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May 11 2012
Russia: Yavlinsky Stir Reveals Opposition Rift
On May 10, Grigory Yavlinsky [en] controversially wrote [ru] in his LiveJournal blog that the Russian opposition's recent turn to more confrontational tactics is a bad omen for democracy. Yavlinsky, born the same year as Vladimir Putin, is one of Russian politics' oldest faces. He played a pivotal role in the immediate post-Soviet period, authoring important elements of Russia's transition to a free-market economy. Since the 1990s, Yavlinksy has been the face of Yabloko [en], Russia's original liberal democrat political party. In the Putin era, Yavlinsky's party has remained a curious outlier to both “systemic politics” and “nonsystemic politics,” having lost its Duma presence in 2007 but remaining an officially registered party that is still viewed by many oppositionists as compromised and pro-establishment.
Grigory Yavlinskiy, economist and politician, 15 Jan 2011, photo by Skilpaddle, CC BY-SA 3.0; Wikimedia Commons.
True to Yabloko's troubled past and present, Yavlinksy's May 10 blog post has upset many and pleased relatively few. While he made a point of praising protesters' bravery and placing “main responsibility” on the authorities ('those who falsify elections, propagate corruption and thievery,' etc.), many have focused exclusively on Yavlinsky's criticisms of the protest movement. Lenta.ru, for instance, ran an article [ru] titled, “Yavlinsky Declares Protests Meaningless.”
Yavlinsky's concerns with the new developments in Moscow protests center on spiking violence and a perceived drift away from politics. He writes:
При этом я считаю, что если у организаторов есть расчет на то, что жестокость омоновцев будет мультиплицировать количество желающих с ними сражаться, то это неверный расчет. Опыт Триумфальной показывает, что мультипликации не получится. Наоборот, люди перестанут ходить на митинги и шествия, если там льется кровь, если их там избивают. Неужели кто-то полагает, что можно чего-то добиться лобовым столкновением, гражданской войной?
[…]
САМИ ПО СЕБЕ ГРАЖДАНСКИЕ МИТИНГИ, АКЦИИ, ГУЛЯНИЯ И ПРОЧИЕ ФЛЕШМОБЫ, ПРИ ВСЕЙ ИХ ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКОЙ ДОСТОЙНОСТИ, ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИ НИЧЕГО НЕ ИЗМЕНЯТ И В СИЛУ СВОЕЙ БЕСПОМОЩНОСТИ БУДУТ ЧАСТО ПЕРЕРАСТАТЬ В ДРАКИ И СХВАТКИ. Разрастание насилия сделает ситуацию во всех отношениях гораздо хуже.
If organizers are counting on the brutality of riot police to multiply the number of people wishing to join their fight, I think that's a flawed count. The experience of Triumfalnaia [Square] shows that no such multiplication occurs. On the contrary, people stop coming to rallies and marches, if blood is being spilled there, or if people are being beaten. Do some people really believe that anything can be accomplished with a head-on collision, or a civil war?
[…]
BY ITSELF, CITIZEN DEMONSTRATIONS, RALLIES, WALKABOUTS, AND SIMILAR FLASHMOBS (WITH ALL THEIR HUMAN DIGNITY) WILL NOT CHANGE ANYTHING POLITICALLY, AND BY VIRTUE OF THEIR OWN IMPOTENCE WILL OFTEN ESCALATE INTO FIGHTING AND CRACKDOWNS. The spread of violence will make the situation much worse in every respect.
As an alternative to this brand of dissent, he proposes a response “personal, programmatic, idealogical, organized, professional, moral, AND POLITICAL,” saying that a gradual, long-term approach is the only real option:
Надо начинать заниматься серьезной политикой , выигрывать выборы и брать власть. Долго? Да, шесть лет очень долго, но раньше и мы ничего не успеем. И следует понимать - альтернатив будет не одна, а три: левая, демократическая и националисты. Какая победит - скажет народ.
Reactions to Yavlinsky's comments have varied. Some bloggers have been less than polite. Anti-Putin LiveJournal user i_l_d responded [ru] simply: “Go screw yourself, Yavlinsky.” Nationalist blogger sinn-fein-front wrote [ru] gloatingly:
Ну вот и Явлинский, отчисливший Навального за национализм, в своем блоге на Эхе Москвы признал националистов равноценной силой протеста. Что ж, отрадно. Один за одним падают бастионы русофобии в публичной политике
Prominent blogger Rustem Adagamov [en], linking to the above-mentioned Lenta.ru article (not Yavlinsky's original text), tweeted [ru]:
Вот и Явлинский! http://lenta.ru/news/2012/05/10/yavl/ “Надо начинать заниматься серьезной политикой” Вау, а 16 лет до этого—это что было?
Dmitri Ivanov, a political satirist from the website CarambaTV.ru [ru], a webtv project, tweeted [ru]:
Явлинский заявил о бессмысленности митингов. Митинги заявили о бессмысленности Явлинского
Despite the backlash against a politician infamous for upsetting pro-Kremlin and oppositionist figures alike, support for Yavlinsky also exists on the RuNet. Some of his supporters are predictable, like Ivan Bolshakov, a deputy chairman of Yabloko's Moscow branch, who faulted [ru] critics for taking Yavlinsky's words out of context:
И каким же надо быть простачком (или сознательным дискредитатором?), чтобы этот смысл извратить до «Явлинский – против митингов» и фактически приравнять заявление Явлинского к позиции Путина его дружков!?
Vladimir Milov [en], another prominent oppositionist politician who briefly served in the Russian government as Deputy Energy Minister in 2002, is another figure who has publicized his disdain for street confrontations. He tweeted [ru] a mild attack on Lenta.ru and announced his support for Yavlinsky's comments:
Вот образчик типичного наглого хипстерского вранья http://www.lenta.ru/news/2012/05/10/yavl/ а вот оригинал, с которым я полностью согласен http://gr-yavlinsky.livejournal.com/43985.html
In the aftermath of parliamentary elections, between December 2011 and February 2012, the Russian opposition experienced an explosion of mass popularity that disadvantaged professional politicians like Yavlinsky and Milov, whose careers (or ‘activism,' if one prefers) are fixed on evolutionary improvements to Russian society and governance. Theirs is the politics of policy and statecraft — what critics view as regime-collaboration and allies see as realistic, constructive work.
Current developments in Russia's protest movement have widened the gap between populist dramatics and nuts-and-bolts politics. Consequentially, Yavlinsky's blog-post scandal is symptomatic of a growing rift between guards Old and New. And, yet, men like Milov are fairly young. (He turns forty this summer.) The question is less about age than temperament and tactical preferences. Does one work ‘within the system' for gradual change — a relatively thankless task with only distant satisfaction — or, to borrow a phrase from Yavlinsky, opt for more aggressive “head-on collisions”?
May 10 2012
Russia: American Video Streaming Site Ustream.tv Attacked Over Russian Blogger
On the morning of May 9, 2012, unknown parties launched a DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attack on the live feed website Ustream.tv [en]. According to Victoria Levy of Ustream.tv, the attack took place from thousands of unique IPs, based in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Iran. It was centered on one particular user, reggamortis1 [ru], who for the past four days has been covering opposition rallies and protests in Moscow.
Although Ustream.tv began operating normally after ten hours of downtime, the reggamortis1 channel remained inaccessible for several more hours. CEO Brad Hunstable said in an interview [en] that this was the most serious DDoS attack on the website ever.
Screenshot of Ustream.tv's homepage featuring reggamortis1's coverage of the protests in Moscow.
True to this mission, Russian citizen journalists like Kirill Mikhailov, aka reggamortis1, who also tweets at @reggaemortis1 [ru] and blogs at reggae-mortis.livejournal.com [ru], have been utilizing the service to report on recent Russian protests in lieu of coverage by official Russian television networks.
One such live broadcast, by user vova-moskva [ru], gained traction through Twitter on March 5. It covered the situation on Pushkinskaya Square in Moscow during the rally against Vladimir Putin’s reelection. Mikhailov blogged about the need for such action [ru] on February 29:
From every square we will need to maintain constant coverage and concentrate it in one place. But that’s for the future.
At this point Mikhailov was slightly behind the times. The Ustream.tv channel of Ridus [en], a Russian citizen journalism platform, has been posting live feeds of protests starting last December, and has since collected well over two million live views.
This type of guerilla reporting is in line with the general trend of internet-based news coverage in Russia. For example, tvrain.ru [ru] is a liberal-leaning online television channel that often interviews opposition leaders and hosts them on its talk shows. It recently provided a platform [ru] for new opposition darling Ksenia Sobchak after her political debate show had been forced out from mainstream television. On the other side of the barricades, MinaevLive [ru] is a live-streaming “internet-show” run by Sergei Minaev, a Russian writer and blogger with reputed ties to the Kremlin. His from-the-rooftops YouTube coverage of the May 6 March of the Millions was a four-hour bird’s eye view of the conflict and its development. (A compressed and sped-up 4-minute YouTube version is located here.)
The current DDoS attack on Ustream.tv is consistent with other attacks on Russian opposition websites and social networks. RuNet Echo has previously covered [en] DDoS attacks against Russian opposition media and blogs during the Russian parliamentary elections last December. Ridus’ Ustream.tv channel was likewise DDoS’d on December 6 and January 6. Attacks on online media were most recently repeated during the March of the Millions. “The tvrain.ru website isn’t working, and so are the sites of Slon [slon.ru] and Echo Moskvy [echo.msk.ru],” tweeted @tvrain [ru] on May 6. On the same day, General Director of Kommersant, Demian Kudriavtsev, warned on his Facebook [ru] that the daily newspaper’s website was under a DDoS attack. Echo’s Varfolomeev gave the same reason [ru] for his site’s erratic behavior.
Perhaps because of this Mikhailov, an opposition activist from Ufa [ru] who charmingly calls himself “Navalny’s battle-hamster,” doesn’t put all of his eggs in one basket. Although he has been using Ustream.tv since April 15 [ru], during the May 9 attack on his channel he switched to a Bambuser.com account (Bambuser is a streaming service similar to Ustream) to continue his coverage. On his blog he also lists the Ustream channel of his colleague, romanpomych, whose stream was up while Mikhailov’s was down.
Before his current project, Mikhailov had been covering the Astrakhan hunger strike (GV coverage is here and here), in which he participated as one of the strikers. Incredibly, he is conducting another hunger strike [ru] at the moment, even as he is running around Moscow and reporting. Amidst all of this activity, Mikhailov has found time to write an email [ru] to Ustream.tv, in which he implicates the Russian government and the youth group Nashi in the attacks:
[…] Russia actively tracks the current events thanks to your website. This is the only source of communication, thanks to which we will find out how Putin is killing our citizens. […] Your site currently doesn’t work only because of these bastards – kremlin.ru and nashi.su. These people, under Putin’s orders, rob the people of information and are trying to hide the mayhem happening in the capital of Russia and are conducting a DDoS attack against ustream.tv.
