of Paul Richard Blum's 2010 book Philosophy of Religion in the Renaissance (2014-09-16) are of potential relevance in the context of this thread:
  [quote]The area of Renaissance philosophy seems to gain attention from historians primarily, thereby suffering from neglect by those interested and specialized in philosophy. One reason for this is that the Renaissance se...
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Liber, libri, m. : livre : Pierre Ronsard

Liber, libri, m. : livre : Pierre Ronsard

Vous le savez sans doute, la BnF a mis en vente un certain nombre de livres électroniques dans le cadre de sa filiale BnF-partenariats. Ceux-ci sont disponibles à moins de deux euros sur les grandes plate-formes d’achat, Fnac, Amazon, iTunes et j’en passe.

J’ai beaucoup d’interrogations sur le fait qu’une bibliothèque, dont la mission première est de donner accès à l’information, vende des ouvrages, qui est plus est du domaine public. C’est une somme modique, me direz-vous, qu’importe, c’est une petite somme qui peut rebuter ceux qui sont les plus fragiles et à ce titre elle me pose problème. Relisez à ce sujet la remarquable tribune d’Hervé Le Crosnier et le billet d’Aldus, ainsi que le communiqué de Savoirs com1.

Les ouvrages publiés par BnF-partenariats sont tous issus d’oeuvres du domaine public. En parcourant la liste, j’ai repéré un volume d’Oeuvres choisies de Ronsard, qui est l’auteur sur lequel j’ai travaillé dans mes jeunes années. Difficile pour moi de résister à une nouvelle édition du poète vendômois, j’ai donc acheté l’epub Oeuvres choisies.

Le communiqué de la BnF s’ouvre ainsi "BnF-Partenariats, la filiale de la BnF, lance BnF collection ebooks, une collection de livres numériques de référence publiée en haute qualité éditoriale au format epub”. Il est dit aussi que les epub mis en ligne sont le "fruit d’un méticuleux travail de sélection".

#BNF #ebooks #domainepublic

March 01 2013

Early Neolithic Water Wells Reveal the World's Oldest Wood Architecture

The European Neolithization ~6000−4000 BC represents a pivotal change in human history when farming spread and the mobile style of life of the hunter-foragers was superseded by the agrarian culture. Permanent settlement structures and agricultural production systems required fundamental innovations in technology, subsistence, and resource utilization. Motivation, course, and timing of this transformation, however, remain debatable. Here we present annually resolved and absolutely dated dendroarchaeological information from four wooden water wells of the early Neolithic period that were excavated in Eastern Germany. 

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