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July 10 2015

02mydafsoup-01
// mit bester Empfehlung - oAnth

Vortrag "Die Eurokrise - Warum versagt die Wissenschaft?" von Prof Heiner Flassbeck am 01.07.2015 an der FU Berlin im Rahmen des Kurses "Finanzkrisen und Geldsystem".
Im Vortrag wird insbesondere auf die Währungsunion, Handelsungleichgewichte und Lohnstückkosten eingegangen.
Der Kurs wird mitorganisiert von den Kritischen Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern Berlin unter Kursleitung von Prof. Klaus Peter Kisker. Weitere Infos zum Kurs hier:

http://www.kriwis-berlin.org/finanzkrisen-u-geldsystem/

June 23 2015

02mydafsoup-01

October 08 2014

Scheren, schor, geschoren (st.) vs. scheren, scherte, geschert (schw)

Ich schor ein Schaf, da war es kahlgeschoren. Du scherst dich nicht darum, dann scher dich doch zum Teufel. Wie hängen die Verben ›scheren, schor, geschoren‹ und ›scheren, scherte, geschert‹ zusammen? Inhaltsverzeichnis: ▶ 01:05 Verbpärchenschema im Deutschen: Schwimmen und schemmen, trinken und tränken, dringen und drängen -------------------------------- ▶ 06:42 Urindogermanisch sker- 'schneiden, abschneiden, kratzen, scheren' → scheren, schor, geschoren, englisch to shear, sheared (shore), sheared (shorn) -------------------------------- ▶ 10:42 Urindogermanisch sker-H- 'trennen, teilen' → skor-ā 'Teilung, Trennung' → Schar, engl. share → scheren, scherte, geschert: ausscheren, sich zum Teufel scheren -------------------------------- ▶ 15:23 Urindogermanisch sker-s- 'Wolle krempeln' → scherren, schor, geschorren → scharren, scharrte, gescharrt -------------------------------- ▶ 16:48 scheren, schor, geschoren → scherender Schmerz → sich um etwas scheren -------------------------------- ▶ 19:00 Falsche Etymologie bei Duden: scerōn 'scherzen'

http://www.belleslettres.eu/video/scheren-geschoren-geschert-gescharrt.mp4



Reposted from02mysoup-aa 02mysoup-aa

September 27 2014

September 26 2014

September 24 2014

September 23 2014

Reposted fromfefe fefe

September 21 2014

September 09 2014

02mydafsoup-01

July 21 2014

02mydafsoup-01

July 10 2014

02mydafsoup-01

January 27 2014

02mydafsoup-01
Der Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs verwandelte die Deutschen in ein Volk von Dichtern. Nach einer Schätzung des Literaturkritikers Julius Bab gingen im August 1914 täglich etwa 50 000 Kriegsgedichte in den Redaktionen von Zeitungen und Zeitschriften ein. An der «poetischen Mobilmachung», so Babs Ausdruck, beteiligten sich auch die professionellen Schriftsteller. Euphorische Gesänge, die Deutsche und Österreicher beim Gang in die Schlacht beseligen sollten, sind überliefert von Richard Dehmel, Gerhart Hauptmann, Rainer Maria Rilke, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Rudolf Alexander Schröder (um nur die bekanntesten zu nennen). In Prosa sekundierten ihnen Epiker wie Thomas Mann und Alfred Döblin, Philosophen wie Max Scheler und Paul Natorp, Theologen wie Ernst Troeltsch und Adolf von Harnack, Soziologen wie Georg Simmel und Werner Sombart.

[...]
Deutsche und englische Lyrik im Krieg: Kriegserlebnis und Dichtung | Manfred Koch - Literatur und Kunst Nachrichten - NZZ.ch - 2014-01-25

July 25 2013

02mydafsoup-01
Alle regierenden Parteien wussten dies und müssen sich über die langfristig verhehrenden politischen und entwürdigenden Konsequenzen klar gewesen sein, wohlweißlich, ohne darüber jemals dem Volk Rechenschaft gegeben zu haben; die sogenannte Kanzlerakte und die himmelschreiende Tatsache, dass sich einige CDU/CSU-Abgeordnete am Anbeginn der Regierungszeit Willy Brandts zu einer geheimdienstlich agierenden Einheit als parlamentarischer Ableger des BND bzw. BAVerfS erklärten (die Einheit bestand bis zum Amtsantritt Helmut Kohls), gibt jene zynisch-anbiedernde Haltung der deutschen politischen Klasse zu erkennen, die sich bis heute nahtlos fortsetzt.    