Brad Hunstable also finds the attack very disturbing. To him, someone is trying to take away the right of global citizens to speak and be heard, in essence subverting his company’s mission. Currently, Ustream.tv is debating the best response to the situation. In the meantime, and in a gesture of defiance, they have added a Russian-language option to the website:
May 09 2012
Russia: Charity Crowdfunding
Private Charity: the Situation in Russia
The main representatives of the ‘third sector economy' are non-profit organizations and independent voluntary bodies. Despite the obvious importance of the contributions from volunteers, charities, and NGOs to the resolution of social, ecological, and legal problems (among others), their status is extremely unstable. The activities of NGOs are severely restricted by legal regulations, and their financial situation depends mainly on the generosity of individual donors and businesses.
Last year, Russia moved up from 138th to 130th place in the annual ‘World Giving Index' [ru] compiled by the Charity Aid Foundation (CAF). Each country's ranking is based on several indicators: private individuals' donations, voluntary work, and impromptu charitable acts (for example, giving money to beggars). Despite Russia's moving up on the list, the situation cannot be considered favorable for the charity sector.
In terms of charitable donations in Russia, business contributions remain incomparably higher than private donations. This can be explained by the fashionableness of corporate social responsibility (which in one form or another exists today even in small businesses), as well as the fact that large corporations are obliged to fulfill certain budgetary redistributions in the regions where they maintain a presence.
No provision is made in Russia for tax breaks or other incentives for donors, and — despite the best efforts of the non-profit sector to expand through social media and the wider mass media — there are very few successful cases. This is possibly because ideas about mutual aid and voluntary participation in the resolution of problems that are not one's ‘own' have yet to become mainstream.
According to the research carried out, only 5% of those questioned across Russia donate to charity. Certainly, on a national scale, this seems insignificant. But this is not to say that there is a lack of successful ‘people' projects, financed by private philanthropy. While much activity exists only in cyberspace, the effects of charitable organizations' work is quite tangible and real, and confidence in these groups is undiminished. The proof: the Tugeza [ru] (”Together”) community.
“Togetha: Suddenly Inflicting Good!”
The section on the official Tugeza site, titled ‘Who Is Doing This?' states the following:
Нас часто с опаской спрашивают: «Кто вы, ребята?» Мы теряемся, краснеем и не знаем, что ответить в двух словах. Мы не религиозная секта, не политическая партия, не благотворительный фонд, да чего уж там, мы даже плохо знаем друг друга.
Tugeza began its life on the blog dirty.ru [ru] and eventually became, on August 7, 2010, a volunteer project. The names of the organizers are not a trade secret, but finding them is practically impossible. This is on purpose, as Tugeza is not a hierarchical structure but a ‘charitable anarcho-syndicate,' as it is called by its creators.
Screenshot of Togeza's website, 9 May 2012.
Tugeza is now a community without leaders. The running and moderation of the portal is handled by coordinators: the founding fathers and newer volunteers, whose participation is strongly encouraged. Sometimes this coordination is carried out on a regional basis and the monitoring of activities being carried out is taken on by volunteers who live not far from (or at least closest to) to the location where the aid is being directed.
Tugeza helps to attract financing for projects all over Russia that are diverse in both theme and scale: at the moment, volunteers are raising funds for a rehabilitation and education complex in Kaluga [ru] and last month helped an equine therapy center in the Pskov region [ru].
The technology on which the work of Tugeza is built is called crowdfunding [ru]: the collective collaboration of people who voluntarily pool their money or other resources (as a rule, via the Internet) in order to support the efforts of other people or organizations.
How Tugeza works
It all begins with a discussion through the community's social networks: who needs help? And what kind of help? Each project is jointly organized, so that anyone wishing to can make a contribution and share what they have to offer — transport, for example, or the possibility of helping not by collecting money but by donating unneeded clothing, a drumkit, for instance, or bringing friends along to volunteer. This way, as practice shows, significant resources can be shared: time, as well as money.
Next comes the most interesting part: information about the new project is posted on the Tugeza site, such as how much money must be raised and the timeframe involved, what it is being spent on, and who is being helped. Sometimes the beneficiaries are located in isolated rural regions where there is no Internet access, without the chance to comment on what is going on or take part in the fundraising themselves. In such cases, this work is undertaken by Tugeza organizers, who more often than not remain behind the scenes.
All funds are raised virtually, via e-wallet. On the one hand this complicates fundraising (not everyone has an e-wallet) but, on the other, it makes it simple to keep track of things. Tugeza fights the mistrust of e-payments and, even moreso, of ‘e-philanthropy' as best they can: they have released data regarding the proceeds of their Yandex e-wallet, so that everyone can see that their donations have been received. After the completion of the project, they can see on the same site how their money has been spent.
Original [ru]
Russia: Putin's Return Rouses Online Polemics
In the wake of protests against Vladimir Putin's inauguration, the reactions of Russian bloggers demonstrate a wide spectrum of opinion online. That oppositionist activism has suddenly taken on a more radical tone has only further inflamed the passions of already polemicized observers.
In the Eyes of History
Certain bloggers have raised vivid, though not always convincing, historical analogies in their posts about the May 6 protests.
Vladislav Naganov, oppositionist blogger and frequent author at Novaya Gazeta, authored a post [ru] titled, “This is War,” where he compared police brutality on May 6 to the French invasion in 1812, as well as the Nazi offensive in 1941:
Скажу сурово, без прикрас – как оно есть. Это – война. Идёт битва за Россию. Я надеюсь, что каждый, кто до сих пор этого не понимал – теперь, наконец, это понял. Уже сброшены все маски. Расставлены все точки над «i». Отныне война народу объявлена публично.
In a post [ru] titled, “The Bloody Sunday of the 21st Century,” blogger Sparkman likened the violence outside Bolotnaia Square to the 1905 massacre [en] of protesters outside Tsar Nicholas II's Winter Palace in St. Petersburg.
Собственно, ведь и демонстрация 9 января 1905 года рассматривалась не как начало Революции, но как последний всплеск петиционной кампании, начатой осенью 1904 года – сперва банкетами во славу призывов к реформам, затем принятием либеральных обращений от имени земств, адвокатских и профессорских собраний.
What It Means For the Future
Putin and his wife in the Kremlin's Cathedral Square in Moscow after the inauguration ceremony, (7 May 2012), photo by the Presidential Press and Information Office, CC BY-SA 3.0; Wikimedia Commons.
Rather than turn to the Imperial or Soviet past, other bloggers have focused instead on what the current protests mean for Russia's future.
Viacheslav Egorov, who blogs as jurist_egorov, discussed the recent violence in a post [ru] titled, “Who Scares the Authorities?” exploring possible motives for what he believes was excessive police force:
Чего она боится, заставляя полицию применять слезоточивый газ, избивать митингующих, задерживать спокойно сидящих на земле оппозиционеров Навального и Удальцова, задерживать сейчас спокойно митингующих на «народных гуляниях» Алексея Навального и Ксению Собчак??? Чего боится Власть? Чего боится Король? Революции? Бунта уставшего народа? Так бунт неизбежен, если Власть будет так вести себя. Революция неизбежна, если Правительство (новое) и Король (старый новый) не станут прислушиваться к своему народу!!!
Blogger Nazavrik reviewed [ru] a controversial statement made by President Putin's Press Secretary, Dmitri Peskov, who said that police displayed too much self-control and should have used greater force against the May 6 protesters. Nazavrik posted photos of similar police measures used against crowds in Italy and Chile, arguing cynically that Moscow's police are increasingly eager to hone their skills studying the West's police history:
Он прав. У нашего омона пока ещё недостаточно опыта для разгона массовых мероприятий. На Западе давно уже отточены все действия по применению газа, резиновых пуль, провокаторов, водомётов и прочей спец.техники. На Западе в этом плане и законы жёстче и полномочий побольше. […] Но теперь, когда стабильность вновь воцариалась в стране, наш омон быстро нагонит зарубежных коллег и все приёмы, годами репетируемые на учениях, отработает на протестующих, действуя жёстко в угоду переживаниям Пескова.
A Digital Delusion?
Other bloggers have pointed out that Moscow's street demonstrations are far from the concerns of average citizens, dismissing as hysteria rumors about “revolution.” In a reversal of the typical oppositionist claim that digital and citizen media breaks through censorship to reveal a truer picture of everyday life, Dmitri Kotukov argues [ru] that protesters have constructed a false reality by tweeting and writing endlessly about their adventures with the police:
Несколько дней практически не открывал ноутбук, не использовал айпад, короче как и положено в праздники - отдыхал. Сегодня открыл ленту и удивился. Читаю все эти надрывные истории о столкновениях непонятных людей с ОМОНом, какие-то нелепые призывы куда-то выйти, про марши миллионов-триллионов, революции […]. […] Что самое удивительное, эта видимость существует только в инете. В реалии люди отдыхают, радуются весне, гуляют, встречаются на праздники.
May 04 2012
Russia: Varlamov's Failure in Omsk
Ilya Varlamov, the Moscow photographer and popular blogger whom an online primary nominated last month to run for mayor of Omsk, has ended his election campaign. On May 2, Varlamov's campaign chief, fellow blogger Maksim Kats, announced the decision, claiming that it was impossible to collect the necessary 10,000 signatures to officially register Varlamov for the election. Kats lashed out at Omsk's other candidates, writing:
Мы закрыли кампанию. […] Совершенно ясно, что все подписи за всех остальных кандидатов рисованые — все платные сборщики, к которым мы сегодня обратились (к нам в штаб житель Омска принес 40,000 рублей и предложил заплатить волонтерам за сбор подписей), все платные сборщики сообщали, что “ну вы же понимаете как это делается? У нас тут база…”. Именно так собираются 10,000 подписей за 6 дней.
In his own blog, Varlamov defended the choice to quit the election, saying:
Начинать кампанию с жульничества - это первый шаг к грязной политике, к которой мы все привыкли. Потом нужно будет платить за компромат, нужно платить журналистам на правильные статьи, нужно платить судам, полиции и так далее. Эта не та игра, в которую мы хотим играть.
When Varlamov entered Omsk's mayoral race, he provoked a serious rift between the Russian opposition's supporters and opponents of ‘blogger politicians.' Now that he's abandoned the race, the debate has only grown more heated.
Alexey Navalny wearing Guy Fawkes mask during protest march against Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg, Russia. (25 Feb 2012) Photo by ROMA YANDOLIN, copyright © Demotix.
Before Varlamov ended his campaign, a schism [ru] broke out between oppositionists when Vladislav Inozemtsev ignored his promise to stay out of the Omsk race, after failing to win the nomination in the online primary. Anti-Kremlin blogger and longtime primaries-supporter Aleksei Navalny sided with Varlamov. Vladimir Milov's group DemVybory, on the other hand, backed Inozemtsev, who belongs to the organization.
Varlamov's decision to cancel his campaign — particularly that he did so with still nearly a week left to collect signatures — has dealt a significant blow to Navalny and those who have championed the real-world political potential of bloggers and online activists. While Navalny has emphasized the campaign's success in drawing a new level of attention to primaries and political life, he criticized Varlamov for his apparent ignorance in beginning something he was unprepared to finish:
Сбор подписей - специальная процедура, которая придумана жуликами из Кремля и ЦИКа, чтобы не пускать на выборы неугодных. Собрать их правильно практически невозможно. Ну так мы все это и раньше знали. Вы же сами решили сыграть в эту игру.
Если в игру играть не хотите, то надо не на выборы мэра Омска идти, а на митинги “За честные выборы”. Потому и митингуем, чтобы отменили весь этот бред и допустили до выборов всех желающих, а ограничения были разумны.
