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September 01 2013

Syria Statement - International Crisis Group

Syria Statement - International Crisis Group
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/mena/syria-statement.aspx

To precisely gauge in advance the impact of a U.S. military attack, regardless of its scope and of efforts to carefully calibrate it, by definition is a fool’s errand.  In a conflict that has settled into a deadly if familiar pattern - and in a region close to boiling point - it inevitably will introduce a powerful element of uncertainty.  Consequences almost certainly will be unpredictable.  Still, several observations can be made about what it might and might not do:

A military attack will not, nor can it, be met with even minimal international consensus; in this sense, the attempt to come up with solid evidence of regime use of chemical weapons, however necessary, also is futile.  Given the false pretenses that informed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and, since then, regional and international polarisation coupled with the dynamics of the Syrian conflict itself, proof put forward by the U.S. will be insufficient to sway disbelievers and skepticism will be widespread.

It might discourage future use of chemical weapons by signaling even harsher punishment in the event of recidivism - an important achievement in and of itself.  Should the regime find itself fighting for its survival, however, that consideration might not weigh heavily.  Elements within the opposition also might be tempted to use such weapons and then blame the regime, precisely in order to provoke further U.S. intervention.

It could trigger violent escalation within Syria as the regime might exact revenge on rebels and rebel-held areas, while the opposition seeks to seize the opportunity to make its own gains.  
Major regional or international escalation (such as retaliatory actions by the regime, Iran or Hizbollah, notably against Israel) is possible but probably not likely given the risks involved, though this could depend on the scope of the strikes.

Military action, which the U.S. has stated will not aim at provoking the regime’s collapse, might not even have an enduring effect on the balance of power on the ground.  Indeed, the regime could register a propaganda victory, claiming it had stood fast against the U.S. and rallying domestic and regional opinion around an anti-Western, anti-imperialist mantra. 

Ultimately, the principal question regarding a possible military strike is whether diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict can be reenergized in its aftermath.  Smart money says they will not: in the wake of an attack they condemn as illegal and illegitimate, the regime and its allies arguably will not be in a mood to negotiate with the U.S. Carefully calibrating the strike to hurt enough to change their calculations but not enough to prompt retaliation or impede diplomacy is appealing in theory.  In practice, it almost certainly is not feasible.  

Whether or not the U.S. chooses to launch a military offensive, its responsibility should be to try to optimize chances of a diplomatic breakthrough.  This requires a two-fold effort lacking to date: developing a realistic compromise political offer as well as genuinely reaching out to both Russia and Iran in a manner capable of eliciting their interest - rather than investing in a prolonged conflict that has a seemingly bottomless capacity to escalate.  

In this spirit, the U.S. should present - and Syria’s allies should seriously and constructively consider - a proposal based on the following elements:

1- It is imperative to end this war . The escalation, regional instability and international entanglement its persistence unavoidably stimulates serve nobody’s interest.

2- The only exit is political . That requires far-reaching concessions and a lowering of demands from all parties. The sole viable outcome is a compromise that protects the interests of all Syrian constituencies and reflects rather than alters the regional strategic balance;

3- The Syrian crisis presents an important opportunity to test whether the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran can work together on regional issues to restore stability;

4- ...

(...)

Reposted byiranelection iranelection

August 15 2013

Marching in Circles : Egypt's Dangerous Second Transition - International Crisis Group, 7 août 2013

Marching in Circles : Egypt’s Dangerous Second Transition - International Crisis Group, 7 août 2013
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/egypt/b035-marching-in-circles-egypts-second-transition.aspx

Article très intéressant, il aborde des points essentiels et la fin est particulièrement juste, l’actu le prouve.

By taking advantage of a favourable balance of power and rushing to create a new political order that essentially marginalised losers, they put the country’s stability at risk and hope of a return to normalcy out of reach. Only this time around, the cost of failure could well include political violence at a level not experienced by Egypt since the early 1990s.

#ICG

June 28 2013

Les métastases du conflit syrien Un remarquable rapport (

Les métastases du conflit syrien

Un remarquable rapport (http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/143-syrias-metastasising-conflicts.aspx) de l'International Crisis Group sur la Syrie, qui explique l'impasse actuelle.

A noter cette petite phrase qui explique que les Russes ont transmis un message du Hezbollah à Israël que Tel-Aviv ne devait pas s'inquiéter de son intervention en Syrie.

A senior Russian official brushed aside the prospect Syria might become an arena for a wider confrontation of this type, asserting that Hizbollah had asked him to convey messages to Israel stressing that it should not consider the Shiite movement's involvement in its neighbour's war as a threat.

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