March 01 2013

Eine allzu lange unterschätzte Gefahr

Olaf Sundermeyer erzählt in seinem Buch „Rechter Terror in Deutschland“ eine erschreckend lange „Geschichte der Gewalt“.

zu Olaf Sundermeyer: Rechter Terror in Deutschland. Täter, Opfer und der hilflose Staat.
Verlag C. H. Beck, München, 2012.


Rezension von H.-Georg Lützenkirchen (28.02.2013)

Der Skandal des Umgangs mit rechter Gewalt in Deutschland liegt darin, dass diese Gewalt lange Zeit überhaupt nicht angemessen wahrgenommen wurde. Gerne wurde sie kleingeredet, es war dann von wahlweise bedauernswerten oder erschreckenden Einzelfällen die Rede, oft wurde ein rechtsextremer Hintergrund nicht wahrgenommen und die Tat ging als ‚normale‘ Gewalttat in die Statistik ein. Eine verfehlte Extremismustheorie, die rechte und linke Gewalt gerne gleichsetzte, verhinderte zudem den Blick auf die spezifischen Bedingungen rechter Gewalt in Deutschland. Nicht auf dem rechten Auge blind war der Staat, er war schlicht nicht informiert.

Entsprechend groß war der Schock, als 2011 die rechte Terrorgruppe „Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund“ (NSU) eher zufällig aufgedeckt wurde. Über zehn Jahre war das Trio Uwe Mundlos, Uwe Bönhardt und Beate Zschäpe sowie das sie unterstützende rechtsextreme Netzwerk unerkannt geblieben. In dieser Zeit verübten sie mehrere Gewalttaten, zwischen 2000 und 2006 ermordeten sie in verschiedenen Städten neun Menschen, allesamt Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund. 2007 erschossen sie in Heilbronn eine Polizistin.

Warum? Olaf Sundermeyer leitet sein Buch „Rechter Terror in Deutschland“ mit der Antwort eines ehemaligen NPD-Funktionärs ein: „Die haben ja das umgesetzt, von dem die meisten anderen in der Szene nur träumen, weil sie selbst zu feige sind, es ihnen gleichzutun. Aber grundsätzlich sehnen viele eine Endlösung für Ausländer herbei.“ Denn Rechtsextremisten fühlen sich in einer „permanenten Notwehrsituation“. In ihrer Logik sind ‚Ausländer‘ Beweis für eine bedrohende Überfremdung; Linke und andere „Gutmenschen“ leisten dieser Überfremdung Vorschub und bedrohen damit zudem die „weiße Rasse“. Überall Bedrohung, gegen die man sich mit Taten statt Worten wehren muss. „Und Taten“, so schreibt Sundermeyer, „sind Gewalttaten“. Sie gehören zum Rechtsextremismus – den Sundermeyer als eine Ideologie beschreibt, „die von der Ungleichwertigkeit der Menschen ausgeht und Gewalt als Mittel der Politik sieht“. Diese Ideologie, so stellt Sundermeyer klar, speist ebenso die rechtsextremen Terrortaten wie „beispielsweise die Politik der NPD“. Die Ziele sind die gleichen, nur dass die NPD sie zuweilen mit „strategischer Rücksicht auf die Anerkennung, die sie für Wahlen benötigt“, zurückhaltender formuliert. Dankenswert klare und richtige Aussagen, die der Autor hier trifft.

Sundermeyers „Geschichte der Gewalt“ beginnt in den 1980er-Jahren. Als markantes Datum steht das „Oktoberfestattentat“ in München, bei dem am 26.September 1980 13 Menschen ums Leben kamen – unter ihnen auch der mutmaßliche Attentäter. Bis heute ist der Hintergrund dieses Anschlages nicht vollständig aufgeklärt. Spuren führen aber zur „Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann“. Deren ehemaliger „Chef“ Karl Heinz Hoffmann ist nach wie vor in der rechten Szene aktiv. Sundermeyer berichtet von einem bizarren Besuch bei Hoffmann, der ihm die „wahren Hintergründe“ des Attentats in München zu erläutern versucht. In Hoffmanns Wehrsportgruppe waren jedenfalls viele, die mit Gewalttaten auffielen. Der Autor nennt sie alle. [...]