The collection of signatures is a special procedure concocted by the cardsharps in the Kremlin and the Central Elections Commission to bar undesirables from elections. Collecting the necessary quantity truly is a practical impossibility. But we all already knew that. You're the ones who decided to play this game.
If you don't want to play the game, then you needn't enter Omsk's mayoral race. Instead, you belong at a ‘For Honest Elections' rally. That's exactly why we protest: to end all this crap and all the unreasonable restrictions, and allow into elections anybody who wants to run.
Navalny went on to anticipate correctly that some traditional oppositionists would use Varlamov's half-baked campaign to advocate formal congresses instead of online primaries to nominate the movement's leaders. Finally, Navalny criticized the Omsk primary for a lack of debates, which he believes would have exposed Varlamov's untenable approach to collecting signatures.
Russian blogger Ilya Varlamov in Moscow. Photo by VITALIY RAGULIN, (04/08/11) CC BY-SA 3.0.
Vladimir Milov has also emphasized the need for public debates, ironically arguing roughly the same thing as Navalny, despite their opposite positions on Varlamov's Omsk candidacy:
Необходимо для того, чтобы отсечь “бумажных” (или “интернетных”) кандидатов, которые в интернете Рэмбо, а на публику их выпусти - так сплошная пустопорожняя болтовня и демагогия про “борьбу с коррупцией” и т.п., и шансы выиграть реальные выборы равны нулю. Нужны кандидаты, которые могут убедительно говорить, в том числе не только о жуликах и ворах, но и о том, какую политику проводить в сфере промышленности, сельского хозяйства, ОПК, медицины и т.п.
Milov then further explained why he has such little faith in the Internet:
Поэтому к голосовалкам в интернете я отношусь плохо даже не потому, что они вечно продуцируют конфузные результаты типа побед Тесака, Мавроди или Варламова (объяснение понятно - голосование по клику не предполагает никакой реальной ответственности “кликующего”), но скорее потому, что […] не позволяют определить наиболее сильного кандидата, способного в будущем реально выиграть выборы.
St. Petersburg city assemblyman and Yabloko member Boris Vishnevskii weighed in [ru] on Varlamov's abandoned mayoral run, calling it “an overwhelming defeat” that “once again shows that politics and clownery are fundamentally different.” Like oppositionist blogger Oleg Kozyrev [ru], he rejects Kats' idea that it is impossible to collect 10,000 signatures honestly. Vishnevskii also laments that Yabloko's candidate in Omsk, Aleksandr Korotkov, has not generated more public interest, saying:
Но о Короткове ничего не сообщают популярные сайты и знаменитые блогеры – их внимание привлечено исключительно к пиар-акции Варламова-Каца и обсуждению причин ее провала. Впрочем, ничего удивительного: обсуждать клоунаду всегда было куда более занимательным занятием, чем обсуждать политические действия…
А у Александра Короткова, - о ужас!, - кажется, вообще нет блога. Но я уверен, что он будет очень хорошим мэром Омска.
Popular websites and famous bloggers aren't publicizing anything about Korotkov. Their attention is fixed on Varlamov's and Kats' PR scheme, and discussions about why it collapsed. Admittedly, it's no surprise: discussing clownery has always been a far more entertaining experience than looking at political actions…
And, oh dear, it seems that Aleksandr Korotkov doesn't even have a blog! I'm confident, all the same, that he will be a very good mayor for Omsk.
Viktor Korb, one of the activists who founded Citizen Mayor [ru], the group that organized the Omsk virtual primary, penned a particularly shattering response to Navalny's blog post about Varlamov's exit from the mayoral race. As it turns out, Korb explains, the Omsk primary did feature public debates, however Varlamov (and Inozemtsev, for that matter) ignored them entirely. Korb writes:
Прочитал пост Алексея Навального Варламовокацное о “Казусах Иноземцева и Каца” и сначала даже опешил. Ну зачем, зачем честный Навальный так откровенно передергивает и извращает факты, а если говорить прямо, просто врет? Ведь ему не стоило никакого труда узнать фактические обстоятельства и изложить их максимально точно. Чтобы несколькими досадными “мелочами” не смазывать общий пафос своего, в целом, верного рассуждения об ответственности гражданских лидеров.
Firmly planting his tongue in his cheek, Korb then explained how he nearly forgave Navalny for the misrepresentation of the Omsk primary:
Алексей Навальный совсем не случайно стал одним из самых популярных лидеров мнений. И дело вовсе не только в очевидных качествах: честности, неангажированности, решительности и т.п. Лидер, владеющий умами миллионов, обязан владеть особым навыком - формулировать мифологические представления, простые и яркие образы, выстроенные по особенной логике, логике мифа. В этой логике “реальность” обеспечивается не фактическими обстоятельствами, а “очевидностью”, доказательства заменяются “убедительностью” и т.п.
Korb concludes with a warning about the dangers of ill-gotten success, complaining that too many oppositionists seem to share Navalny's defects:
Яркие и убедительные образы вполне можно строить на основе фактов, а не домыслов или откровенного вранья. И это необходимо делать, если есть интерес не в локальном, а в стратегическом и устойчивом успехе. Потому что успех, основанный на лжи, даже кажущейся “незначительной” и “оправданной”, таит в себе серьезную угрозу разрушения главной опоры любой общественной конструкции - доверия. Похоже, Алексей Навальный, как и другие “вожди”, этого пока не понимает. И советы соратников слушать не научился.
The collapse of ‘Mayor Varlamov' is a black-eye for individuals like Navalny, who rely heavily on the Internet to generate publicity and public support for their political careers and various civic initiatives. That a prominent blogger was nominated in an online primary, but then failed so miserably to run an effective campaign, is undeniably a setback for Russia's digital activists. While the stigma of Varlamov's candidacy can only be temporary, one wonders what effect it will have at this stage in Russian history, as Vladimir Putin returns to the Kremlin, and the country prepares for subtle but significant expansions of democratic rights brought about by recent electoral reforms.
Russia: Tolstoy's ‘War and Peace' Legacy Today
RuNet Echo continues its series examining the 200th anniversary of Tsarist Russia's Victory over Napoleon by examining Leo Tolstoy's novel ‘War and Peace' and the role it plays today online. Although the book was initially published in 1869, its story begins in July 1805 and progresses through the 1812 French invasion, the Battle of Borodino, and the occupation of Moscow, all the way to the French retreat and rebuilding of Russia.
A recent survey of over 100 respected British and American authors revealed that ‘War and Peace' is considered to be one of the greatest works of the past two centuries. Russian blogger paradise-apple enthusiastically reported these results in a post titled, “Anna Karenina Won!”
These works were listed as the nineteenth century's best:
‘Anna Karenina' by Leo Tolstoy, ‘Madam Bovary' by Gustave Flaubert, ‘War and Peace' by Tolstoy, ‘Adventures of Huckleberry Finn' by Mark Twain, Anton Chechov's short stories, ‘Middlemarch' by George Eliot, ‘Moby Dick' by Herman Melville, ‘Great Expectations' by Charles Dickens; ‘Crime and Punishment' by Fyodor Dostoevsky, and ‘Emma' by Jane Austin.
Additionally, TheRussianAmerica.com reviewed the authors whom the British and American judges selected as the greatest writers of all time. Again, Tolstoy was listed at the top, followed by William Shakespeare, James Joyce, Vladimir Nabokov, and Fyodor Dostoevsky.
Kramskoy's portrait of Leo Tolstoy (1873), public domain.
On the RuNet today, discussions about ‘War and Peace' and Tolstoy's literary style are common, often addressing a variety of issues such as the proper translation of the title, the length and depth of the work, and Tolstoy's use of the French language.
Translation of the Title
The title ‘War and Peace' is written in Russian as ‘Вoйнá и мир' (Voina i mir). ‘Voina' is the Russian word for ‘war.' In the context of Tolstoy's novel, ‘mir' is traditionally translated as ‘peace,' although an alternate translation of ‘mir' in a variety of contexts is ‘the world.'
Recently, two RuNet Twitter users debated whether or not the common translation, ‘War and Peace,' is what Tolstoy intended, rather than ‘War and the World.'
Вчера узнал, что слово “мир” в “Война и мир” Толстого имеет значение “сообщество”, а не “перемирие”.
А я не согласен. Я считаю, что он сравнивал их. Ведь у него через том описывается то война, то мир (перемирие).
Влияние войны на общество.
Ты так говоришь, как-будто сам Толстой встал из гроба и тебе об этом рассказал :) Это же не математика!
Добавь к моему мессаджу “мне кажется”))
Length and Depth of the Novel
Famous for being one of the longest books ever written in either the Cyrillic or Latin alphabets, ‘War and Peace' is divided into four volumes. The novel is unique for its detailed and realistic discussion of the nature of war. Tolstoy combined his own Crimean War experiences with interviews he conducted with survivors of the French invasion to write something that resembles Thucydides' ‘History of the Peloponesian War' as much as it does a traditional novel.
On Twitter, RuNet users often focus on the magnitude of the work in terms of both its size and gravity, frequently referencing other Russian authors like Pushkin, Dostoevsky, and Bulgakov.
Школьники, которым предстоит прочитать 4 тома «Войны и мира» очень жалеют, что на дуэли убили не Толстого, а Пушкина!
Читал войну и мир, только позже, когда проникся мировоззрением толстого. у булгакова до сих пор люблю только записки юного врача
Tolstoy's Use of French in the Novel
The French language was effectively the language of Russia's nobility, when Napoleon's army invaded in 1812. Tolstoy underscored the elite's relationship to this foreign language by writing parts of ‘War and Peace,' including the opening paragraph, in French.
In comments following an April 2012 post, Russian LiveJournal blogger dohlik_nemruchi discussed the practice of creating art in a foreign language, comparing ‘War and Peace' to Russian filmmaker Alexander Sokurov's award-winning 2011 film ‘Faust,' which was made in German. LJ user menelik3 reminded readers that some of Tolstoy's ‘War and Peace' had been written in French, arguing that Sokurov had likely used German simply to incite controversy. dohlik_nemruchi responded that Tolstoy's use of French was a tool to show progression in the novel — that ‘War and Peace' is initially in both Russian and French, with the latter fading as the plot develops and anti-French sentiments grow.
Some Russian bloggers prefer not to analyze Tolstoy's literary style, instead simply posting notable and perhaps timeless lines from ‘War and Peace' to their journals as status updates:
Обратите все ваше внимание на самого себя, наложите цепи на свои чувства и ищите блаженства не в страстях, а в своем сердце. источник блаженства не вне, а внутри нас…
May 03 2012
Russia: Crowdsourcing to Solve Local Urban Problems
Solving problems at the local level, the kind encountered by inhabitants of big cities and regional centers, is becoming more and more feasible thanks to projects based on crowdsourcing technology. Crowdsourcing is getting groups of people involved in the discussion and resolution of all sorts of different problems, ranging from firefighting to election-monitoring.
Map of Moscow and the Moscow Region
In theory, there are already various government agencies and institutions working to manage local life so that citizens can live in comfort and security. But in practice the results are not always satisfactory: the illegal cutting down of trees, broken lifts, and burnt-out light streetlights are still problems people encounter on a daily basis. To solve these and similar problems “clouds” have been created — virtual projects, in which anyone with an Internet connection and a desire to improve things can take part.
StreetJournal.org [ru] is a project launched in the city of Perm, now operating in several major cities across Russia. The site has publicized nearly 8,000 problems, of which more than a third have been resolved. In addition to ordinary citizens, the platform is also being using by local authorities, who can use it to monitor the work of their contractors and to react to serious reports efficiently and directly.
The third group of people using the platform are nonprofit organizations, which can get access to up-to-date information and use it to monitor a situation and direct volunteers towards solving it.
ДайСигнал [DaiSignal] [ru] is an alternative project concerned with the eternal problems of roads and urban infrastructure and services. The portal receives information from more than 220 cities and towns.
The problem-solving process becomes itself the biggest problem.
In a majority of our encounters with life's daily problems (which we are individually incapable of fixing ourselves), the “problem-solving process becomes itself the biggest problem.” While the complaints submitted to DaiSignal are from individuals without any connection to one another (and are resolved privately, as well), the platform is a tool that allows people to view a situation holistically.
In cases where the number of reports in a given region is “off the scale,” one can conclude that specific services there are ineffective, and take the necessary measures, not by informing the authorities but instead informing those competent to fix things.
How effective such a system can be is demonstrated by the British analog FixMyStreet, which has accumulated more than 1,600 reports, including photographic and video evidence, of overflowing trash-bins, broken footpaths, and illegal graffiti.
Original [ru]
April 30 2012
Russia: Gun Rights Advocates Rally Around Tula Hero
Russian gun ownership laws are long and restrictive [ru]. Currently, civilians cannot carry guns for self-defense, and most are ineligible to purchase rifles. No one can own guns shorter than 80 centimeters (effectively outlawing handguns). This is why a small-scale farmer in Tula turned to a kitchen knife [ru] to kill three out of four armed robbers that threatened him and his family on April 7. This, at least, is the narrative that some Russian gun rights advocates have pursued in the aftermath.
On the day of the incident, fifty-two-year-old Gegam Sarkisian [ru] was watching television with his wife, daughter, daughter-in-law, and grandchildren, when four men armed with an (illegal) handgun, as well as knives and a baseball bat, entered their house. The robbers, not satisfied with the small amount of money Sarkisian had readily available, began to beat him and the women. Miraculously, Sarksian was able to successfully defend himself with a knife. Only one robber escaped, alive but wounded, as a result. Sarkisian himself walked away with just a brief hospital stay.
The story went viral, and Sarkisian’s instantaneous hero status helped him avoid criminal charges — a very real danger in Russia, even in clear-cut cases of self-defense. The popular sentiment was expressed by Vladimir Soloviev, a journalist and television personality, who tweeted [ru], “Gegam Sarkisian […] is a real hero. He should be lauded, not tried.” The governor of Tula Oblast responded [ru] on Twitter with his reassurance: “[Gegam] is a true MAN, and we will not let him come to harm.” Indeed, no murder charges were ever filed against Sarkisian.
For most the story was just that — a rare happy ending in the rather bleak world of crime reporting. Not so for Russia’s nascent gun rights activists, who view the entire situation as avoidable, if only handgun possession were legalized in Russia. One might question the sense of making a man who killed his assailants with a knife a cause célèbre for gun ownership. Activist Maria Butina does not [ru]:
Однако кажется очевидным, что далеко не каждый сможет зарезать нападающих ножом, возможность защищаться более совершенным техническим инструментарием позволила бы такие случаи успешной самозащиты воспроизводить в куда большем масштабе […].
Butina is the coordinator of the “Right to Arms” movement. The movement’s stated goal is to legalize handgun ownership, and to coordinate the necessary lobbying activities to this end. She runs the group’s vk.com page [ru], a pro gun website [ru], and her own blog [ru], where she writes almost exclusively about gun politics.
Linking handgun ownership to self-defense is a common theme for proponents of gun rights. On April 9, Butina created a petition [ru] titled “Self-defense Is An Act of Bravery, Not A Crime!” on www.OnlinePetition.ru, a Russian website similar in concept to Change.org [en]. The petition, which now has nearly 1,500 signatures, links Sarkisian to Alexander Tarasov, a seventy-year-old retiree who killed a burglar with a knife on April 7, 2011 – exactly one year before Sarkisian's break-in. Tarasov, however, was found guilty of premeditated murder, and the petition calls for a review of his case and the decriminalization of self-defense. The header of the petition (shown below) depicts a young woman aiming a handgun, her face determined. The approach to self-defense seems clear enough.
Maria Butina's online petition advocating greater gun ownership rights in Russia. Screenshot, 20 April 2012.
Konstantin Krylov, a well-known nationalist ideologist and blogger who believes [ru] that gun ownership is one of the basic human needs, also capitalized on Sarkisian's story to promote the right to self-defense. Before it was clear that Sarkisian would not be charged, Krylov wrote [ru]:
Что характерно, наказываются именно те люди, которые во всём остальном мире были бы признаны национальными героями.
On April 15, Krylov was among a group of speakers at a Moscow rally [ru] organized by “Right to Arms.” Nationalist politician Vladimir Tor and opposition activist-blogger Vladislav Naganov also showed up to promote self-defense and handgun legalization to a crowd of approximately two hundred people. Although Sarkisian was originally on the agenda [ru], Tula authorities' decision not to prosecute made him a less interesting case by the time of the rally.
In hindsight, it seems that gun rights activists were quick to jump on Sarkisian’s case because of its confluence with Tarasov’s and because the April 15 rally was planned before [ru] the April 7, 2012, incident. Butina herself wrote [ru] that “the circumstances allowed [the rally] to enter the flow of events with Tarasov and Sarkisian,” potentially increasing the coverage it would have otherwise received. One weapons blogger, tl2002, has called the move exploitative in a post titled “Handgun Advocates Try to Hitch A Piggyback Ride”:
Непонятно каким боком расследование убийства налетчиков связано с легализацией пистолетов […]. Как говорится было бы желание, а повод найдется.
Others have pushed back against the arguments [ru] that “if the entrepreneur had a handgun, the bandits would not even try to enter,” or “if they had, the self-defense hero would probably not need to be hospitalized.” One commenter on Butina’s blog cited his own military experience to argue [ru] that a handgun would not have helped Sarkisian, writing, “The assailants would not likely miss a gun safe […]. Here the knife was much more appropriate.” Furthermore, a handgun, even if it was easily accessible, might not have been helpful in Sarkisian’s situation because of the danger of friendly fire, writes [ru] blogger don_djovanni.
Meanwhile, Tula Governor Vladimir Gruzdev is also hitching a ride on the issue. A local news agency is running an online poll [ru], asking whether people support Gruzdev's initiative [ru] for freer gun sales. So far, 65% of respondents say “Yes” or “Yes, but with limitations.” In any case, a dialogue has been opened.
Russia: The Battle of Borodino Lives On
In September 1812, France's Napoleon Bonaparte faced Russian Imperial General Mikhail Kutuzov at the Battle of Borodino. After 200 years, through the works of artists such as Leo Tolstoy (as well as legal disputes about the historic preservation of the battlefield), Borodino continues to inspire passion and incite controversy. Recently [en], RuNet Echo examined the historical and modern contexts of Russia's victory in the Napoleonic Wars. In this post, we continue that study, focusing closely on the Battle of Borodino.
Napoleon I on the Borodino Heights, by Vasily Vereshchagin (1897), public domain.
Napoleon's Blog describes [en] the strategic significance of the Battle of Borodino as follows:
The Battle of Borodino (Russian: Бородинская битва Borodinskaja bitva, French: Bataille de la Moskowa, fought on September 7, 1812, was the largest and bloodiest single-day action of the Napoleonic Wars, involving more than 250,000 troops and resulted in at least 70,000 total casualties. The French Grande Armée under Emperor Napoleon I attacked the Imperial Russian army of General Mikhail Kutuzov near the village of Borodino, west of the town of Mozhaysk, and eventually captured the main positions on the battlefield, but it failed to destroy the Russian army.
The battle itself ended in disengagement, but strategic considerations and the losses incurred forced the Russians to withdraw next day. The battle at Borodino was a pivotal point in the campaign, since it was the last offensive action fought by Napoleon in Russia. By withdrawing, the Russian army preserved its military potential and eventually forced Napoleon out of the country.
Travel website Russia-Channel.com's blog describes [en] how Borodino's grounds are preserved today (protecting the site of World War II battles, as well):
Located in the Mozhaysky District of Russia’s Moscow Oblast, the village of Borodino is indelibly etched in Russian history as the location of two devastating battles. The historic Borodino battlefield is a protected area that has been preserved as a reminder of the two history-shaping conflicts that took place there, firstly between Russia and France in 1812, and later between Soviet and German military forces in 1941. Within the protected area is the State Borodino War and History Museum chronicling these conflicts in detail, while the former battlefield is scattered with memorials and monuments as reminders of specific events and influential figures relating to both wars.
Russian LiveJournal blogger paluch675 provides [ru] photographs of Tsar Nicholas II and his family at the 1912 celebration honoring the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, featuring images of the following events:
Император Николай II, императрица Александра Федоровна с дочерьми и сопровождающие их лица проходят по перрону железнодорожного вокзала по прибытии на станцию Бородино для участия в торжествах. Второй справа — барон В. Б. Фредерикс. Бородино, 25 августа 1912 года.
Крестный ход к памятнику Бородинской битвы во время торжеств в деревне Бородино, 25 августа 1912 года.
In a 2008 post, Russian History Blog discussed [en] some of the more recent celebrations honoring the Battle of Borodino:
People from all over the country and overseas, particularly from France come to this historical event. These people are big fans of history. This celebration took place in 1962. In 1995 it got a status of a historic military fest. During its 190 anniversary in 2002 300 thousand people gathered.
In anticipation of this year's celebration honoring the 200th anniversary, both RuNet and Anglophone bloggers have reported on protracted legal disputes between historical site preservationists and developers. In May 2011, Russia Profile went so far as to announce [en] “The Third Battle of Borodino.” In April 2012, the Kremlin intervened [en] against illegal housing developments around the historical site of the Borodino battlefield.
Borodino's cultural legacy is not confined to the physical location of the battle — indeed, it lives on in a variety of art forms.
In a post titled, “The Battle of Borodino (A Painting to Remember),” Justin's Systema Blog describes [en] an exhibit found in Moscow's Napoleonic War Museum:
It was an amazing painting, with details of the battle painstakingly captured with the precision of the artist. You could see everything. Hundreds of men on horseback charging each other with sabres drawn, while their comrades on both sides loaded their muskets and fired at each other. Cannons aimed at the opposing armies with smoke covering the battlefield. In addition to the mural which was very large, small huts had been constructed on dirt surrounding the artwork in order to replicate the scene of the battle. There was even a recording which would play in the background; the sound of the trumpet signalling a cavalry charge, followed by the sound of galloping horses, cannon and gunfire. The effect was incredibly impressive.
Finally, summarizing the historical significance of Borodino, Historical and Regency Romance UK blog quotes [en] Napoleon Bonaparte himself:
Although the Russians were beaten they were not completely defeated and Napoleon later said of the encounter: “The French showed themselves to be worthy victors and the Russians can rightly call themselves invincible.”