Reposted from02mysoup-aa 02mysoup-aa

February 24 2013

"History and Identity in the Late Antique Near East", edited by Philip Wood

Egypte actus's curator insight, Today, 8:23 AM

 

History and Identity in the Late Antique Near East gathers together the work of distinguished historians and early career scholars with a broad range of expertise to investigate the significance of newly emerged, or recently resurrected, ethnic identities on the borders of the eastern Mediterranean world. It focuses on the "long late antiquity" from the eve of the Arab conquest of the Roman East to the formation of the Abbasid caliphate. The first half of the book offers papers on the Christian Orient on the cusp of the Islamic invasions. These papers discuss how Christians negotiated the end of Roman power, whether in the selective use of the patristic past to create confessional divisions or the emphasis of the shared philosophical legacy of the Greco-Roman world. The second half of the book considers Muslim attempts to negotiate the pasts of the conquered lands of the Near East, where the Christian histories of Hira or Egypt were used to create distinctive regional identities for Arab settlers. Like the first half, this section investigates the redeployment of a shared history, this time the historical imagination of the Qu'ran and the era of the first caliphs. All the papers in the volume bring together studies of the invention of the past across traditional divides between disciplines, placing the re-assessment of the past as a central feature of the long late antiquity. As a whole, History and Identity in the Late Antique Near East represents a distinctive contribution to recent writing on late antiquity, due to its cultural breadth, its interdisciplinary focus, and its novel definition of late antiquity itself.

Oxford University Press, USA, April 1, 2013, 272 pages

 

------------------------------------

 

 

Contents via http://scholar.qsensei.com/content/1t9yw6 ;

 

Sophronius of Jerusalem and the end of roman history / Phil Booth -- Identity, philosophy, and the problem of Armenian history in the sixth century / Tara Andrews -- The chronicle of Seert and Roman ecclesiastical history in the Sasanian world / Philip Wood -- Why were the Syrians interested in Greek philosophy? / Dan King -- You are what you read: Qenneshre and the Miaphysite church in the seventh century / Jack Tannous -- The prophet's city before the prophet: Ibn Zabala (d. after 199/814) on pre-Islamic Medina / Harry Munt -- Topoi and topography in the histories of al-?ira / Adam Talib -- "The crinkly haired people of the black earth"; examining Egyptian identities in Ibn 'abd al-?akam's futu? / Hussein Omar -- Forgetting Ctesiphon: Iran's pre-Islamic past, ca. 800-1100 / Sarah Savant -- Legal knowledge and local practices under the early Abbasids / Mathiew Tillier.

 



Reposted byiranelection iranelection

February 13 2013

Reorganizing a vast Archive: ITS - SPIEGEL ONLINE

By David Crossland in Bad Arolsen, Germany

 

Global Web of Memory

Reorganizing the database is one of the tasks of Susanne Urban, the ITS head of research, who joined the archive in 2009 after working in Yad Vashem, Israel's official memorial to the Holocaust. She says she expects the archive to reveal a plethora of "mosaic stones" to complete the picture of the genocide rather than alter it.

"Here you keep getting confronted with the global aspect of the Holocaust and survival, you see how it started in Germany, spread across Europe and with the documents about the survivors we see how a web of memory has spread across the whole world. Here you get an overview over everything. What makes it so harrowing is that you don't just get one aspect, you get them all. You sense this monolith that was built of pain and sorrow."

The work may be fascinating, but it can also be exhausting and saddening. Urban has only two research assistants on temporary contracts, which she says isn't enough.



Reposted from02mysoup-aa 02mysoup-aa

Die „Banalität des Bösen“

Margarethe von Trottas Film über Hannah Arendt.
Von Alexandra Pontzen (13.02.2013).