April 27 2012
Russia: Bloggers Respond to Putin's Proposed Siberian State Company
On April 20, the Russian newspaper Kommersant revealed [ru] an ongoing legislative project to create a state company to oversee the economic development of Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. Working on orders from Vladimir Putin, the Ministry of Economic Development has drafted a law to establish this entity, and has already distributed the document to four other ministries for approval. If created, the state company would be responsible for developing 16 sub-federal units in Russia's east that collectively make up 60% of the country's entire territory. The legislation would suspend many current laws on subsoil extraction, foresting, land ownership, urban planning, labor, and citizenship. Most contentiously, the state company would be under the direct control of the Russian President, effectively granting the Kremlin carte blanche over fundamental elements of local governance across Siberia.
A gas pipeline in Novosibirsk, Russia. (19 Dec 2011) Photo by AIHAM DIB, copyright © Demotix.
News about Putin's plan for Siberia has provoked a variety of reactions in the RuNet blogosphere. The prospect of a ‘grand national project' (the end-all panacea to the country's woes, according to Russian ‘patriots') has predictably met with approval from Putin's supporters and opprobrium from his critics. Study some of the individual responses, however, and the schism at the heart of any such dichotomy quickly reveals that Russian bloggers harbor certain apprehensions that shape their political perceptions. While a trend emerges that ostensibly demonstrates a divide in popular opinion, a closer reading can identify fundamental shared assumptions that are vital to understanding the landscape of RuNet civil society.
The Anti-Putin Bloggers
Yuri Krugovykh represents one of the most peculiar groups of bloggers: anti-liberal, anti-Kremlin Russian nationalists. Twenty-years-old, Krugovykh is convinced that Putin's plan for a new state company in Siberia is an American plot to colonize Russia's eastern regions through Moscow. Attacking the groups that assembled earlier this year to defend Putin against liberal democrat protests, Krugovykh writes [ru]:
It's very funny to listen to the ‘anti-orange' activists after Putin's election victory was so favorably received by the United States. What's all this about the GosDep [the U.S. State Department]? What are you on about? Putin is doing everything exactly according to instructions. The Kremlin's [American] bosses are entirely satisfied.
Konstantin Krylov [ru], a pro-liberal, anti-Kremlin Russian nationalist, also worries that the proposed state company in Siberia would hark back to Tsarist colonialism, replicating Ivan the Terrible's oprichnina [en], a seven year period in the mid-sixteenth century, when the Russian Tsar held exclusive power over vast territories and many of the financial centers of the empire.
Echoing Krugovykh's concerns about the Kremlin's interest in obtaining foreign wealth, Krylov writes [ru]:
Incidentally, removing 60% of [Russia's] territory from local control would also seem to pursue ‘curious relations with foreigners' (just as Ivan the Terrible had). I wonder, will they sell off the land by the roots, or just empty out all its useful deposits and limit themselves to that?
Blogger Maksim Kalashnikov [en] (real name Vladimir Kucherenko) is a Eurasianist Russian ‘patriot' (not to be confused with Russian nationalists, whose beliefs bear a distinctly ethnic component). While Kalashnikov shares others' unease that the new state company could inflict upon Russia a new wave of colonialism, his most serious objections are rooted in the notion that Putin's draft legislation embodies “the privatization of the state,” marking the pinnacle of Putin's ‘fanatical support' for economic liberalism. For Kalashnikov, the state company in Siberia represents a clone of the East India Company, which Putin intends to use to destroy Russia's state apparatus [ru]:
Under the happy pretext of ‘developing Siberia,' they are not only creating a clone of the East India Company, but are also legalizing the very principle of privatizing the government and the state apparatus. […] Next, the monopolies will take over the state, become the authorities, take over command of the army and penal system, and finally brush aside even the appearance of democracy with a junta.
In Kalashnikov's doomsday scenario, the United States is just as much a victim as Russia. Capitalism's impact on governance (represented by state-controlled monopolies) will be the same everywhere, he contends, consuming Washington and Moscow alike.
The Pro-Putin Bloggers
Khakassian blogger Mikhail Verkhoturov strongly endorses [ru] the proposed state company (even going so far as welcoming comparisons to Ivan the Terrible's oprichnina), and accuses liberals of premature objections:
The liberals are astonishing people. They can't even for a second resist their fault-finding psychosis and not start talking about how ‘they'll skim off the budget, they'll plunder everything, they'll sell Siberia to the Americans-Chinese-Japanese.' They've already started to whine, when the corporation hasn't even been created yet!
Nikolai Starikov [en], a well-known conspiracy theorist and state television manager, also embraces the oprichnina label, perceiving [ru] it to be the only measure capable of countering ‘Western-engineered' decentralizing reforms initiated during Russia's winter of street protests:
The Russian state lost the information war that was unleashed against it on the eve of the elections. […] In an information war, people aren't wounded or killed, but the losers are reprogrammed by the winning side. […] After December 2011, the centerpiece of Russia's concessions to our ‘Western partners' was the passage of the new law on elections.
According to Starikov, the direct election of governors is also a Western initiative to weaken the Kremlin:
If the President doesn't get the ability to ‘filter' the list of governor candidates, it will be a powerful blow to the territorial integrity of Russia. […] Think about it: what does the direct election of governors really mean? It is a reduction of the President's rights. Before, he could appoint — now he cannot. Ask yourself what, other than pressure from the West, could prompt the urge to pass this law in such a short timespan?
Finally, Starikov defends the creation of a powerful state company, under the direct control of the President, as a last line of defense against the chaos unleashed by the West:
How do we neutralize the potential election of governor-populists and governor-democrats and governor-separatists? How do we avoid the creation of authorities at the regional level, who might begin to sabotage federal programs and prioritize development programs based on Washington's ‘requests'? What is to be done with those who are suddenly ruled by narrow local concerns, rather than nationwide interests? […] Put Eastern Siberia and the Far East under [the President's] personal control. Create a structure that will bypass the rebellious boyars and promote the national interest.
The RuNet's Distinctions
While the pro-Putin and anti-Putin battle lines are as clear as day, it is worth noting that the Russian blogosphere is permeated by misgivings about the outside world's intentions. Critics fault Putin for surrendering too much to the agents of the West, whereas his supporters defend his tactics as the only way to deter further Western (and perhaps future Chinese) manipulation.
Respectable public figures, like former Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, have based their objections [ru] to Putin's plan for a Siberian state company on concerns about crowding out private investors and competitors. Worries focus on the freeness of the market and durability of the rule of law, if the state company is endowed with the proposed extraordinary special powers.
While legal and economic questions play a role in the RuNet debate about the potential Siberian state company, conspiratorial phobias animate all sides, sometimes driving the conversation to extremes that are difficult to understand without a thorough appreciation of the RuNet's particular landscape.
Russia: Dombrovsky and Molotov
The Faculty of Useless Knowledge tells a story of writer Yuri Dombrovsky's brief encounter with Vyacheslav Molotov, and shares a link to a documentary [ru] about Dombrovsky's life.
April 26 2012
Russia: Julian Assange's Debut on RT
Mark Adomanis criticizes the critics of Julian Assange's debut on RT (Russia Today) last week.
April 23 2012
Russia: The Tsar's Victory over Napoleon, 200 Years Later
Across Russia, celebrations have commenced honoring the 200th anniversary of Tsar Alexander I's defeat of France's Napoleon Bonaparte.
Napoleon's Blog contextualized [en] the Russian Campaign amid the greater scheme of the Napoleonic Wars, as well as other conflicts with similar names.
The French invasion of Russia in 1812 was a turning point in the Napoleonic Wars. The campaign reduced the French and allied invasion forces to a tiny fraction of their initial strength. […]
Napoleon’s invasion is better known in Russia as the Patriotic War (Russian Отечественная война, Otechestvennaya Vojna), not to be confused with the Great Patriotic War (Великая Отечественная война, Velikaya Otechestvennaya Vojna). The Patriotic War is also occasionally referred to as the ‘War of 1812,' which is not to be confused with the conflict of the same name between the United Kingdom and the United States.
The post went on to examine Napoleon's decision to invade Russia.
At the time of the invasion, Napoleon was at the height of his power with virtually all of continental Europe either under his direct control or held by countries defeated by his empire and under treaties favorable for France. No European power on the continent dared move against him. The 1809 Austrian war treaty had a clause removing Western Galicia from Austria and annexing it to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. This Russia saw as against its interests as well as being seen as a launching point for an invasion of Russia. Tsar Alexander found Russia in an economic bind as his country had little in the way of manufacturing and being rich in raw materials yet being part of Napoleon’s continental system denied it the trade that was its lifeblood for both money and manufactured goods. Russia’s withdrawal from the system was a further incentive to Napoleon to force a decision.
Reconstruction of a historical 1812-era military parade, in St. Petersburg, Russia. (10 September 2009) Photo by GENNADY CHERNYAVSKY, copyright © Demotix.
Patriotic War of 1812 Blog incorporated [en] excerpts from Wikipedia into a greater analysis of the Battle of Smolensk — the first major confrontation of the war.
The Battle of Smolensk, the first major battle of the French invasion of Russia took place on August 16–18, 1812, between 175,000 men of the Grande Armée under Napoleon Bonaparte and 130,000 Russians under Barclay de Tolly, though only about 50,000 and 60,000 respectively were actually engaged.[…]
An initial probing force captured two suburbs but failed to bring the Russians out to battle. Napoleon ordered a general assault with three corps of the Grande Armée, supported by two hundred artillery pieces. This was initially successful, the intense artillery bombardment setting the city on fire but the French forces lacked ladders or climbing apparatus to scale the city walls and were under counter fire from Russian artillery. By nightfall, most of the city was burning. [..]
Technically the battle of Smolensk was a victory for Napoleon as he captured the city. However his soldiers were already running short of food and its destruction denied him a useful supply base, adding to the logistics problems caused later by the Russian scorched earth tactics.
In another post, Patriotic War of 1812 Blog provided [en] a timeline of the major events of the Russian Campaign, including the occupation of Moscow, as well as the Grande Armee's retreat.
1812
- August [16-18]: Battle of Smolensk.
- September 1: Moscow evacuated.
- September 7, 1812: Battle of Borodino.
- September 14: Napoleon arrives in Moscow to find the city abandoned and set alight by the inhabitants; retreating in the midst of a frigid winter, the army suffers great losses.
- October 19: Beginning of the Great Retreat.
- October 24: Battle of Maloyaroslavets.
- December 1812: last French troops are expelled from Russia.[…]
Several bloggers of the RuNet have also highlighted the various celebrations around the Russia marking the 200th anniversary of the French Retreat.
In a post last February, 1812-2012 LiveJournal blog discussed [ru] an earlier event in southern Moscow and identified even grander events to come.
The first event was already held on January 7 at the Tsaritsyno palace [ru] (now a museum and memorial grounds), which Napoleon's troops occupied in 1812. ‘Although it was somewhat improvised, around 2,000 people attended,' said the President of the International War History Association, Alexander Volkovich, who was certain that future events will draw larger crowds. Another two mass events are planned to take place at Tsaritsyno on May 18 and between June 23 and 24. During May's ‘Night of Museums' [en] festival, the Tsaritsyno mansion will host a large-scale battle reenactment, with several hundreds of people taking part in the spectacle. […] In the summertime, between June 23 and 24, Tsaritsyno will host a ball dance, reenacting the very ball in honor of Alexander I where he first learned of the start of the war.
LJ blogger Residents of Perlovka introduced [ru] an exhibit that will be on display until September, beginning by quoting Tolstoy's ‘War and Peace':
‘The Rostov train on this night was in Mytischi, 20 versts [13 miles, 21 km] from Moscow.'
The blogger then cited the exhibit's designers:
Tolstoy's references to Mytishchi in the pages of his novel inspired us to create the exhibit ‘1812. War and Peace,' which describes prominent military leaders (including Denis Davydov [en] — a pioneer of the guerrilla movement that played a vital role in the defeat of Napoleon's army), the combat valor of Russian warriors, the famous battles, the military uniforms and weapons, as well as the perspective of life in the year 1812, and of the Russian nobility in the first half of the 19th century.
Mainstream news outlets have also reported on the 200th anniversary of Russia's victory over the French. An Italian source discussed [en] how a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church has proposed making the French expulsion from Russia into a national holiday. RIA Novosti — Russia's State News Agency — provided [en] several photographs of battlefield reenactments. Voice of Russia joined the coverage, discussing [en] issues surrounding the historiography of the Russian Campaign.
Finally, this author's own blog illustrated [en] the lingering cultural effects of Russia's victory over Napoleon by recounting a past conversation with a Russian-American taxicab driver in Los Angeles:
On one occasion I'd arrived home and, when the West LA van pulled up, I noticed that the driver was the same driver who I'd met on my previous trip. He was from Russia and so I immediately spoke to him in Russian and explained to him that we'd met before. […] Two other passengers boarded the van with me. […] I translated for the driver and the four of us had a lively conversation about travel and Los Angeles, etc. until at one point the driver suddenly switched to English. He pointed to a sign that said, BISTRO and said in English, ‘Do you know why they call cafes ‘bistros'?'
I then explained in English that the Russian army had fought all the way to Paris during the Napoleonic Wars. Russian officers would sit in French cafes and they'd taunt the Parisian waiters by saying, ‘Bistro Bistro Bistro.' ‘Bistro,' I continued, was the Russian word for ‘quickly' and, as a result, cafes where patrons expect quick service have come to be known as ‘bistros.'
April 21 2012
Russia: Anti-Drug Activist Identifies Corrupt Moscow Police in Sverdlovsk
Evgeny Roizman [ru] is a controversial figure. A Yekaterinburg [en] based art-collector and former Duma deputy who supported Mikhail Prokhorov’s failed presidential bid, Roizman originally made a name for himself by establishing a non-profit fund [ru] called “A City without Drugs” [ru]. The fund both treats drug addiction and targets dealers, albeit using somewhat vigilante methods. It is known for cooperating with local law enforcement agencies, and Roizman often blogs [ru] on LiveJournal about successful raids and arrests [ru]. Some aspects of the program are especially troublesome, including accusations of use of force and kidnapping [ru] to get addicts into detox.
In spite of these allegations — and because of the fund’s success in reducing drug-related crime — Roizman is a respected politician, activist, and blogger in Yekaterinburg. Since his most recent association with Prokhorov, he has become a prominent member of the opposition, as well as last winter's protest movement. Recently, he has also helped facilitate publicity for Oleg Shein’s Astrakhan hunger strike [ru]. At the same time, his blog, together with the locally based news agency URA.RU, has been at the forefront of publicizing a police corruption scandal in Sverdlovsk Oblast.
Tackling the Racketeers
Although locals have apparently been aware of the problem for some time, Roizman first blogged about it on April 4, citing an URA.RU article about racketeering related arson [ru] at a Yekaterinburg market, and tacitly linking the arson to Sverdlovsk Oblast’s new police chief, Mikhail Borodin [ru]. Borodin and over 70 of his underlings are allegedly transplants from the Moscow police. In his post, Roizman calls these policemen “Muscovites,” and claims that they have taken up many important positions in the regional police infrastructure and are beginning to abuse their authority. “I am carefully studying the situation, and I now have a strong impression that these people are here to rob,” he concludes [ru].
Screenshot of the Sverdlovsk Oblast police website, including Mikhail Borodin's portrait, at http://66.mvd.ru.
Later that day, Roizman linked to another URA article [ru] detailing some of the alleged racketeering. The extortion is apparently centered on openair markets, one of which recently burned down. However, as Roizman himself states in the article, “They take from everyone — banks, car lots, spas, vegetable stands, even the older women who sell sunflower seeds and homemade pickles on the street. Even they pay tribute.” Roizman later elaborated [ru] that the “tribute” for the sunflower seed sellers amounts to 5,000 rubles (170 USD) per person every ten days.
How does Roizman acquire his information? The answer is that he is not afraid to solicit the public for it. In his second April 4 blog post [ru], he wrote: “Friends! If anyone has any other information about the Muscovite tribute-takers, leave it here or come to the Fund, or call me directly.” The post soon made it to a Top-25 list [ru] on Livejournal. Although many people were at first afraid of retribution and requested to stay anonymous (leading Roizman to somewhat uncharitably call them cowards [ru]), the information he has collected through such requests allowed him to pen an official inquiry to the Urals Federal Okrug [ru] (where Yekaterinburg is located) on April 9, as well as a brief to a Federal Investigatory Committee [ru] on April 18.
Roizman has described some of the extortion schemes on his blog. For instance, on April 16 he wrote [ru] that: “Several owners of mini-markets from Elmash, Vtorchermet, Viza, and so on came to me on Friday. They brought their official complaints and told me how it happens.” Roizman attached a scan [ru] of one such complaint with the names blacked out. Small-scale merchants at this particular market were each told by the police to remit 15,000 rubles (510 USD) every month. When they refused, the police confiscated their merchandise, and returned it only after the business owners had each paid 10,000 rubles (340 USD). Another incident [ru] involves a couch that one of the police chiefs extorted for his office from a local furniture factory. According to Roizman, the police chief later decided that the factory should also pay him protection money. (This version of events is challenged by a local blog with likely ties to the police, on the grounds that the couch was allegedly purchased at IKEA [ru].)
Marginalized and Stewing
With so much current focus on Astrakhan and “Pussy Riot,” the mainstream and liberal Russia media have yet to devote any real attention to Roizman's story. The noteworthy exception in this trend has been the U.S. consulate in Yekaterinburg, which called Roizman and asked him for a meeting [ru]. Roizman’s reaction was lukewarm, as was that of over 800 comments to his blog, after he revealed the Americans' interest. Nevertheless, he appears to be doing fine on his own. So far, his and URA.RU’s reporting has prompted many people to come forward and file complaints. In an interview with URA.RU [ru], Roizman said that the upper echelons of the region's police and FSB are aware of the situation, but seem to be waiting for word ‘from the top' to make their move. If that move is not made soon, he warns, the citizens of Yekaterinburg take to the streets in mass protest.
Beyond Russian police corruption (a tired trope for many), this case speaks to the increasingly contentious relationship between the Kremlin and peripheral regions like Sverdlovsk. There is bitterness in the way Roizman constantly refers to the corrupt policemen as Muscovites, seemingly implicating all those who live in Moscow and benefit from the government’s stranglehold on the periphery. If the situation continues unabated, Yekaterinburg could easily become another hotbed of regional rebellion, like Astrakhan, Ulyanovsk, and Omsk today.
Russia: Liberal Democrats Join Opposition to Ulyanovsk NATO Hub
In the last week, Vladislav Naganov and Aleksei Navalny, two of Russia's most prominent liberal democrat bloggers, entered the debate about a proposed NATO transit hub in Ulyanovsk. The transit hub (or “military base,” as critics call it) is unlike most Russian political issues that involve the North Atlantic Alliance, as the Kremlin in this instance has agreed to cooperate with (rather than resist) the West. Until recently, the public backlash was chiefly limited [GV link] to activists in the Communist Party and other factions notorious for their anti-American sentiments. The arrival of liberals like Navalny and Naganov is a powerful reminder that RuNet political mobilization can produce strange bedfellows.
Alexey Navalny attends a massive protest rally against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's rule in St. Petersburg, Russia. (2 Feb 2012) Photo by ELENA IGNATYEVA, copyright © Demotix.
Not Friends Anymore
The attack on the Ulyanovsk hub tends to be conspiratorially angry. In their April LiveJournal posts, Navalny and Naganov both accuse Putin and Russia's military leadership of being foreign spies. While Navalny's tone is largely ironic, Naganov seems to seriously believe that Putin colluded with the United States to secure American support for his reelection. Navalny jokes [ru]:
We need to find the [Russian] politicians who take orders from the global cabal and beg for scraps at NATO's offices. Channel One is silent. NTV doesn't film [GV link] ‘The Anatomy of the Military Base.' Clearly, the American spies have already infiltrated quite deeply.
Naganov, on the other hand, writes [ru] the following about the Kremlin:
These scum fool Russian citizens as a service to another country. They're all traitors to the Motherland, unashamedly masked as patriots actively battling the United States and NATO — all in order to cover their tracks and promote themselves.
In a follow-up post, Naganov states [ru] plainly:
[Putin's] seat as President of Russia was exchanged for the NATO base in Ulyanovsk, disguised by anti-Western hysterics in the media, and agreed upon [in advance] with the Americans.
Opposition leader Garry Kasparov, speaks during a protest rally against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's rule in St.Petersburg, Russia. (2 Feb 2012) Photo by ROMA YANDOLIN, copyright © Demotix.
How unusual is it for liberal democrats to attack the Kremlin for undermining Russian sovereignty? Garry Kasparov was perhaps the first liberal oppositionist to raise the conspiracy flag, blogging [ru] on the day of Putin's reelection (March 4) that Washington was curiously silent about “the gravest human rights violations in Russia,” pondering connections to Ulyanovsk as “geopolitical currency.” The election context is important to understanding how liberal democrats have reconciled themselves to joining the anti-NATO activists. Typically champions of Russia's path to integration with Western Civilization, liberal oppositionists have momentarily abandoned that line in order to lash out at American “appeasers” like Hillary Clinton and Michael McFaul (who remained “silent”), as well as sustain their campaign to deny Putin's legitimacy as President.
Every Post is a Repost Repost
Various pro-Kremlin bloggers were quick to point out [ru] that both Navalny and Naganov very clearly either misread or misrepresented Federal Resolution 219 [ru], a government ordinance enacted in 2008 that regulates the transit of military cargo over Russian soil into Afghanistan. Both bloggers listed weapons from the resolution's annex, arguing that the government had authorized NATO to transport across Russia items such as “bombs,” “lasers,” and “warships.” In reality, however, the annex is a list of weapons excluded from the Resolution's jurisdiction.