Margarethe von Trotta hat ihrer filmbiografischen Galerie von ‚starken Frauen‘, nach Gudrun Ensslin, Rosa Luxemburg und Hildegard von Bingen, ein weiteres Porträt hinzugefügt, das der vor den Nazis 1941 nach New York geflohenen  und ebendort 1975 verstorbenen deutsch-jüdischen Philosophin Hannah Arendt.

Unter dem verkürzten Titel „Hannah Arendt“ – auf den Zusatz des Originaltitels „Ihr Denken veränderte die Welt“ wurde in der deutschen Präsentation eher verzichtet (er hätte auch zu sehr an den in der DDR gängigen, auf Lenin gemünzten Spruch „Er rührte an den Schlaf der Welt“ erinnert) – erlebte der Film im Beisein der nordrhein-westfälischen Ministerpräsidentin und dreier ihrer Ministerinnen am 8. Januar in Essen seine deutsche Erstaufführung und gelangte ab dem übernächsten Tag in die deutschen Kinos. Kaum ein deutsches Feuilleton lässt sich finden, das dem Werk nicht seine Aufmerksamkeit und Reverenz erwiesen hätte – und beides, soviel vorweg, dürfte sich mindestens ebenso doppelter politischer Korrektheit, feministisch wie historisch grundierter, wie seinem filmkünstlerischen Rang verdanken.

[...]

Reposted from02mysoup-aa 02mysoup-aa

"A Crisis Of The State? The End Of The Post-Westphalian Model" by Carlo Bordoni

Carlo bordoniBefore we delve into the reasons for the crisis of the state it is necessary to clarify the meaning of ‘nation’. Nation has a cultural connotation and its distant origins are historically much older than state: it is still recognisable as a nation even when its borders have not been marked out and, at least formally, it is still not a state with its own laws. A population that is recognised as a nation feels free in the territory in which it lives and does not need to set limits on their freedom of movement within that space that they feel belongs to them.

And yet a country can continue to exist only if it exists as a state, that reinforces its identity and ensures precise territorial limits, because while the idea of “nation” is a feeling, the state – more pragmatically – needs a territory in which to take root. According to Jürgen Habermas, on the other hand, “national community does not precede the political community, but it is the product of it” (The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, Polity Press, 2000, p. 76). A statement which is partially accepted, if we admit that the idea of nationality can mature only within a state, which, however, does not take into account the presence of a core of national feeling (although not institutionalised) on which to build a state.

State and nation go together and support each other, but something began to change in the late seventies and subsequent decades, in correspondence to the dissolution of modernity.

The anthropologist Arjun Appadurai was the first to report that the concept of nation is entering a crisis (Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, University of Minnesota, 1996), because it is the very cultural identity that is first damaged by the change taking place. What is called into doubt is the idea of the national community, based on the same language, same customs, same religion, same culture.

The opening of borders is preceded by a cultural openness that upsets the age-old certainties. The idea of nation endures while the presence of linguistic, religious or political minorities is “confined” temporarily or geographically in “enclaves” in ghettos, in refugee camps or in shelters. Then, when the diasporic communities begin to see recognition of their rights as citizens with full rights, and then demand recognition of their “diversity” with respect to the obligation to integrate (the customary path towards equality), the ‘unity of the nation begins to crumble.

Already in the nineties, Appadurai talked about post-national states, where diasporic communities are no longer occasional or temporary events, but long-lasting ones built into the system, which have become an integral part of the culture and history of a country. The term post-national better defines the earlier concepts of multinational and international, that remain fairly strongly related to economic, legal and practical dependence with the state as reference, until the entire system is weakened.

We live in a constant state of crisis, and this crisis also involves the modern state, whose structure, functionality, effectiveness (including the system of democratic representation) are no longer suited to the times in which we live.

There are many critical issues facing the modern state and the causes are many: some induced by deep historical and cultural changes that took place between the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the third millennium, others by political and economic choices that led to consequences in people’s daily lives, further exasperating the distance from the institutions.

In the first place, the end of the post-Westphalian model. It appears crucial to an understanding of the present condition starting from the loss of meaning of this model of balance between states, which has stood for centuries and has been the cornerstone of international relations. The Treaties of Westphalia (Münster and Osnabrück) in 1648 (then essentially reconfirmed by the statute of the United Nations) have established some basic principles on which to base the rights and limits of the modern state, the new civil system that was born from the ashes of feudalism and that Hobbes represented as metaphoric in Leviathan: a form of monstrous strength made up of all the men who gathered together and recognised each other in a superior unity.