The backlash was so overwhelming that Naganov was compelled to respond with a second blog post [ru], where he explained that the Kremlin would enact separate legislation to permit the transit of lethal military cargo, now arguing that Resolution 219 “allowed” items like “tanks” and “explosives” because it did not explicitly ban them. He lashed out sarcastically:
On the whole, it's a completely idiotic situation. There are all kinds of agreements with NATO countries — but there's no permission to transport and there won't be any! The ‘Kremlin patriots' declare: ‘When they actually grant permission for transits, then we'll talk!' and Naganov and Navalny are just lying. They didn't read the documents. They aren't real lawyers. Yeah, well, we are lawyers, and you are idiots. Why on Earth then did they conclude bilateral agreements on military cargo transits in the first place? And the Americans decided to open a NATO base [in Ulyanovsk] not to transport weapons, but to ferry napkins and toilet paper from Afghanistan to the Baltics?
Was this Naganov's initial argument? The text of his original blog post contains none of this subtlety, and neither does Navalny's shorter and more moderate repost.
Whatever these bloggers' true beliefs and intentions, the RuNet debate about Ulyanovsk and Resolution 219 has produced a remarkable reversal of the usual political conflict. Activists known [en] for lobbying the Justice Department to enforce American laws against Russian citizens are now accusing the Kremlin of betraying Russian sovereignty by cooperating with NATO. Equally bizarre, pro-Kremlin bloggers (as well as avowed Stalinists [ru]) are now flocking to defend Russia's decision to better assist Washington's military effort in Afghanistan. Indications are that this debate is far from over.
April 18 2012
Russia: Astrakhan in Turmoil
Alexander Alyimov is the director of a self-created PR firm, Tochka Otsheta, and one of the most popular youth bloggers [ru] in Astrakhan. He can often be seen with Igor ‘Astranin,' the local leader of Nashi. Astranin is also a popular local blogger [ru], whose election-season activism included a visit [ru] to Moscow to attend pro-United Russia rallies last December. Both bloggers have remained closely connected to politics, and Alyimov attended both pro-Kremlin and opposition demonstrations in February. Defending one pro-Putin rally, Alyimov wrote:
Митинг организовали профсоюзы, ожидаемых сгонений всех и вся на митинг не случилось. Оно и понятно, ведь чиновники не имели к нему никакого отношения.
Alyimov gave a speech at the same rally, describing a recent encounter with, as he explained it, a rather unfortunate soul:
[…] общался с одним “оппозиционером” в жж и спросил его, что они планируют. Он ответил, что надо сметать власть. А что будет когда сметем? спросил я. И мне ответили,потом разберемся, а пока будет временный президент. Так вот я против такого подхода. Такое “потом разберемся” уже было. Оппозиция прежде чем звать нас на баррикады должна точно знать куда нас поведет. Иначе все может обернуться очень плохо. Есть гражданское общество, нет достойных лидеров в оппозиции. И поэтому я поддержу на этих выборах Путина. Хоть я постоянно и борюсь с прооизволом чиновников, я не хочу рисковать страной ради таких лидеров “оппозиции”.
Alyimov noted the low attendance at opposition protests, estimating that about half of the people who came were politicians. His blog post ends with the following emphatic denunciation:
Вы спросите почему так мало людей вышло “против” и почему очень мнгого тех кто недавно был “Против” пришли на митинг “ЗА”? Причина в лидерах, которые выводят людей на улицу. Слишком мало доверя им в современном обществе.
From Apathy to Awareness?
Navalny with a local student in Astrakhan, Russia. (14/5/2012). Photo by Anastasiya Simonenko. (Used with permission from author.)
April 10 brought unexpected change to Astrakhan: activism, famous Moscow politicians, and sizable rallies. The commentary on VKontakte [ru] was mixed:
Ничего особенного! голодовка-провокация! Шеин ничем не лучше Столярова […] вообщем шило на мыло менять нет смысла.
Шеин - лучше Столярова. Факт. Но голодовка - бессмысленна. Она ничего не изменит.
Такого митинга никогда не было! За нами следит вся страна и к субботе будет много иногородних.
An Astrakhan pro-Shein group has grown on Vkontakte, as well, with people offering their homes to visitors in town for the demonstrations.
The VKontakte Backlash
Banner in support of Oleg Shein in Astrakhan, Russia. (14/4/2012) An anonymous image widely circulated online and throughout the city.
As commentary posted to VKontakte [en] grew more intense, cynical Internet memes [en] appeared mocking the arrival of Muscovites in Astrakhan, implying foolish or sinister plots in the works. The complaints often targeted Aleksei Navalny [en], alleging a foreign infiltration of Astrakhan by outsider activists and politicians. One typical post [ru] read:
У нас в Астрахани москвичи кричат: “Это наш город” […] жесть […]
A number of image macros [en] and Photoshops also appeared, often ridiculing the arrival of “the Muscovites,” as well as deriding Oleg Shein for his hunger strike:
"You're not a mayor when you're hungry. Don't wait: have a Snickers." (14/4/2012) An anonymous image widely circulated online.
Muscovite American Pie Meme. (14/4/2012) An anonymous image widely circulated online.
Zhirinovsky Duma meme. (14/4/2012) An anonymous image widely circulated online.
In the first image above, Shein is implanted into a Snickers advertisement, encouraging him to break his hunger strike. In the next mockup, an advertisement for the latest American Pie film [en] is transformed into “Astrakhanskii Pie: Reunion,” equating Muscovites' trek to Astrakhan with a fatuous high school reunion. Finally, we find an example of a popular Zhirinovski meme. This iteration alleges that Astrakhan's protests are an import from Moscow — and that locals do not attend: “There's Navalny. There's Udaltsov and Yashin. And Sobchak is flying in, too. But where are the Astrakantsi?”
Short anecdotes have also emerged, again mocking Shein's resort to a hunger strike. VKontakte user Vasily Kamaldinov published the following joke:
“Почему Шеин голодает?” ~А Вы его фамилии наоборот прочитайте.~
(A note to non-Russian speakers: “Shein” read backwards is “ni esh,” or “don't eat!”)
A More Active Activism
All week long, Navalny traveled around Astrkahan, encouraging locals to attend the April 14 rally and tweeting pictures as he met students, civil workers, and government employees. On the day of the demonstration, opposition leaders relied on social media to mobilize and coordinate protestors after police blocked off the square originally intended for the rally. Technology, however, is not a panacea for Astrakhan's struggling opposition. Many in the city are still strangers to Internet technology, and remain equally unaware of both the Twittersphere and the political atmosphere. Traditional outreach efforts are still underway — the mid-April events were littered with the winter's signature white ribbons, and activists enthusiastically handed out buttons and flyers. Even a local night club added to the propaganda effort (as well as the confusion), by trying to use the April 14 protest as a marketing tactic.
Protest in Astrakhan, Russia. Masks depicting Astrakhan Mayor Stoliarov and Governor Bozhenov. (14/5/2012) Photo by Rikki Brown
Protest in Astrakhan, Russia (14/5/2012) Photo by Rikki Brown
“He's tired! Thievery, Promises, and Lies. On May 6, the Million Man March for honest government!” in Astrakhan, Russia. (14/5/2012). Photo by Rikki Brown
April 17 2012
Russia: An Interview With Two Astrakhan Protesters
At OpenDemocracy.net, a translation [en] of Svetlana Reiter's Esquire.ru interviews [ru] with two activists who have spent the past month hungerstriking in Astrakhan, protesting the results of the disputed mayoral election together with ex-candidate Oleg Shein. (An earlier GV text is here.)
April 16 2012
Russia: Evgeni Malkin's Journey to the 2012 Stanley Cup Playoffs
Evgeni “Geno” Malkin - a Russian-born ice hockey player who currently serves as the alternate captain for the NHL Pittsburgh Penguins - has led his team to the 2012 Stanley Cup Playoffs.
Born in the industrial city of Magnitogorsk in 1986, Evgeni played for the same Metallurg Magnitogorsk hockey club where his father had served as a defenseman. In 2003, Evgeni represented Russia in the U-18 World Hockey Championships before he was selected 2nd overall in the 2004 NHL draft. By 2009 he'd already won his first Art Ross Trophy.
During the 2012 World Junior Ice Hockey Championships, which were held in Calgary around the New Year, Russia defeated Canada 6-5 in a semi-final before ultimately losing to Sweden in the championship match. The Pens Blog captured Mr. Malkin's playful banter directed at his Canadian teammates via his Twitter account:
Pittsburgh Penguins center Evgeni Malkin skates against the Columbus Blue Jackets in a Feb. 26, 2012 game at Consol Energy Center in Pittsburgh, PA. Photo by Michael Miller (Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0).
As you probably know, Russia defeated Canada in a semi-final game at the World Junior Hockey Championship tonight. Evgeni Malkin spent the night trolling on Twitter. James Neal got in the act as well. […]
What we've learned from this is that Crosby, Staal, Fleury and Asham each owe Malkin $100.00. Too bad the Pens don't have any Swedish players for the final.
Here are some of the specific tweets the post cited:
@malkin71_ here they come geno
I cant wait see Canada lose tonight!!!
Whats the score Canada)))))?????
Thanks boys))))#87,11,29,45-100$ tomorow please)))))
Anything can happen. What a game. Tough loss for the Canadian boys. Ur lucky this time @malkin71_
Fathead Sports Blog discussed in a February post how Mr. Malkin had taken a leadership role in the absence of the Penguin's Captain, Sydney Crosby:
Even with Sidney Crosby injured, Evgeni Malkin is having an amazing season. Within a three week span in January 2011, Crosby fell to a concussion and Malkin suffered a devastating knee injury. For a team that’s expected to perennially contend for the Stanley Cup, having their future Hall of Famers in doubt was worrisome.
While it’s unfortunate that Sidney Crosby is still sidelined with lingering effects of a concussion, Malkin has dominated this season. One would never guess that he shredded his knee not too long ago because he’s playing at such a high level. At this time, Malkin is leading the NHL with 78 points and has the Penguins looking like the Cup contender they’re supposed to be.
Because of Malkin, the Penguins are currently fourth in the Eastern Conference standings. He has scored five points in a game a remarkable five times this season. Five times! In the modern day NHL, that is simply astounding.
In March, Mr. Malkin's intensity of play led to a discussion as to whether or not he should have been suspended for a hit on Boston Bruins defenseman Johnny Boychuk:
According to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, the boarding minor Malkin received in the Penguins' victory over the Bruins on Saturday will be the extent of his punishment: No suspension, no fine, just time served.
Seth Rorabaugh of Empty Netters has it right: This was a trifecta in Malkin's favor. No immediate injury, no prior history of illegal hits and there's enough gray area in Boychuk's last-second turn to the boards that supplemental discipline gets a little murky.
In April, both English- and Russian-language sources reported that Mr. Malkin had scored his 50th goal of the season, which was all the more remarkable because, (1) the season had been relatively low-scoring across the league, and, (2) Mr. Malkin himself had been forced to miss several games due to an injury to his knee.
CBS Sports Blog announced the goal in an April 7 post and also mentioned that Mr. Malkin had secured his second Art Ross Trophy for leading the league in scoring points at the end of the regular season:
Entering Saturday's game against Philadelphia it was pretty much already decided that Evgeni Malkin was going to finish as the NHL's leading scorer and win his second Art Ross Trophy. And that's exactly what he's going to do, as he will finish the regular season with 109 points, leaving a pretty significant gap between himself and the second leading point producer in the NHL, Tampa Bay's Steven Stamkos.
And Malkin did it while playing in just 75 games. His 1.45 points per game average pretty much blew everybody else away.
The only question that remained unanswered for Malkin was whether or not he would score his 50th goal of the season. Late in the second period, with the Penguins already up 3-2, he did just that by moving into the center of the ice and beating Flyers goalie Sergei Bobrovsky with a wrist shot.
StarSport.com - a Russian-language news outlet - announced Mr. Malkin's 50th goal of the season on April 8. A few days later, a Russian-language Twitter user posted a YouTube video of Malkin's training exercises.
Looking ahead to the Stanley Cup playoffs, Mr. Malkin thanked the fans via his Twitter account in both English and Russian:
#Pens fans are the best- always support me & team! Thank you for everything! Can't wait for playoffs- Be loud :)
Спасибо всем!!!Спасибо за вашу поддержку,переживания и теплые слова-хороший сезон,но впереди самое интересное)))Хорошего Вам настроения)))
The Penguins have lost their first three Stanley Cup playoff games against their instate rivals, the Philadelphia Flyers. Game 4 will be played in Philadelphia on April 18.
April 13 2012
Russia: Proposed NATO Hub in Ulyanovsk Sparks Protests
“There are no ‘NATO bases' in Russia” [ru], tweeted Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin on March 15, a couple of days after news agencies reported on plans for a NATO transport hub based in Russia [ru]. The perpetual Communist Party (KPRF) leader Gennady Ziuganov was not convinced, tweeting a few days later: “The NATO base in Ulyanovsk – presents from Putin to the USA for recognizing [Russia's presidential] elections” [ru], and further calling it a “betrayal.” This quasi-exchange exemplifies the hubbub over a transport hub that will be based on an airfield in Ulyanovsk [en], a medium sized city on the Volga River, and the birthplace of Vladimir Lenin. On one side is a scandalized Russian Internet community, along with opposition politicians milking the scandal; on the other are government officials trying to downplay the incident.
Russian politician Dmitry Rogozin giving a press conference in Moscow, 2/22/2011, photo by A.SAVIN. CC BY-SA 3.0; Wikimedia Commons.
Rogozin was reacting to a wave of online indignation that has since spread to the streets, leading to hunger strikes and anti-NATO marches in Ulyanovsk and Moscow. He has since continued to tweet emphatically about the situation, blaming the spreading resentment on “provocateurs.” After all, when Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made the initial announcement, he made it clear that the hub supporting NATO’s Afghanistan mission would be used for the transport of only “non-lethal” equipment and for refueling. The Foreign Ministry was later careful to dispel worries [ru] that the new “base” will be anything but a transport hub, or that NATO personnel would be stationed there.
Unfortunately, Russians’ mistrust of both NATO and their own government means that no agents provocateurs are necessary to incite discontent. In fact, the “move along, nothing to see here” line serves only to encourage accusations of conspiracy. The analysis in Russian blogs ranges from the potential use of Ulyanovsk to transport Afghani drugs to Russia [ru] to flippant calls [ru] for an analogous Russian base in the USA or Europe. According to many bloggers, Putin is either betraying vital national interests [ru] in order to soften his now-completed presidential campaign's militant rhetoric, or there is some quid-pro-quo [ru] between European missile defense and the Ulyanovsk base. And, of course, there is the sacrilege of tying the anti-Communist alliance to the birth place of the founder of Russian Communism. (Photo.)
KPRF has in fact been at the forefront of opposition to the hub in Ulyanovsk. On March 19 [ru], the communists organized the first anti-NATO meeting. Although it was small, the subsequent March 26 [ru] “No to NATO” protest, also organized by the local KPRF branch, drew around 300 people. The April 7 march [ru] was even more numerous, drawing approximately one thousand protestors. However, members of the fringe political party “Will of the People” claim [ru] that they, along with other nationalist groups, made up most of the crowd. “Will of the People” advertised the march on its blog [ru], as well as on the newly created “Ulyanovsk without NATO” [ru]. (Photo.)
Anti-NATO protests in Moscow, 4/5/2010, photo by ILYA VARLAMOV, copyright © Demotix.
Communists and nationalists seem to be the only major opponents of the base. So far, Eduard Limonov’s “Other Russia” [en] movement has been the only liberal opposition group to register protest with its “The Foreign Ministry is a Den of Traitors” [ru] action on April 5 in Moscow. Even Aleksei Navalny, a darling of both nationalists and liberals, has not commented on the issue. Nashi and other pro-Kremlin activists, the usual suspects staging anti-NATO protests, are also conspicuously silent. Perhaps they were satisfied by ministerial assurances.
The communists were not satisfied, however, launching a hunger strike on April 8 [ru] at the Ulyanovsk airport slated for the base. Although their encampment has since been dismantled by the police [ru], they plan to continue the strike at least until April 21 [ru]. This hunger strike has been drawing much less attention than the one in Astrakhan [en], although it looks like KPRF has been using search engine optimization [ru] to increase public awareness. Incidentally, some local bloggers believe that the strike is driven by the desire of Nairi Chatinian, a factory owner and a local KPRF committee member, to move into bigger politics [ru] or perhaps take over the leadership [ru] of the local party machine.
On March 26, the NATO General Secretary tried to alleviate some the above fears [ru] by stating that NATO has no plans for a “base” in Russia. Vladimir Putin reiterated this when he addressed the Duma on April 11, saying [en]:
I assure you that nothing unusual, not corresponding to our national interests, is happening there. On the contrary, everything that is being done in this sphere fully corresponds to the national interests of our people.
Indeed, if ever there is a NATO base established in Russia, Vladimir Putin is probably the only political leader who could get away with it. Until then, the facts on the ground don’t really matter. Without mutual trust, the Kremlin and members of the opposition will simply continue to talk past each other.
Russia: Ilya Varlamov, Omsk's Blogger-Mayor?
As the Moscow opposition adjusts to the reality of Vladimir Putin's return to the Kremlin, there are growing indications that the capital's activists and protesters are seeking to reestablish last winter's momentum by relocating their efforts to Russia's regions. In the last week, dozens if not hundreds of Muscovites have pilgrimaged to the southern city of Astrakhan, to support a local politician's hunger strike against last month's vote, which he claims was falsified. More than 1,500 miles to the northeast, in the city of Omsk, an activist group has arranged online primaries for opposition candidates to stand in the city's June mayoral election.
Going Digital
The virtual election is not new to the Russian opposition. In October 2010, tens of thousands of Internet users elected [ru] Aleksei Navalny to replace Yuri Luzhkov as mayor of Moscow. (Not an elected office, President Medvedev later appointed Sergei Sobyanin to serve in this position.) Navalny's virtual triumph that October was an important step to attaining the political celebrity he enjoys today.
In a LiveJournal post earlier this year, blogger Vladislav Naganov addressed the protest movement's collapse by advocating [ru] the adoption of primaries:
Generally speaking, the time has come to organize full-fledged primaries within the opposition. We can't continue as we have for much longer. We need to determine a real leader once and for all.
“Citizen Mayor” [ru] is a virtual primaries project initiated by activists in Omsk, designed to nominate a single individual to represent the city's united opposition. In a strange turn of events, photographer and popular blogger Ilya Varlamov has suddenly become the most likely winner of the “Citizen Mayor” contest, which will conclude its final round of voting [ru] on Monday, April 16.
The Joke That Has Fewer and Fewer Laughing
Russian blogger Ilya Varlamov in Moscow. Photo by VITALIY RAGULIN, (04/08/11) CC BY-SA 3.0; Wikimedia Commons.
Varlamov's candidacy started as a joke [ru] on social networks like Twitter, producing a meme that typically began “if Varlamov becomes Omsk mayor,” and followed with a humorously optimistic comment. For instance, one user tweeted: “If Varlamov becomes Omsk mayor, we'll just secede from the state and organize a mini-paradise there.” Another young woman in St. Petersburg wrote: “If Varlamov becomes mayor of Omsk, I'll leave Peter[sburg] and return to my homeland [in Omsk].”
Initially, Varlamov admitted that he could not take his candidacy seriously, telling journalists on April 5:
First, because I've only been to Omsk once, and it was only for a couple of days, and to nominate [yourself] to be head of a city that you don't know is strange, to say the least. Second, I don't want to mix politics with some kind of performance, which the campaign could become if I participate.
Five days later, however, Varlamov announced a change of heart, admitting that his running for Omsk mayor is “at first glance, entirely absurd,” but he promised the public “the funnest, loudest campaign in the history of Russian mayoral races.” He wrote [ru] in his LJ blog:
We'll bring a new level of discussion to questions about government transparency and the urban environment of Russian cities. When we're done, our issues will be the main issues of every election across the country.
In lieu of an Omsk-tailored political platform, Varlamov directed readers to an April 3 post, titled “Ten Steps: Moscow for People,” which set out ten priorities for improving urban life in Russia's capital. (Varlamov's text focuses on improving public transit, bicycle and disabled access, architectural aesthetics, and so on.) Explaining the transposition of his Moscow initiative onto Omsk, Varlamov said:
Omsk is a small Moscow. Problems everywhere are the same. First we'll put things in order there, and then across all of Russia.
Varlamov also named a handful of individuals who will join his Omsk campaign, including the mega-popular LJ blogger Artemy Lebedev, who summed up [ru] the team's plan with a characteristic flourish of profanity:
The plan is simple: Varlamov becomes the mayor of Omsk (and not on fucking Foursquare, but for real), he brings his team with him, and some decent city management begins.
Lebedev then added:
Today, Omsk is one of the country's most fucked over cities.
Going into some detail, Lebedev went on to describe his plans for the architectural redesign of Omsk, listing various types of bureaucrats and buildings that would be slated for destruction, should Varlamov win the election. “The old farts,” he wrote about the city's existing government, “will be ousted in disgrace, and left to sell sunflower seeds outside the entrances of tomorrow's construction sites.”
Winners and Losers
While campaigns like Varlamov's in Omsk and Navalny's in Astrakhan might represent exciting new directions for Moscow's opposition movement, what consequences could this projection of influence have on local actors?
Igor Fedorov is one of Omsk's most popular locally-based bloggers. Six years before Ilya Varlamov was even born, Fedorov settled in Omsk, where he has lived ever since. Though he is unlikely to defeat Varlamov, Fedorov has posted to his LJ account a far more detailed campaign program [ru], including a sober analysis [ru] of municipal revenue prospects. (He notes that 84% of the city's budget relies on three taxes that legally cannot be raised until 2013.) While Fedorov proposes many ideas that mirror Varlamov's “10 Steps,” he breaks with the Muscovite photographer on several issues that seem to carry local significance, such as celebrations for the upcoming 300-year anniversary of Omsk's founding, as well as the need to balance public transportation development with the completion of construction already underway on automobile roads. In a particularly telling distinction, Varlamov promises to import foreign specialists from America and Europe to beautify Omsk, whereas Fedorov claims [ru] that the city's ideal model should be Pavlodar, Kazakhstan [en], which he “was lucky enough” to have visited on a business trip earlier this year.
In preliminary voting [ru], Fedorov led Varlamov in support on LiveJournal, though the latter finished well ahead in the overall tally. If Varlamov indeed takes the nomination and registers to campaign officially in Omsk, will it signal a victory for the democratic process and a second wind for the opposition, or could it threaten to make a mockery of both?
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