Based on the principle of limited sovereignty, the post-Westphalian model recognises in the modern state absolute and indivisible sovereignty over its territory and ownership in international relations, of which it is the sole subject.

If for a long time the state and nation have been able to live together, united on a historical and legal level by the insolubility of the fundamental principles that modernity assured, it was thanks to the agreements made in the Treaties of Westphalia, at the end of the long religious war, that had shattered Europe for thirty years. Since then, modern states, in the form that we have known for centuries, have standardised the so-called “post-Westphalian model”, which sets down the rules of universal stability and recognises the full sovereignty of a state within its own borders.

In the third millennium, it is the very post-Westphalian model that enters into crisis, dragging with it the crisis of the modern state, which is determined not only by the opening of borders, but by the inability demonstrated in maintaining its commitments to its citizens. In this phase, it is the “internal” boundaries that create problems. Security, defence of privilege, identity, recognition and cultural traditions, which once coincided with the boundaries of the post-Westphalian state, are now altered, uncertain, liquid. They are no longer reliable.

The dissolution of geographical or temporal limits imposed on diasporic communities determines the well-known phenomenon of the turnaround: if in the past it was the majorities that enclosed the minorities in “enclaves”, now it is the same majorities that shut themselves inside the “gated communities”, guarded by private security guards, by electronic control and security systems; jealous of the privacy that is no longer guaranteed on the outside.

Now it is clear how this model entered into crisis with the development of globalisation, whose explosive force has erased the boundaries between states and undermined any claim of absolute sovereignty. But the consequences of globalisation are not limited only to undermining the rules of international relations; they have led to a further upheaval, removing the power and raising it to a higher level. Now it is distant and spread on a global level, thus separated from politics, with which, up to now, it had been intimately linked. Hobbes’s Leviathan, deprived of its operating arm, is reduced to a mutilated body that wallows in its impotence. It gets agitated, argues and proclaims, but can not do anything even when it has made momentous decisions because the operational side is the responsibility of others. This no longer belongs to it.

The separation of politics and power is lethal to the modern state. Especially if it is a democratic state, whose constitution has promised its citizens to let them take part in common decisions that but now are taken by bodies that are non-democratically appointed or controlled from the bottom. The tragedy of the modern state lies in its inability to implement at a global level the decisions taken locally. The citizen, for example, elects their representatives to the European Parliament, who, in turn, elect committees and subcommittees, where executive decisions are taken by the last organisational bodies, formed on the basis of a series of institutional changes, the complexity of which should be a guarantee of impartiality and independence.

If it were just a matter of bureaucracy, complicated by the presence of more than one body, the system would still retain some form of democracy, although there is no direct relationship (no feedback, no opportunity to reply) between the last of the voters of a small European country and the drafter of a Community regulation. The problem is more serious, from the moment when the most important decisions on an economic, financial and developmental level are taken not by institutional bodies, as required by a democratic system, though it be a rather loose network, but by groups of power, by holding companies, multinationals, lobbies and the so-called “market”, that is by a summation of personal actions, technical consequences, emotional reactions, political will and particular interests that overlap in a very confusing manner and determine the fate of millions of people without any liability. Everything seems to happen because this is how the world turns and no one is able to oppose it. Not the people taking to the streets, protesting, whose only result is, at best, to sensitise public opinion that is otherwise distracted by an excess of information. Not even the nation-state, which does not have the instruments needed to operate at global distances and never had, since the issue had never been raised before.

Before being physical, political, legal and economic, in compliance with the post-Westphalian model, borders have always maintained that balance of strength and relationships which now no longer exists.

The crisis of the state coincides with the crisis of the post-Westphalian model, whose certainties have been swept away by the opening of borders, by increasingly more rapid exchanges of communications, by an economy at a global or supranational level and, not least, by a culture which is no longer at a local level, and is deeply influenced by suggestions, information, and comments from all over the world. The global village of McLuhan was created (or is being created) thanks to economic and cultural exchange, but at the expense of system-states that it is no longer in line with the changing times.

Reposted from02myEcon-01 02myEcon-01
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